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An Empirical Examination of the Dark Side of Relationship Marketing Within a Business
to Business Context
Brent L. Baker
ABSTRACT
A large number of empirical studies have illustrated the benefits of adopting and
implementing a relational or relationship marketing strategy. However, there is an
emergent stream of literature that suggests that despite the recognized benefits associated
with this strategy there may also be a dark side that manifests itself between firms as a
result of adopting a relationship marketing strategy. However, though this stream of
literature recognizes the presence of the dark side, causal antecedents mediating the dark
side constructs, or consequences of the dark side have yet to be theoretically derived,
explained or empirically tested.
This dissertation constructs theoretical relationships between common relational
constructs, such as trust and commitment and dark side symptoms such as relational
myopia, complacency, vulnerability and suspicion. This dissertation also examines how
these dark side symptoms, upon their onset, can yield negative consequences for the
firms that have adopted the relationship marketing strategy. Data from a diverse set of
business to business (B2B) relationships (N=305) was gathered to test the structural
model implicit in the theoretical propositions presented in this dissertation. The results
support the hypothesized notion of a dark side to B2B relationships as the relational
vi

constructs of shared values, commitment, trust, and satisfaction were all found to have a
positive, significant relationship with elements of the dark side. These results are
discussed in detail within the chapters of this dissertation.

vii

Chapter One: Introduction
Relational marketing (RM) or the notions of relational exchange has assumed a
predominant position within the marketing literature. Large numbers of empirical studies
have illustrated the benefits of adopting a relational perspective for implementing and
governing business to business (B2B) exchange relationships. However, there is a small
body of emergent literature that suggests there might be negative consequences or a dark
side to implementing the RM strategy. For example, in an effort to explain the limited
effects of involvement and commitment on research use, Moorman, Zaltman, &
Deshphande (1992) suggest that members of a long term B2B relationship may lose their
ability to objectively evaluate each other. They also suggest that the relationship may
become stale and or boring which may inhibit new ideas. Grayson and Ambler (1999)
empirically investigated Moorman, Zaltman, & Desphande‟s (1992) suggestions
regarding long term B2B relationships and the proposed weakening of relational
constructs in business relationships over time. Though Grayson and Ambler (1999) were
able to support the weakening of certain relational constructs, interpreted as the existence
and manifestation of the dark side, the authors were unable to offer an explanation for
this manifestation. Other authors, such as Hibbard et al. (2001) and Pressey and Tzokas
(2004) have directly investigated the existence of the dark side and have been consistent
in their support for the phenomenon. However, the explanation for “why” B2B
relationships often develop this down or negative side is not as well explained.
1

Anderson and Jap (2005) recently provided anecdotal accounts of the dark side of
B2B relationships. The authors suggest that such things as (1) immediate benefits, (2)
interpersonal relationships between boundary spanners and (3) transaction specific
investments all provide initial benefits for the firms involved but begin to yield negative
effects with the passage of time. Also, though the authors do offer suggestions for
avoiding or suppressing the dark side, the identification of the causal factors provoking
its onset remains unclear.
The above review provides evidence of marketing‟s recognition of the dark side
phenomenon. However, although scholars have mentioned the dark side, they have never
discussed its operationalizations in a systemic manner. Figure one below illustrates the
relationships between oft studied relational constructs such as trust, commitment,
satisfaction et al. (c.f. Palmatier et al. 2006; Palmatier, Dant and Grewal 2007) and the
dark side constructs of relational myopia, complacency, vulnerability and suspicion. The
model also illustrates how these dark side constructs may be related to relationship
strength as well as how the length of the relationship or time, as labeled in the model, will
moderate the relationships between the relational constructs and the dark side constructs.
The following dissertation theoretically develops and empirically investigates many of
the common relational constructs familiar to the RM literature (c.f. Palmatier et al. 2006;
Palmatier, Dant, and Grewal 2007), as potential antecedents to certain dark side
symptoms. The dark side elements investigated in this dissertation consists of relational
myopia, complacency, vulnerability and suspicion. Though perhaps counterintuitive this
dissertation suggest that relational antecedents typically viewed as positive influences on
B2B relationships may lead to these darks side constructs.
2

After reviewing the relevant literature this dissertation explores the shared values
construct, reviewing its various conceptualizations, operationalizations and definitions
within the B2B context. This dissertation also explores how shared values may lead to a
shared but narrowed view of the business environment labeled within this dissertation as
relational or relationship myopia.
Following the shared values discussion, this dissertation discusses how commitment
can lead to the onset of several dark side symptoms. Specifically, this dissertation
examines how different components of commitment are related to such things as a
narrowed or myopic view of the exchange relationship and complacent attitudes toward
the relationship and the business environment. How these complacent and myopic views
may constrict an organization‟s ability to take advantage of the opportunities presented to
them via the business environment with which they operate is also discussed.
This dissertation also explores the dark side constructs of vulnerability and suspicion
and how they relate to firms in a committed B2B relationship. Just as relational myopia
and complacency can be provoked via relational constructs such as commitment, feelings
of vulnerability and suspicion are also believed to manifest and can be directly
attributable to relational constructs such as trust, satisfaction and commitment. For
example, as firms become more integrated with their exchange partner(s) they allow
themselves to become more transparent and this exposure will naturally lead to feelings
of vulnerability and suspicion.
Trust and commitment are two of the more heavily studied relational constructs in the
RM literature (Palmatier et al. 2006). The recent meta-analysis published by Palmatier et
al. (2006), investigating the factors that influence RM effectiveness, found 146 and 96
3

separate effects between trust and commitment respectively. By comparison, this same
meta-analysis only found 36 effects between antecedents to relational mediators and
relationship quality. Though often cited as one of the more important constructs needed
for B2B relationship development (e.g. Dwyer Schurr and Oh 1987; Morgan and Hunt
1994) this dissertation suggest that trust may also act as an antecedent for all of the dark
side symptoms mentioned above. For example, a focal firm may trust a distributor to
deliver a high demand product vital for the focal firm‟s success. Without that product,
the focal firm will not be able to deliver this product to their customers, which could cost
the focal firm customers, profitability and damage to their reputation. As these negative
consequences become a reality the focal firm will attribute the realization of these
consequences to their distributor‟s inability to deliver as expected (and obviously as
needed). It makes sense that in such a scenario, the focal firm will feel anger toward their
partnering firm but also vulnerable upon realizing that the trust in their partnering firm
left them exposed to their partnering firm‟s potential failure. In other words, instead of
working to secure delivery themselves, the focal firm believes their partnering firm will
deliver as promised. Delivery failure of course can be harmful to the focal firm but
initially may not be something that is even considered. It is not until the partnering firm
fails to deliver that the focal firm realizes it misplaced its trust as feelings of vulnerability
are provoked. The above example illustrates how trust may lead to the onset of
vulnerability.
Just as trust and commitment have been studied extensively within the B2B literature
(Palmatier et al. 2006) satisfaction has also received a significant amount of attention
(e.g. Garbarino and Johnson 1999; Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995). Just as this
4

dissertation explores how the seemingly positive relational constructs of shared values,
trust and commitment can lead to negative effects or outcomes for the firms engaged in
the relationship it also analyzes satisfaction and its relationships with the dark side. The
proposition that firms that are satisfied with their exchange partners can be affected by
the dark side may initially be counterintuitive but with a deeper analysis of these
constructs the relationship to the dark side becomes more apparent. For instance, if a
firm that is satisfied with the financial rewards associated with being involved in a certain
business relationship is focused solely on these financial rewards with little to no
attention on the relationship itself, then their view of the relationship is analogous to the
myopic firm as originally proposed by Leavitt (1960). If an economically satisfied firm
has not acknowledged the other aspects of the relationship then it is possible their narrow
or shortsighted view is blinding the firm to issues that may need attention or relational
opportunities that may further enhance relational performance. Regardless of what the
firm is missing by having such a narrow focus toward the financial aspects of the
relationship, the point remains that the firm‟s view toward the relationship is narrower
than what it could be and thus the satisfied firm, as described in this example, is
relationally myopic. This hypothetical example illustrates just one possibility of how
satisfaction may hasten the onset of the dark side symptom of relational myopia.
Satisfaction is believed to have the ability to also hasten the other dark side symptoms
discussed in this dissertation. These relationships are theoretically derived and explored
in more detail in Chapter two of this dissertation.
Alluded to above, is the idea that these dark side relationships become a destructive
force for B2B relationships when they begin to hinder or in some other way inhibit
5

relational performance. This runs counter to most of the current RM literature as the
notion that employing an RM strategy yields positive benefits for the firm employing the
strategy is fairly well supported (Palmatier et al. 2006). However, there is no consensus
regarding which relational constructs influence performance the most or are most
important for the success of the RM strategy (Palmatier et al. 2006). For instance, some
researchers suggest that trust and commitment are most important (e.g. Morgan and Hunt
1994) while others believe trust by itself is most important (Doney and Cannon 1997).
Still, others suggest commitment should be regarded as the most important relational
construct. Yet, others believe that a more global measure, such as relationship quality,
consisting of trust, commitment and satisfaction is the most appropriate way of
measuring an RM strategy‟s influence on performance (e.g. Kumar, Scheer, and
Steenkamp 1995).
This dissertation deviates significantly from this line of thinking by suggesting that
not only can the dark side manifest in B2B relationships it can also influence the strength
of the B2B relationship. This dissertation explores the relationships between relational
constructs and the dark side as well as how these relationships influence relationship
strength which is believed to influence perceptions of performance.
Finally, time is expected to moderate the relationships between the relational
constructs and the dark side symptoms. Exactly how much time must pass before the
dark side will set in is impossible to pinpoint as each B2B relationship will advance
through the relationship development phases (c.f. Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987) at
differing rates, depending on such things as the industry, firm personnel and frequency of
contact. However, regardless of industry, time will have to pass to let the B2B
6

relationships develop to the point where the dark side can manifest. Although the amount
of time needed may be shorter in one industry than in another, there is no denying the
importance of time as a moderating variable on the relationships between the relational
constructs and the dark side symptoms discussed in this dissertation.
An empirical study was conducted in an effort to test the hypothesized relationships
proposed in this dissertation. As the relational constructs used in this dissertation have
already received significant empirical attention, the items used to measure these relational
constructs in this dark side study have been adapted from this existing body of work.
However, the dark side constructs examined in this dissertation have yet to receive any
empirical attention within the B2B literatures. Therefore, items have been adapted from
several other disciplines and research settings. The appropriateness of each item is
argued deductively and discussed in greater detail in chapter three of this dissertation.
Given the exploratory nature of this study, a battery of items based on the constitutive
definitions of these dark side constructs is also developed. These items are also discussed
more fully in chapter three of this dissertation.
Six qualitative interviews were conducted prior to the empirical portion of the study.
The interviews provide qualitative data that can be used to help theoretically derive
relationships between constructs, as well as support hypothesized directionality,
something that is difficult to do using only a cross sectional empirical study. Interviews
were conducted with people from both sides of the relationship dyad. Three buyers and
three sellers were asked to talk about their beliefs and experiences as it pertains to B2B
relationships and the onset of dark side. B2B relationship managers on the buying side of
the dyad produced 305 usable surveys used for the empirical examination of the dark
7

side. The empirical results support the hypotheses that over time, shared values,
commitment, trust, and satisfaction do have a significant relationship with three of the
four dark side constructs introduced in this dissertation. The details of this empirical
study, as well as a detailed interpretation of these results are discussed in chapters three
and four of this dissertation.
Given the broad acceptance, support and implementation of the relational marketing
paradigm, knowledge of its shortcomings will be invaluable insight to practitioners, firms
and industries embracing the processes that the relational exchange paradigm promotes.
Relationship marketing can be costly and demanding on a firm‟s resources. Insight into
where and why relationships begin to fail should prove financially advantageous for firms
investing in developing relational exchange norms and processes. These insights will
also prove useful when evaluating a firm‟s long versus short term business relationships.
The ability to spot potential causes of future dark side behaviors should provide firms the
ability to stop these behaviors before they have had a chance to fully manifest resulting in
destructive consequences. This ability will not only save the firm money, time and
resources it may also provide the firm the ability to maintain profitable B2B relationships
that may have otherwise disintegrated. In turn, it would allow firms objectivity needed to
sever B2B relationships that have stopped being profitable or have otherwise become
destructive. A more detailed discussion of these implications is presented in chapter five
of this dissertation. This chapter thoroughly discusses the theoretical and managerial
implications of the results of this dissertation. Limitations and suggestions for further
research are also suggested in this final chapter.
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Figure 1: Dark Side Structural Model
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Chapter 2: The Dark Side of Relationship Marketing
Relationship marketing (RM) has received considerable attention in both business and
academic circles in recent years (Palmatier et al. 2006; Srinivasan and Moorman 2005).
This considerable amount of attention is understandable given the positive outcomes
generally associated with adopting a RM strategy. Specifically, successful B2B
relationships have been recognized as a significant contributor to a firm‟s financial
performance as well as increased efficiencies, expanded markets, reduced costs and
greater innovation (Cannon and Homburg 2001; Palmatier, Dant and Grewal 2007;
Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001). Other more relational benefits of a successful B2B
relationship include: greater cooperation (Palmatier, Dant and Grewal 2007), reduced
opportunism (Ganesan 1994) increased commitment (Verhoef, Franses, and Hoekstra
2002) and greater satisfaction (Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 1999).
Given all of the benefits of actively seeking out and maintaining B2B relationships, all
of the academic and managerial attention RM has received certainly seems warranted.
However, there is an emerging body of literature that suggests that RM isn‟t without its
dark side and may even carry the seeds of its own destruction (Anderson and Jap 2005;
Grayson and Ambler 1999; Hibbard et al. 2001; Pressey and Tzokas 2004). Some of the
characteristics of this dark side include: the deterioration of relationship strength over
time (Grayson and Ambler 1999; Hibbard et al. 2001; Moorman, Zaltman, and
Desphande 1992), declining relationship interest over time (Bennett 1996) and firms, due
10

to inertia, remaining in unprofitable or inefficient relationships long after they should
have been terminated (Haytko 2004; Young, and Danize 1994).
This dark side of business to business relationships (B2B) should not be confused with
implementing a RM strategy where one is not appropriate. For instance Rao and Perry
(2002) conclude that such things as the type of product or service being marketed, the
potential exchange partner‟s receptivity toward having a relationship, the firm‟s industry
and internal organization are all factors that need to be considered when deciding whether
or not implementing a RM strategy is appropriate. Given the expense associated with
RM it is easy to see how if the above factors are not conducive to such implementation
the strategy might yield negative and costly results (Rao and Perry 2002).
The dark side is also not to be confused with poor implementation of the relationship
strategy (e.g. Colgate and Danaher 2000; Colgate and Lang 2005). Poor implementation
isn‟t so much a strategic issue as it is a problem with execution. The dark side of B2B
relationships is believed to lie within RM itself. That is, the adoption of a RM strategy is
itself believed to lead to such dark side symptoms as complacency, relational myopia,
vulnerability and suspicion regardless of the appropriateness of the strategy or how well
the strategy is implemented.
The following discussion briefly reviews RM including its origin and how it has
evolved into one of the dominant areas of interest within the marketing and B2B
literature. The following discussion also provides a detailed and descriptive review of the
relevant but limited dark side RM literatures. Drawing from this literature and several
other areas within the marketing domain, a formal definition of the dark side is then
presented. Using this definition as a guide this dissertation draws from several areas and
11

theoretical domains such as management, social psychology and the marketing exchange
literature to develop a nomological network illustrating several key relational constructs
and their influence on several dark side symptoms. The relational constructs of
commitment, trust, shared values, and satisfaction are discussed in relation to the dark
side of B2B relationships. Specifically, how these relational constructs may provoke the
onset of such dark side symptoms as complacency, myopia, vulnerability and suspicion
as well as how the dark side subsequently influences relationship strength and
performance. Finally, the moderating role of time is introduced as this variable is
believed to be crucial in any investigation involving the dark side of B2B relationships in
that it is the inexorable passage of time that is purported to convert a functional B2B
relationship into a dysfunctional one. Drawing from this discussion, testable hypotheses
relating these constructs to the dark side as well as the dark side to relationship strength
and subsequently, performance are also presented.
Theoretical Development and Literature Review
Relationship marketing has its roots in social exchange theory. Social exchange
theory is a psychological theory derived from the work of Thibaut and Kelley (1959),
used for explaining human behavior within groups. The theory is rooted in the notions of
reciprocal exchange. The reciprocal rule dictates that as one individual gives, another
person returns, in some measure, what was given (Bothamley 1993; Thibaut and Kelley
1959). The balance of this exchange is not always equal however. Social exchange
theory explains that how an individual feels about a relationship and the exchanges
within the relationship are dependent on the individual‟s perceptions of (1) the difference
between what is put into the relationship and exchange versus what is returned (2) the
12

kind of relationship we feel we deserve and (3) the chances of having a better relationship
with someone else or the attractiveness of alternatives (Thibaut and Kelley 1959).
Comparison level and a comparison level for alternatives are used for calculating
what is fair regarding the outcomes of exchange (Kelley and Thibaut 1978). Anderson
and Narus (1984) defined the comparison level in the channels of distribution context as
(p. 63) “…a standard representing the quality of outcomes the distributor (manufacturer)
has come to expect from a given kind of relationship, based upon present and past
experience with similar relationships, and knowledge of other distributors‟
(manufacturers) similar relationships. The results of the exchange relationship are
compared against this standard and determine the attractiveness of the relationship and of
the exchange itself.” The comparison level of alternatives can be defined, within the
channels of distribution context as “…a standard that represents the average quality of
outcomes that are available from the best alternative exchange relationship” (Anderson
and Narus p. 63). The comparison level of alternatives can be seen as a sort of zero point
or the lowest level required for the comparison level standard to remain the most
attractive choice. If the comparison level of alternatives is higher or rather the perceived
benefits of an alternative relationship exceed those of the current relationship then
exchange partners should be expected to switch to the more attractive relationship.
Kelley and Thibaut (1978) do say however, that the emotional, social or legal costs
associated with switching to the more rewarding relationship may simply be too
restrictive to affect such a change.
Drawing from social exchange theory, many marketing researchers began to shift their
emphases to the marketing relationship. For example, Bagozzi (1978) argued that
13

relationships are the essence of marketing. Hunt (1983) echoed similar sentiments when
he argued that the primary focus of marketing is the exchange relationship. Arndt (1979)
believed that long term buyer seller relationships are important for the growth of
domesticated markets. Other works in the marketing literature that illustrates the shift
toward a relational focus in the marketing literature include (Ferber 1970; Kotler 1972;
Kotler and Levy 1969).
It is with this focus on the relationship within the marketing context that the notion
of RM was born. Many definitions of RM have been introduced (Hultman and Shaw
2003). However, many of these definitions fall short of defining all forms of relational
exchange (Morgan and Hunt 1994). Many definitions stress the importance of the
acquisition and retention of customers but neglect other aspects of relational exchange
such as those between a focal firm and its stakeholders aside from customers, such as its
employees, the government and suppliers among others (Hultman and Shaw 2003). For
instance, Groonos (1991) explains that the establishment and maintenance of
relationships is RM‟s primary purpose. Barry (1983) defined RM as “Attracting,
maintaining, and enhancing customer relationships”. Jackson (1985) defined RM as
“Marketing oriented toward strong, lasting relationships.” (p. 2). In an effort to cover all
forms of relational exchange, Morgan and Hunt (1994) proposed the following definition
of RM “Relationship marketing refers to all marketing activities directed towards
establishing, developing, and maintaining successful relational exchanges” (p 22).
Macneil (1980) categorizes types of commercial exchange on a continuum ranging
from relational on one extreme to discrete on the other. Discrete transactions are those
with very little to no relational behavior between the exchange partners (Macneil 1980).
14

The classic example of a purely discrete transaction is the one time, out of town, cash
purchase of unbranded gas from an independent gas station (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh
1987). The other side of the continuum is relational exchange or the long term
continuous relationship in which the relationship is more important to the exchange
partners than individual exchanges (Macneil 1980). Also important to note is that
relational exchange occurs over time. With relational exchanges the relationship is said
to begin at the end of the first transaction and implicitly carried on into the future
(Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987).
The way contracting norms manifest and subsequently govern the exchange
relationship is another characteristic of relational exchange that differentiates it from
discrete transactions that do not produce such norms (Kaufmann and Stern 1988).
Macneil developed these relational norms as a way of explaining the principals that
guide, control, and regulate proper relational exchange behavior (Ivens and Blois 2004).
These norms include such sentiments as role integrity, reciprocity, flexibility and
solidarity among others. Though a detailed discussion of each of Macneil‟s relational
norms is outside the scope of this dissertation it should be noted that a large number of
marketing researchers have utilized Macneil‟s notions of relationalism and relational
norms when investigating RM and the governance of relational exchange (e.g. Bello and
Gilliland 1997; Dant and Schul 1992; Heide 1994; Heide and John 1992; Kaufmann and
Dant 1992; Kaufmann and Stern 1988).
As one may discern from the above discussion that RM is concerned with creating a
series of sequential exchanges that are closer and long term orientated compared to
individual discrete exchanges typical of a discrete orientation (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh
15

1987; Hultman and Shaw 2003). More succinctly, tying the customer or exchange partner
to the firm with a series of transactions following the establishment of the exchange
relationship is the goal of RM (Ford 1980; Hultman and Shaw 2003), while discrete
transactions or exchanges involve a single, short time exchange with a distinct beginning
and end (Gundlach and Murphy 1993).
RM and relational exchange has received broad acceptance from marketing academics
as well as marketing practitioners (Morgan and Hunt 1994; Palmatier et al. 2006; Rao
and Perry 2002). Some view relational marketing as a paradigm shift or change in world
view that essentially overturns most previous marketing thinking (Gronroos 1996; Sheth
and Parvatiyar 1995) while others view relational marketing as a strategic focus (Li,
Greenberg and Li 1997) or merely a tactic or strategy used while conducting marketing
activities (Davis 1995; Larson 1997). All areas of marketing, from professional selling
(e.g. Bejou 1994; Chonko and Tanner 1990; Crosby, Evans and Cowles 1990) to services
marketing (Allen 1988; Berry 1983; Gronroos 1988) or from channels of distribution
(Johnson 1999; Kumar, Scheer and Steenkamp 1995; Siguaw, Simpson and Baker 1998)
to retailing (Reynolds and Beatty 1999; Srinivasan and Moorman 2005) have reportedly
benefited from the adoption of the RM paradigm or more specifically, the adoption of
business practices that are based on interactions within a network of relationships (Bejou
1997; Gummesson 2004). There have been numerous journal articles, special journal
issues as well marketing conferences dedicated to RM topics and research (Rao and Perry
2002). Whether RM represents an actual paradigm shift in marketing thought or is
merely a marketing strategy is still a matter of some debate (Rao and Perry 2002)
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The vast amount of attention RM has received should come as no surprise considering
that the benefits of adopting a relational as opposed to a discrete approach toward
marketing are very well documented. For example, when the relational variable of trust
is high between two partners, higher profits are said to be realized as well as an increased
ability to serve customers (Kumar 1996). Greater relationship satisfaction and
anticipation of future contracts from customers have also been linked to an RM or
relational exchange mindset (Anderson and Narus 1990; Doney and Cannon 1997). Also,
RM approaches have been found to positively influence performance variables like
profitability (Anderson and Weitz 1989; Lusch and Brown 1996) sales (Palmatier et al.
2006) or other financial metrics such as ROI (Iacobucci and Hibbard 1999).
However, in spite of the rather sizeable amount of literature extolling the virtues of
RM, some executives have been disappointed in the results of their RM efforts (Colgate
and Danaher 2000; Palmatier 2007) while other researchers suggest there may be a dark
side to implementing a RM strategy.
Of the limited amount of RM literature that discusses the dark side of B2B
relationships, no piece is cited more than the 1992 work by Moorman, Zaltman and
Desphande. The authors, using a sample of market research users and marketing research
providers empirically investigated the role of trust between these knowledge users and
knowledge providers. The authors found that trust and perceived quality of interaction
contribute most significantly to research utilization, with trust having indirect effects
through other relationship processes. However, the authors also found that involvement
and commitment do not have much effect on research use. In an effort to explain why
involvement and commitment do not influence the use of the information provided by the
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research provider the authors suggest that members of the long term relationship may
lose their ability to be objective, which detracts from their effectiveness (p.323). Also,
the relationship may become stale or the members of the relationship may become too
much like each other which may breed boredom and subsequently inhibit new ideas
(p.323). The authors suggest higher expectations between the members of the
relationship as the relationship wears on (p.323). Finally, the authors suggest that
opportunities for opportunistic behavior arise as the result of increased commitment and
involvement (p.323). Though the authors do not formally declare these behaviors or
attitudes toward the B2B relationship as the dark side, subsequent literature has referred
to this article and specifically these behaviors and attitudes as the dark side.
Interestingly, these explanations were not empirically investigated in this work as this
piece investigated the value of trust in the B2B relationship, not the manifestation of
these dark side symptoms.
In 1999 Grayson and Ambler produced what is essentially the first empirical piece of
research investigating the dark side of B2B relationships. This work, as far as can be
discerned by the author of this dissertation, is the first work to utilize the phrase “dark
side” regarding the potential hazards of implementing a RM strategy. Their work first
sought to replicate the previous empirical work by Moorman, Zaltman, and Desphande
(1992) and then extend their work by empirically investigating the aforementioned
author‟s inability to support their hypothesized link between relational constructs and use
of market knowledge provided by the knowledge provider. Grayson and Ambler (1999)
used the propositions in the Moorman, Zaltman, and Desphande (1992) work to describe
the dark side. More specifically, the suggestions proposed by Moorman, Zaltman, and
18

Desphande (1992) that firms lose the ability to remain objective when evaluating
exchange partners, increased opportunism in long term relationships, and increased
expectations between exchange partners are the manifestations of the dark side put to test.
Grayson and Ambler (1999) were unable to empirically support the notion that their dark
side constructs, such as perceived opportunism, perceived loss of objectivity and rising
expectations, mediate the relationships between trust and advertising use. In other words,
though they found evidence to suggest that the effects of trust are dampened in long term
relationships, they were unable to link this effect to the dark side constructs originally
suggested by Moorman, Zaltman, and Desphande (1992).
Hibbard et al. (2001) took the investigation of the dark side of B2B relationships a
step further than previous work when they empirically investigated the dark side
phenomenon. Though the authors do not offer a definition of the dark side they do
describe what can be inferred as the dark side by suggesting that over time the association
between performance and certain relational variables will weaken:
“Specifically, it may be that attitudes and behaviors associated with a strong,
close relationship (trust, commitment etc) become less important over time in
terms of their impact on performance…” (p. 30)
In this work the authors empirically investigated the relationship between relational
constructs of trust, commitment, communication, shared values and mutual dependence
and their influence on performance over time. The results were interesting in that the
correlation between the relational variables and performance initially strengthened but
over time began to diminish. The results of this study were consistent with Grayson and
Ambler (1999) in showing that a dark side of B2B relationships does indeed exists.
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Though this article conceptually extended the limited understanding of the dark side of
B2B relationships by empirically linking it to several relational variables, it does fail to
operationalize any of the theoretical reasons for the onset or manifestation of the dark
side of B2B relationships. Instead, the authors used time as a surrogate for the
emergence of dark side sentiments and concluded that over time, the links between
relational constructs and performance decline, implying that dark side symptoms must
have developed. In other words, the actual emergent dark side sentiments have yet to be
overtly measured in the extant literature.
Another work offering a significant contribution to the scant dark side literature is the
piece by Pressey and Tzokas (2004). This paper looks at the dark side of long term
relationships using a cross industry sample of UK exporters who are engaged in a
relationship with a principal foreign customer. The authors draw from the previous
literature on the topic to describe the dark side. Consistent with previous published
works, the authors describe symptoms of the dark side as the loss of objectivity over time
due to the high level of experience produced through extended and close B2B
relationships (p. 696). The relationship may also become stale over time due to the
perceptions of less added value (p. 696). Expectations also are said to increase over time
(p. 696) and again, there may be a perception that one exchange partner is taking
advantage of the other opportunistically (p. 696). Like Hibbard et al. (2001), Pressey and
Tzokas (2004) use the passage of time as a surrogate for the onset of the dark side but do
not directly operationalize the reasons for its onset. The authors found that there is
indeed a dark side but it isn‟t as extensive or significant as some of the previous literature
might suggest. More specifically, the authors found that there is some weakening of
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export relations over time in terms of level of commitment but as the authors state "if this
can be described as a dark side then it surely must be surpassed by the importance placed
in competence and the relative increase in performance” (p. 699). In effect, like Hibbard
et al. (2001), Pressey and Tzokas (2004) too failed to directly operationalize the reasons
for the emergence of dark side.
Anderson and Jap‟s qualitative article in the Sloan Management Review in 2005 uses a
case study approach to examine, define and explain the dark side of B2B relationships.
The authors describe the dark side of long term relationships between organizational
partners as something that subtly undermine relationships in which parties are confident
and optimistic about their collaboration and where both parties are receiving ongoing
benefits. The authors are quick to point out that this dark side phenomenon is not the
same thing as a B2B relationship that has soured and subsequently become dysfunctional
and destructive. Rather, the authors interpret the dark side as a force that subtly
undermines relationships that are believed by the exchange partners to be otherwise
healthy. This article explains that close personal relationships can be a problem because
it enables opportunism (p. 75). Also, offering immediate benefits seems to be a trade off
between short-term and long-term gains and is a natural point of tension (p. 78). Finally,
being unique may also be a problem since you are not motivated by the dynamics of the
market since competition is minimized or eliminated altogether (p. 79).
Both Pressey and Tzokas (2004) and Anderson and Jap (2005) suggest that the
variables that promote a good B2B relationship may also be the variables that eventually
undermine the relationship. This dissertation expands this notion of the dark side of B2B
relationships by claiming that it‟s the adoption of a RM strategy that eventually leads to
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the dark side of B2B relationships. More specifically, this dissertation suggests that such
relational constructs as trust, dependence and even commitment may, over time, have a
detrimental effect on the ability of a firm to achieve its organizational goals. Therefore,
the dark side can be defined as the decrease in a firm‟s ability to obtain organizational
goals resulting from the investment in B2B relationships.
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore potential boundaries of the RM strategy
and its usefulness within the B2B context and how the continued investment in resources
toward business relationships past the point of the relationship‟s ability to provide
positive results might actually hurt a firm‟s ability to achieve its goals. This dissertation
discusses the results of an empirical study designed to investigate the onset of dark side
behaviors or symptoms within the B2B relationship context. The results of this study
may be used to call into question the appropriateness of the relational exchange paradigm
as well as contribute to the scant amount of literature that actually explores the down side
of implementing a RM strategy.
The limited amount of literature discussed above should illustrate how new and in
need of investigation this area of marketing and more specifically the dark side of
relationship marketing or relational exchange actually is. However, the above cited
works, though exhaustive as it pertains to the most relevant and up to date work that
directly examines the dark side, it should not be confused as an exhaustive description of
all the B2B and marketing literatures that have ever indirectly discussed or otherwise
mentioned the dark side. Several works have indirectly investigated the dark side of B2B
relationships (e.g. Colgate and Danaher 2000; Stewart and Durkin 1999) while others
have casually mentioned the dark side and recognized the potential hazards of relational
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exchange strategies and that a relational exchange strategy is not always appropriate (e.g.
Palmatier et al. 2006; Rao and Perry 2002). Much of this work will be referred to in the
following discussion dedicated to the development of a conceptual taxonomy illustrating
dark side behaviors and the antecedent conditions that lead to them.
To further clarify, a distinction should be made between marketing literature that has
investigated bad B2B relationships and literature that has investigated the bad side of
B2B relationships. In other words, there are several works that have found in their
empirical investigations B2B relationships that were not performing according to the
relational exchange paradigm. However, most of these works found that some key
relational constructs, such as commitment, trust or dependence were not aligned with the
basic tenets of relational exchange and thus produced B2B relationships that were less
than optimal and perhaps ineffectual. For example, Stewart and Durkin (1999) examined
the appropriateness of RM techniques in the Irish bank industry. They found
considerable barriers toward a relational marketing strategy when Irish banks were trying
to court students as new customers. Colgate and Danaher (2000) found that poor
relationship implementation could actually lead to worse results in the New Zealand
Banking industry, than banks that did not implement a relationship strategy at all.
Colgate and Lang (2005) support Colgate and Danhaer‟s (2000) earlier findings in the
New Zealand bank industry when their study found that greater customer satisfaction
resulted from good relational implementation but that poor relational implementation
resulted in poor customer satisfaction compared to banks that did not implement a RM
strategy.
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The above literature review highlights the limited but key work that has discussed to
some extent the dark side of adopting a RM strategy. Though the dark side has received
little attention in the RM literature, it should be noted that other areas of study have also
recognized the potential hazards associated with business relationships. For example,
Spekmen et al. (1998), when discussing the rationale for strategic alliances, recognize
that though there are benefits to alliance formation there are also potential hazards, or as
in the authors words, a „dark side‟ that may accompany these benefits. Specifically, the
authors explain that though learning is often a motivating factor for alliance formation,
opportunistic firms can use their position within the alliance to expropriate propriety
technology at the expense of their cooperative alliance partner. Das and Teng (1999)
discuss what they label relational risk in their work examining risk management in the
strategic alliance context. The authors define relational risk as the potential for
unsatisfactory interfirm cooperation. The probability that partner firms will lack
commitment and engage in opportunistic behavior at the expense of an alliance partner is
a chief premise of relational risk (Das and Teng 1999). Barringer and Harrison (2000)
provide an overview of the interorganizational literature. This work examines several
theoretical paradigms in an effort to help explain interorganizational relationship
formation. Most germane to this dissertation is the author‟s recognition of potential
problems that may arise between B2B relationships. Specifically, the article discusses
the overly optimistic attitude firms will adopt when forming new relationships. These
relationships may sour when their unrealistic expectations don‟t materialize. These
alliance relationships are also difficult to manage due to the complexities of bringing
together two competing corporate cultures (Barringer and Harrison 2000). Though this
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article does not thoroughly examine these issues or offer solutions for dealing with them,
the recognition of such problems between cooperating firms is insight that should prove
useful for those working in the RM context.
Other important insight to be gleamed from the interorganizational and alliance
literature is the considerable failure rate of these types of B2B relationships. Researchers
working in this area cite failure rates anywhere between 50 to 70% (e.g. Barringer and
Harrison 2000; Bleeke and Ernst 1993; Levine and Byrne 1996; Spekman et al 1998).
These alliance relationships are constituted differently than those typically examined in
the RM setting but as the transactions between buyer and seller have become more
relational and thus more like these alliance relationships, this large failure rate between
these cooperative alliances should be of interest to those conducting RM research.
To this point, very little attention has been given to the theoretical justifications for the
onset of the dark side. More specifically, very little if any theoretical reasoning is ever
given in the extant literature as to why the dark side may manifest within B2B
relationships. Since most of the above literature is rooted in the tenets of relational
exchange, as derived from exchange theory, this lack of a theoretical foundation for the
onset of the dark side makes sense. Exchange theory has typically been used as a
theoretical foundation for why exchange relationships develop and subsequently prosper
over time. Therefore, trying to apply exchange theory as a theoretical justification for
why dark side symptoms as relational myopia, complacency, vulnerability or suspicion
develop is difficult to conceptualize and arguably paradoxical.
Though, to this point, there has not been an established theoretical perspective used to
explain the onset of the dark side, it is believed that there are perspectives both inside and
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outside of the marketing literatures which may prove useful in providing a theoretical
foundation capable of supporting the hypothesized relationships between the relational
and dark side constructs as well as the dark side constructs and their relationships to both
relationship strength and performance. These theoretical perspectives will be discussed
in the following chapter where they aid in the theoretical development of the
hypothesized relationships explored in this dissertation.
Also, in an effort to support the directionality of the hypotheses proposed in this
dissertation, six interviews were conducted with people within various industries who are
active in the management of their firm‟s B2B relationships. Though the entire transcripts
of these interviews are not included in this dissertation, the included portions of the
interviews are representative of the general sentiment conveyed by the people who agreed
to participate. These passages are included throughout this chapter, where appropriate, as
is a brief description of the interview participants and the types of B2B relationships they
manage.
To summarize, the aim of the following discussion is to further develop a theoretical
foundation capable of accounting for the onset of the dark side. The following discussion
will draw from the extant academic and practitioner literatures to help develop
hypothesized relationships such relational variables as shared values, commitment, trust,
and satisfaction and the dark side constructs being labeled here as relational myopia,
complacency, vulnerability and suspicion. The following discussion will also draw from
these same areas to develop the relationships between the aforementioned dark side
constructs, relationship strength and performance while introducing time as a moderating
influence on these relationships. Also, six interviews were conducted with individuals
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from varying industries. These individuals are all in some way heavily involved in the
management of at least one of their firms B2B relationships. These interviews were
conducted in an effort to supplement the theoretical justification of these hypothesized
relationships and are referred to often throughout chapter two of this dissertation where
appropriate. Figure two, on the following page, is the structural model illustrating the
hypothesized relationships developed throughout the remainder of this chapter.
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Figure 2: Dark Side Structural Model
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Shared Values and the Dark Side of RM
Shared Values
As with most of the relational constructs being utilized to examine relationships
within the B2B setting, the shared values construct has been operationalized,
conceptualized and defined in many different ways. For instance, some researchers have
conceptualized shared values as a component construct made up of four facets (Barnes
2005). The first facet is the win-win facet, which describes partnering firms‟ recognition
of the need for working together (Peck et al. 1999). The second facet is the affective
component or the “good feelings” members of each firm have for each other (Barnes
1994). The third facet is the ownership component and describes how vertical integration
is likely to have an impact on business relationships (Hakansson and Snehota 1995).
Finally, the depth facet represents the amount of activities performed jointly by the
members of the channel relationship (Ford, Hakansson, and Johanson 1986). Mukherjee
and Nath (2003) also conceptualized the shared values construct as containing several
components or facets rather than as one latent variable. Specifically, in the online
banking context the authors describe shared values as the extent to which banks and their
customers share common beliefs on things like ethics, security and privacy.
Scholars from other areas have related shared values to the construct or concept of
culture. For instance, for application in the area of marketing management, Deshpande
and Webster (1989) define organizational culture as “…the pattern of shared values and
beliefs that helps people understand organizational functioning and thus provides norms
for appropriate organizational behavior (p.4)”. From the area of information technology
Molla and Bhalla (2006) explain that “Organizations impose different values and beliefs
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(also commonly known as culture) on their members. Often, this defines both expected
and accepted behavior modes, working relationships and communication patterns (p.38).”
When discussing the importance of shared values as an important antecedent for
relationship commitment Voss and Voss (1997) discuss how shared values may be
present at differing levels or degrees within a channel‟s relationship. For example, low
pricing may be a shared value between a firm and its customers but this value is relatively
shallow in scope compared to values about business philosophy, ethics and procedures
that run deeper and encompass more of each of the partnering firms.
Though some scholars have used the term shared goals synonymously with shared
values (e.g. Sin et. al. 2002) others have recognized a distinction between the two
concepts. Wilson (1995 p. 9) writes “I define the concept of mutual goals as the degree
to which partners share goals that can only be accomplished through joint action and the
maintenance of the relationship… Although the wider concept of shared values has some
appeal it seems too broad to be effectively operationalized.” Though other researchers
have clearly disagreed with Wilson‟s assertion concerning the operationalizing of the
shared values construct, (e.g. Anderson and Weitz 1989; Morgan and Hunt 1994) this
work provides evidence for the distinction between shared values and shared goals.
Anderson and Weitz (1989) also recognize the difference between shared values and
goals. The authors explain that differences in growth objectives are a difficult and
pervasive problem in channels management. Cultural similarity is operationalized
separately from the goal congruence construct and encapsulates such facet constructs as
geography and culture. Referring to the cultural similarity construct Anderson and Weitz
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(1989 p. 314) explain, “The essence of the problem is lack of shared values and methods
which manifests itself as differences in cognitive styles, operating methods and choices.”
For the purposes of this dissertation, there will be a conceptual distinction between
shared values and shared goals as the words and their meanings, though similar, connote
very different things. For two organizations to have similar goals does not necessarily
mean they share an entirety of values or vice versa. For example, two firms may share a
similar goal of greater return on investment. However, one firm might value ethical and
legal behavior and obtaining these goals legitimately while the other firm might have a
“win at all costs” mentality and support underhanded, sneaky and potentially illegal
behavior as valid means for obtaining these goals. In this scenario it is obvious that goals
and values are referring to two very different things. However, this is not to say that the
two constructs are in no way related. For instance, the shared goals between partnering
firms are certainly things both firms value. Using this logic, and referring to the example
and discussion above, it makes sense to conceive of shared goals as a component or facet
of shared values. Therefore, though shared goals are valued by the partnering firms,
goals are only a component of the much broader construct of shared values.
For the purposes of this dissertation, the definition of shared values offered by Morgan
and Hunt (1994) shall be adopted. Morgan and Hunt (1994 p. 25) define shared values as
the “extent to which partners have beliefs in common about what behaviors, goals and
policies are important or unimportant, appropriate or inappropriate and right or wrong”
This definition conceptualizes shared goals as a component or facet of shared values.
This will allow for the distinction between the two constructs without discounting or
ignoring the relevance shared goals has on the evaluation of shared values between
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partnering firms, as well as accounting for the influence these values have on the business
relationship itself.
Drawing from this definition we can infer that channel relationships that are
characterized by a substantial amount of shared values are made up of firms that are
essentially “on the same page” regarding much of how business works, should work and
how business practices and endeavors should be approached. In other words, these
relationships might very well consist of firms that essentially think the same way or share
a similar philosophy regarding how they conduct themselves within the channel and the
market as a whole.
Shared values are often cited, within the RM literature as a necessary component for
successful long term exchange relationships. For instance, Dwyer Schurr and Oh (1987),
in their seminal article on the subject of relationship development recognized the
importance of shared values. The authors, while explaining the benefits of relational
exchange explain that partnering firms with highly divergent goals may invest a large
amount of economic and psychic resources in conflict and haggling. In other words,
relationships not based on shared goals may actually cost the firms more in terms of
resources, time and energy than had they maintained a discrete transaction orientation
with the partnering firm.
Tate (1996) using the marriage analogy, describes shared values as a necessary
component for strong long-term orientated logistics relationships. The author explains:
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“Both parties must understand each other’s needs, and must be compatible, with
shared values. Like a marriage, a successful logistics partnership requires open
communications, mutual commitment to the partnership, fairness and flexibility”
(p. 7)
Other researchers have echoed the above sentiments while also providing empirical
support for it in their research. For example, Morgan and Hunt (1994) found that shared
values are an important antecedent to both trust and relationship commitment which in
turn was found to influence important relational outcome variables such as cooperation
and acquiescence. Mukherjee and Nath (2003) tested the influence of shared values on
commitment and trust in the online banking context. The authors found that shared
values is actually the most significant determinant of trust in the online banking context
while they also significantly contributed to the commitment customers had for their
online banking institution.
While conducting their qualitative investigation, Voss and Voss (1997) found that
relationships based on shared values as well as governance structures lead to greater
commitment or loyalty than relationships built solely on governance structures.
Fullerton (2003) using a longitudinal experimental design, manipulated his affective
commitment by either eroding or enhancing the shared values between the customer and
their service provider. The results suggest that affective commitment, which was based
on the shared values between customers and their service providers, are more influential
regarding the development of customer loyalty than is continuance commitment, which is
based on switching costs and the lack of attractive alternatives.
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Shared Values and Relational Myopia
It is apparent that shared values are an important ingredient for the development and
sustainability of B2B relationships. However, for the purposes of this research
dissertation the contrary view that shared values, especially over time, might actually lead
to potentially damaging side effects and dark side symptoms is developed. More
specifically, shared values, recognized as one of the key ingredients for forming a
sustainable long term business relationship (Anderson and Weitz 1989; Dwyer, Schurr
and Oh 1987; Morgan and Hunt 1994), may actually lead to the dark side symptom
labeled, in this dissertation, as Relational Myopia.
To illustrate, consider two firms engaged in a channels relationship characterized as
high on shared values. Consistent with the definition of shared values presented above,
this could mean that members of each firm view the environment with potentially the
same knowledge, experience, attitude and bias as their channel partner. Though at times
the similarity in point of view might enable the firms to quickly capitalize on any change
in the environment that presents a market opportunity, it is also possible that these shared
views might blind both firms to opportunities or environmental hazards that arise with the
dynamics of the business environment.
This blinding effect could be the result of relational myopia which stems from two
firms sharing a singular perspective regarding macro issues such as how the environment
is viewed or how to act and react to outside influences that demand attention upon its
recognition.
Marketing myopia was initially defined as a firm‟s shortsightedness or narrowness
when it is attempting to define its business (Leavitt 1960). Other researchers have
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expanded upon this definition, labeling firms by the type of myopia with which they are
plagued. For instance, Richard, Womack, and Allaway (1992) describe three types of
myopia that may describe myopic firms. The first myopia described by the authors is the
classic marketing myopia or the single industry single product orientation most closely
resembling Leavitt‟s (1960) definition. Competitive myopic firms are slightly less
handicapped by their lack of perspective than their classically myopic brethren in that
they are willing to define their business orientation by their customers and not simply
their product. However, from the business environment perspective they limit
themselves by refusing to expand beyond their primary industry for solutions and
opportunities. Finally, efficiency myopic firms are less restrained in their ability to
venture into other industries but are somewhat restrained by their single product
orientation. According to Richard, Womack and Allaway (1992), having a customer
orientated firm that embraces a multi-industry perspective is the only way to truly have
an innovative firm.
The concept of myopia becomes an especially relevant hazard for firms that share too
much of the same view regarding how the firms act within the business environment.
This is due to the shortsightedness or narrow perspective characteristic of myopia. In
other words, firms that take too narrow a view toward things like their product, processes
or customers are often guilty of myopia and subsequently suffer the consequences of their
inability or unwillingness to embrace a larger and broader perspective.
Drawing from the above descriptions of myopia a description of relational myopia can
be derived. Relational myopia can be described as two firms that due to their shared
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values have embraced too narrow a perspective regarding their relationship, its dynamics
and how it should be governed as it maneuvers through the business environment.
If the firms had possessed differing perspectives toward their relationship and the
environment with which it operates, instead of a myopic view of these things, the firms
may have been able to identify problems or opportunities where the myopic firms didn‟t
have the insight. In this case, it was the shared values that posed the problems, or at least
stood in the way of the recognition of the problem or opportunity resulting in action not
being taken at an early and still meaningful time.
Referring to the work of Starbuck, Barnett, and Baumard (2008) which explains and
summarizes much of the work that supports the theoretical implications relating to the
behavioral theory of the firm, we can draw a connection to relational myopia and this
theoretical framework. Specifically, the authors report that firms will often deal with
dynamic events in a standardized way and that firms due to standard operating
procedures, will often act or react unreflectively and automatically. Of course this
implies a lack of vision and complete disregard for the external environment where the
firm operates. To further support the theoretical connection between relational myopia
and Cyert and March‟s (1963) behavioral theory are the findings reported by Starbuck,
Barnett, and Baumard (2008) that suggests that success actually plants the seeds for
future failure. More specifically, as the firm operates it is argued that over time their
success will lead to a more simplistic orientation rather than a more complicated one.
The authors refer to this as strategic inertia and is said to lead to a narrower and
specialized firm over time (Starbuck, Barnett, and Baumard 2008). The parallel to
relational myopia is very striking as what Starbuck, Barnett, and Baumard (2008)
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describe at the firm level is analogous to relational myopia when applied to B2B
relationships. It is not hard to believe that a firm that has allowed this narrow and
simplistic mindset to develop at the firm level will also allow the mindset to govern their
B2B relationships. It might actually be more difficult to envision a situation where the
firms‟ attitude and vision regarding its own governance would really be that drastically
different from how it manages its B2B relationships. If one accepts this connection than
relational myopia‟s connection to the behavioral theory of the firm should be apparent.
Though scant, there is some practitioner and academic literature that either indirectly
or anecdotally supports this notion. For example, Babicz (2000), in her piece discussing
the elements of continuous improvement, recommends rotating auditors every so often so
as not to develop close personal relationships and a myopic vision of the firm being
audited. To quote one of her interview participants “As an auditor, you get comfortable
with a procedure, process or system, you have confidence that you know their system,
and you‟re not catching the nuances that change between visits” (p. 49). This passage
illustrates the dangers of partnering firms sharing too similar a view.
Also in the auditor setting is Mirshekary, Yaftian and Cross‟ (2005) analysis of why
one of Australia‟s top insurance companies failed. Their findings suggest that the
auditors in charge of ensuring the firm‟s financial well being had too close of a
relationship with the partnering firm. Therefore the auditors were not able to offer the
necessary critical evaluation of the firm‟s financial state. This hastened the eventual
collapse of the firm. Subsequent recommendations to the auditor industry include
continuously rotating auditor personnel so as not to develop ties that are too close.
Though close ties are not necessarily a form of relationship myopia, the evidence from
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this account suggests that the same shared values that allowed for the development of
these close ties also led to the development of a myopic view of the relationship, thus
hindering the auditor‟s ability to evaluate the firm critically. The auditors in this case,
missed important issues that the partnering firm had also missed. Their shared
perspective toward the partnering firm, as well as what was to be audited, effectively
restricted the auditor‟s view which consequently led to the failure of the partnering firm.
Similarly, in the academic literature Boughton, Nowak, and Washburn (1996) concede
that bringing in a fresh face to help with new advertising projects is required since
established suppliers are not able to offer the “fresh look” needed when embarking on
new business ventures. This inability is believed to be the result of advertising firms
beginning to think alike which results in predictable non-creative or unimaginative
solutions to new problems.
Moorman, Zaltman and Desphande (1992) suggest that it is commitment that breeds
familiarity which may breed boredom and a desire for new ideas. However, since shared
values has been shown as an important antecedent of both trust and commitment, an
argument can be made that shared values in conjunction with commitment breeds
boredom and familiarity. Conceptually, linking shared values to familiarity and thus
boredom is intuitive since shared values hinge on partners essentially “looking alike”.
When two firms share values it can be said that they also share a view of the business
environment. Thus this myopic or similar view may stifle creativity. Hindering the
ability of the firms to adapt or change with the environment or recognize the
environmental changes that require attention. In other words, the firms might not
necessarily begin to look alike but they may begin to think alike and thus view the world
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alike, essentially reducing the benefits of engaging in a close integrated channels
relationship.
At this point it is important to discuss the influence time is believed to have on the
relationships between the relational variables and the dark side constructs discussed
below. Time or length of the relationship is believed to moderate these relationships.
This is because a certain amount of time must pass to allow for the manifestation of the
dark side. Though at this point it is impossible to say exactly how much time must pass
Hibbard et al. (2001) found that the link between relationship variables and performance
begins to weaken after 160 months or just over 13 years. B2B relationships, according to
Dwyer Schurr and Oh (1987) develop or evolve through a process. Firms must first
recognize each other as viable exchange partners. Then, firms must decide to engage in a
B2B relationship with a partnering firm. At this point firms are tentative as they often
know very little about their new exchange partners. Firms in this phase of the
relationship will keep up their guard and their vulnerabilities close and unexposed. It will
take some time for firms to really become committed to their exchange partners.
Through a series of exchanges over time, relationship norms and expectations will
develop (Dwyer Schurr and Oh 1987). If the relationship is perceived as successful and
the firms involved in the relationship are benefiting from participation, then over time
firms will begin to “settle in” and become more committed to the relationship as well as
their exchange partner. Firms will also let the reach of the relationship expand more into
the firm itself. In other words, firms will begin to allow more exposure of themselves to
their exchange partner as the firms become more integrated (c.f. Dwyer Schurr and Oh
1987).
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During these early phases of relationship development the dark side is unlikely to
manifest with any serious consequence as firms, in these phases, are more vigilant
regarding their exchange partner‟s behavior as well as more motivated to work toward
meeting relational expectations. Should issues like complacency or suspicion develop it
is likely that either one or both firms would simply terminate the relationship. However,
in the later phases of the relationship, firms are more integrated as well as committed.
Recognizing some of the dark side symptoms, such as myopia or complacency may be
difficult as each firm in the relationship is no longer afforded the more objective view of
their relationship and exchange partner afforded them in the beginning phases of the
relationship. Other symptoms like suspicion or feelings of vulnerability may develop in
the later stages simply because firms can no longer simply end an exchange relationship
that in the beginning phases could easily have been walked away from. Referring back to
the Dwyer Schurr and Oh‟s (1987) phase process of relationship development, it becomes
clearer how important the passage of time is for the manifestation of the dark side. In the
beginning phases firms still have the ability to leave a young relationship or simply not
allow a potentially troublesome relationship begin in the first place. However, as time
passes and B2B relationships evolve, firms will become more committed and integrated
which makes the simple act of walking away much more difficult. In these phases, after
enough time has passed it allows for the development of a fairly integrated and
committed exchange relationship. The dark side is much more likely to manifest as firms
in these more developed, older relationships have in many ways, due to the natural
evolution of the exchange relationship, lost their ability to defend against it.
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Many studies within the marketing literature, as well as other business disciplines,
have acknowledged time as an important variable that may have significant influence on
business relationships (e.g. Davies and Prince 2005; Doney and Canon 1997; Hibbard et
al. Lusch and Brown 1996; Verhoef, Franses, and Hoekstra 2002). The interesting and
discrepant aspect of the summation of these studies is the inconsistent results they have
produced. Some of these studies suggest that business relationships improve over time
(e.g. Davies and Prince 2005; Deligonul et al. 2006; Verhoef, Franses and Hoekstra
2002) while others have failed to show the time variable rendering any significant
influence on the quality of the business relationship at all (Doney and Canon 1997;
Flavian, Guinaliu, and Torres 2005; Lusch and Brown 1996).
Though the above cited articles show time as either a positive influence on business
relationships, or were unable to support the notion of a positive influence it is important
to note that there is a growing body of literature that either theoretically suggests a
negative relationship or empirically shows that business relationships do indeed sour over
time. (e.g. Barnes 2005; Harris and Taylor 2003; Hibbard et al. 2001; Reinartz and
Kumar 2000; Robinson 2005).
For instance, Barnes (2005) conducted a qualitative exploratory study that investigated
the dynamics of B2B relationships over time. The results of this study found that there is
often a high degree of optimism in the beginning phases of a relationship but when
business relationships reach the mid point of their term a certain degree of complacency
has a tendency to creep in. A degree of “comfort” is believed to emerge as evidenced by
individuals paying less attention to their channel partners.
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Robinson (2005) is very specific in his piece aimed at practitioners and their
partnering choices. In this piece, he states “However, once a successful partnership has
been forged, there is a tendency for the client to not only neglect supplier relations, but
also to become complacent about the contract itself.” (p.18). This statement reflects the
issues that may arise between firms after the relationship forging process has been
completed.
Harris and Taylor (2003) conducted a qualitative study that discusses the limited role
advertising agencies have on their client‟s development of an advertising budget.
Through the use of qualitative interviews the authors are able to illustrate the influence
time may have on the relationship between complacency and commitment. For example,
on (p. 350) they state:
“However, as time goes on, agency/client roles begin to follow a well-worn path
and thus, less involvement is necessary. Agencies may take their role for granted
and become complacent, thus making themselves less valuable as a strategic
partner…”
Reinartz and Kumar (2000) conducted a study on the profitability of long-life
customers in a non-contractual setting. This study uncovered several results suggesting
that long term relationships are actually more costly than short term relationships. The
results of their study suggest that long term customers are not necessarily as profitable as
shorter term customers, profits do not increase over time with long term customers and
the costs of serving long term customers is actually more not less than short term
customers. Finally, long life customers actually pay less rather than higher prices
compared to short term customers.
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There are other authors that perhaps did not operationalize the time variable in their
studies but have recognized its potential influence while interpreting their results (e.g.
Grayson and Amber 1999; Moorman, Zaltman, and Desphande 1992; Pillai and Sharma
2003).
Moorman, Zaltman, and Desphande (1992), suggest that members of a long term
business to business relationship may, over time, lose their ability to be objective, the
relationship may become stale or the members of the relationship may become too much
like each other. The implication here is that not only do relational norms lose their ability
to yield positive relational outcomes; this inability is something of a time dependent
variable. Grayson and Amber (1999) found similar decreases in benefits from relational
constructs. Though they were unable to pinpoint the reasons for the dampened effects of
trust in a long term relationship they were able to empirically support the notion that trust
does indeed lose some of its positive effects, again, over time. The diminished
correlation between relational variables and performance in Hibbard et al‟s (2001) study
was also witnessed over time. Pressey and Tzokas (2004) in their empirical investigation
of UK exporters also found that though there was an increase in performance, there was
some relational diminishment surrounding the commitment construct. More relevant to
this discussion however, is that this diminishment occurred over time.
Pillai and Sharma (2003) suggest that a lack of innovation is an issue that may
transform a once relational business relationship into a more transactional one. Lack of
innovation refers to the belief that supplier firms, over time, become unable to provide
valued added services to the client or buying firm. That is to say, that the relationship
becomes stale and thus, innovation becomes stymied or is unable to flourish in the
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relationship where it once had (Pillarli and Sharma 2003). The authors also suggest that
dissatisfaction is a problem that builds up over time in mature relationships. The authors
explain how though dissatisfaction isn‟t typically linked to any one incident or that there
isn‟t “one thing” that leads to dissatisfaction the evidence does seem to point to more
dissatisfaction in older relationships or rather the construct manifest within the
relationship over a long period of time. Pillarli and Sharma (2003) also discuss how
changes in the environment will have effects on channels relationships. As technology
and communications evolve, over time, competitive pressures in the environment will
manifest in ways not currently realized. These changes will force firms to evaluate the
nature of their channels relationships to determine if the relationship is still viable in an
environment that is different than the one where the relationship was forged.
It is important to recognize however that the passage of time itself isn‟t necessarily the
factor that provokes the onset of these issues but it is the passage of time that allows for
the development of these issues. For instance, Singh and Mitchell (1996) within the
alliance context, discuss how successful alliances may fail when their environment
changes over time. In this case it is not time that produced alliance failure but
environmental changes. However, without the passage of time, environmental conditions
would remain static and thus these successful alliances would never fail. Pilari and
Sharma (2003) cite the lack of innovation as cause for business relationships to transform
from a relational mindset into a transactional one. In this example, it is not the passage of
time that leads to the transformation of the business relationship but the lack of
innovation. Here again, however, it is recognized that without the passage of time,
innovation would not decline and consequently these business relationships would remain
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relational as opposed to becoming transaction orientated. Finally Harris and Taylor
(2003), discuss how over time advertising agency relationships begin to follow a well
worn path which leads to complacency. This well worn path is the real issue not the
passage of time but without the passage of time members of these agencies are not able to
develop this „well worn path‟ which is the true cause of the onset of complacency.
To expand upon this idea of time leading to the onset of dark side variables, the
examination of how processes might be sped up should also be discussed. More
specifically, Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh (1987) discuss that over time, through a series of
exchanges, the relationship development process occurs. The authors do not however
discuss exactly how much time needs to pass.
Time itself is not the issue per se but the passage of time allows for the development
of issues. In other words, the development of these issues is time dependent. Therefore,
when operationalizing the appropriate moderating variables, a researcher does not need to
measure all the potential issues that may develop over the passage time as the time
variable can act as a surrogate that adequately captures all these issues within one
measure. More specifically, instead of measuring things like interaction frequency,
transaction frequency, environmental changes, routine of process, personnel changes or
any other dynamic that potentially could hasten the development of the dark side, as these
issues, within the relationship context, are time dependent, using one time measurement
will adequately capture the moderating influences these issues have on the relationships
between the relational and dark side constructs.
The above discussion concerning the passage of time is intended to provide insight
into how the passage of time is a necessary condition for the emergence of the dark side
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in general. However, though indirect, specific support for the relationship between
shared values, relational myopia and time‟s moderating influence can be inferred from
the Hibbard et al. (2001) piece that operationalized shared values and found a negative
relationship between the relational construct and performance over time. The influence
of time on the relationship between shared values and relational myopia stems from the
assumption that firms will actually evaluate the nature of their channels relationships as
Pillai and Sharma (2003) suggest they will.
One of the basic assumptions of exchange theory (Thibaut and Kelley 1959) is the
notion of comparison level of alternatives. The comparison level of alternatives can be
described as “the standard that represents the average quality of outcomes that are
available from the best alternative exchange relationships (Anderson and Narus 1984, p.
63)”. The idea is that firms will monitor their alternatives to make sure they are in the
best; perhaps most profitable or efficient, relationship compared to whatever else is
available. Therefore, the comparison level of alternatives represents the lowest level of
outcomes a firm will accept to continue in the relationship (Anderson and Narus 1984).
However, Thibaut and Kelley (1959) do concede that a firm may “remain in the present
less rewarding relationship because the social, emotional, or legal costs entailed in
moving to the better alternatives are too high” (p. 71). One could interpret these costs in
moving as being subsumed in the costs of monitoring and continually searching for better
relational partners. It is reasonable to think that firms, in an effort to avoid these costs,
after having built their relational exchange relationships, may view further monitoring as
an unneeded expense. In other words, if they already have a trusted partner with whom

46

they share values; commitment etc. firms may view the monitoring of the environment or
even the relationship as an unneeded and perhaps wasteful expenditure.
The qualitative data gathered during the interview process largely supports the
relationship between shared values and relational myopia. When asked if she believes
B2B partners share a vision regarding how their relationships run and if there is a down
side or negative consequences to this shared vision, one interview participant, a 29 year
old sales representative in charge of product sales said:
“…because things are going well with your relationship and it just runs on its
own, you might not look out to see if there is a better way or process that could be
more efficient or beneficial to either one of you”
This response is typical of those given by most of the interview participants and seems
to support the idea of shared values between organizations, over time, leading to the onset
of relational myopia.
Shared values have been linked to the development of both trust and commitment
(Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; Morgan and Hunt 1994) both typically regarded as
positive influences on the B2B relationship, over time, shared vales may help usher in the
dark side symptom of relational myopia. This is due to the belief that over time, as the
relationship continues to develop, shared values may limit each firm‟s ability to
objectively evaluate the environment and to assess if each firm is still a good RM partner.
The moderating effect of time on the relationship between shared values and relational
myopia is rooted in this inability to continuously, over a long period of time, evaluate the
environment and relationship due to a firm‟s myopic view of the exchange relationship.
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It is from the above discussion, pertaining to the description of shared values, relational
myopia and the moderating influence of time that the following hypothesis is presented:
H1: Over time, there will be a positive relationship between shared values and
relational myopia
Commitment and the Dark Side of RM
Commitment
Commitment, within the channels literature has been defined in many ways. When
deriving their definition of commitment, Morgan and Hunt (1994) drew from such areas
as social exchange, marriage and organizational behavior. The authors defined
commitment as “An exchange partner believing that an ongoing relationship with another
is so important as to warrant maximum efforts at maintaining it; that is, the committed
party believes the relationship is worth working on to ensure that it endures
indefinitely”(p. 23). Moorman, Zaltman and Desphande (1992) defined commitment as
an enduring desire to maintain a valued relationship. Dwyer, Schurr and Oh (1987)
conceptualize the commitment phase of relationship building as an implicit or explicit
pledge or relational continuity between exchange partners. Leik and Leik (1977) defined
commitment as the unwillingness to consider partners other than those in the current
relationship. This definition is consistent with that of Gundlach, Arcrol, and Mentzer
(1995) who defined commitment as the forsaking of alternative options. Though many of
the above definitions are worded differently and perhaps carry slight differences in
meaning, there does seem to be certain commonalities among all of them. The desire to
stay involved and engaged in a relationship with other channel members is a consistent

48

theme among all of the definitions discussed above, and serves as the primary
conceptualization of the construct.
Parties engaged in B2B relationships view commitment as essential for achieving or
obtaining positive outcomes among channel partners (Morgan and Hunt 1994).
Therefore, relational partners, in order to maintain the realization of these positive
outcomes, will work to maintain and foster commitment within the relationship and
commitment is therefore recognized as one of the key ingredients of long term
relationships (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; Garbarino and Johnson 1999).
This conceptualization has provided guidance in many studies investigating the
dynamics of relational exchange. For example, Priluck (2003) used this conceptualization
of commitment when investigating the mitigating influence of RM during product and
service failure. In his study, he found that consumers involved in relational exchange are
more committed than consumers who are involved with discrete transactions. Tate
(1996) in her qualitative investigation of the relationship between Kimberly –Clark
Corporation and Tricor Warehouse relied upon this conceptualization to explain why
commitment is vital when partnerships encounter rough times. Dorsch, Swanson, and
Kelly (1998) used this conceptualization of commitment and found that the higher a
vendor‟s status with the customer, the more committed customers are to that vendor.
However, researchers investigating the constructs germane to the relational exchange
paradigm have begun to embrace commitment as a multi-faceted complex construct.
Making it worthy of study and operationalization at deeper levels than just the onedimensional gist captured in the definitions discussed above. Specifically, some
marketing researchers have borrowed the multi-component multi-faceted
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conceptualization of organizational commitment, developed by Allen and Meyer (1990)
and applied it to the B2B setting. Works by Gruen, Summers, and Acito (2000) and
Fullerton (2003) among others, have embraced the notion of commitment containing at
least an affective, normative and continuance component.
The affective component is said to exist when channel partners identify with each
other or are emotionally attached (Fullerton 2005). Feelings associated with “liking” and
attachments are associated with affective commitment. Affectively committed
relationships continue out of a sense of “wanting” or a desire to have the relationship
continue. It should be noted that the more traditional view of commitment within the
relational exchange and B2B literature is essentially the affective aspect of commitment
(e.g. Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; Morgan and Hunt 1994; Moorman, Zaltman, and
Desphande 1992)
Normative commitment has been defined as the “degree to which the membership is
psychologically bonded to the organization on the basis of the perceived moral obligation
to maintain the relationship with the organization” (Gruen, Summers, and Acito 2000
p.37). This form of commitment is rooted in a relational partner‟s sense of duty.
Normative commitment is similar to affective commitment in that it is born out of an
affective response rather than a more analytically or cognitively appraised sense of need.
That is, normative commitment isn‟t necessarily born out of a sense of want but rather a
sense obligation. Firms might not “want” to stay in certain channel relationships but feel
a sense of duty to do so.
Finally, continuance commitment stems from a lack of attractive alternatives, high
switching costs or amount of material sacrifice associated with terminating the
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relationship (Dwyer, Shurr, and Oh 1987; Fullerton 2005). Continuance commitment, it
can be said, is derived more out of a sense of need rather than want (Fullerton 2003;
Fullerton 2005; Gruen, Summers, and Acito 2000). If switching costs are excessive or
the benefits of maintaining a relationship are not easily replaced should a firm decide to
switch relational partners, then the firm is more likely to experience continuance
commitment to the relationship (Dwyer, Shurr, and Oh 1987; Gundlach, Achrol, and
Mentzer 1995). Commitment is also formed when one party takes actions that bind it to
another party. Anderson and Weitz (1992) found that actions taken to limit freedom of
choice such as contracts and service agreements also form continuance commitment.
Finally, if one party perceives that they are dependent on the other in the exchange
relationship then they are more likely to be committed to the relationship than if they
don‟t (Anderson and Weitz 1992; Heide and John 1992).
This dissertation recognizes the benefit of making such operational distinctions
regarding the facets or components of commitment. Much of the RM literature used to
help develop the hypothesized relationships with the dark side operationalized
commitment using the “affective” and “normative” component variables. Therefore,
distinctions between affective and normative commitment will be made at the
operationalization level of this dissertation and will be discussed further in Chapter three.
Since this distinction is made at the operational level, the following discussion will use
the more general construct label of “commitment” instead of the more specific
“affective” and “normative” labels. The reasoning for making this distinction at the
operational and not theoretical level stems from the complexity of the structural model
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and the belief that these dimensional differences recede in significance compared to the
differences across other antecedent and mediating constructs.
Commitment and Relational Myopia
High levels of commitment may seem positive and a goal to strive for when engaging
in a RM strategy. As mentioned above, there are positive benefits associated with high
levels of commitment (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; Garbarino and Johnson 1999;
Morgan and Hunt 1994). However, it is also believed that it can be a danger that leads to
partnering firms adopting too narrow a perspective regarding the relationship, its
dynamics and how the relationship should be governed as it maneuvers through the
environment. In other words, firms might become so committed to each other that their
focus becomes narrowed through the good feelings between the firms. These good
feelings about the relationship and the relational partner may be misinterpreted as the
relationship yielding positive benefits and performance outcomes. This is consistent with
the behavioral theory of the firm as it suggests that positive outcomes re-enforce
behaviors even if better options are available to the firm (Ginsberg and Baum 1994).
Applying this theoretical perspective to a B2B relationship suggests that one or both of
the firms may become relationally myopic, over time, as they confuse good feelings for
success or current success for future success. As the focus is drawn more and more
toward the relationship, issues like monitoring of the economic or industrial environment
are neglected as its necessity is effectively off the radar screens of the partnering firms.
This can lead to several negative repercussions for the myopic firm. This myopic view is
believed to impede their ability to adjust to the dynamics of their particular industry or
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other economic factors that may have a bearing on their ability to profitably conduct
business.
It makes sense that when committed firms begin their relationship they are likely to see
themselves as being “on the same page”. Therefore, as their relationship progresses over
time and the members of each firm realize efficiencies and perhaps some measure of
success, the resulting confidence in the relationship will begin to discourage members
from “looking for stuff” that might indicate the relationship is in need of repair or some
other form of adjustment. This subjective view is undoubtedly narrowed and more
shortsighted than an objective view and thus the onset of relational myopia.
Also, commitment might be enough to keep firms in a relationship but not necessarily
enough to keep the relationship from becoming stale or rote. Committed firms will show
persistence in their obligations without regard to environmental or other relational cues
that may dictate a change of perspective (Weiner 1982). When firms are committed to
their obligations but refuse to monitor the dynamics that surround those obligations it can
then be said the firm has effectively narrowed its view or has adopted a myopic view of
their exchange relationship.
One interview participant, a 43 year old software consultant, when asked about firm
level group think and if this actually manifest between B2B partners, responded with the
following:
“…I believe that once the relationship has settled there is an enormous amount of
complacency that develops between the partners”
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The above passage serves as witness to the idea that complacency does develop in
B2B relation ships over time. To further link the onset of complacency to sentiments of
commitment we can draw once again from the 29 year old sales representative:
“I know in my experience that when I have become close to a customer and their
processes, things would just flow without any issues. I would almost know what is
expected of me because of having that experience with them. Unfortunately, that
did not mean anything when a customer would get a better offer from someone
else and then they would go with our competitor because they had something new
and better for them.”
It seems as if maintaining the relationship may not only allow for the onset of
complacency but myopia as well. What is interesting about the above passage is that one
can see an indirect relationship between the onset of complacency and feelings of
vulnerability. In other words, it almost seems as if this sales rep is equating the onset of
both myopia and complacency with an inability to offer anything new to the relationship
which subsequently leads to loss sales which may provoke feelings of vulnerability.
Just as time is believed to have a moderating role on the relationship between shared
values and relational myopia; it is also believed to have a similar moderating effect on the
relationship between commitment and relational myopia. It is extremely unlikely that the
relationship between commitment and relational myopia would occur at the outset or
beginning of the relationship. A number of studies have cited commitment as a positive
influence on B2B relationships (e.g. Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; Garbarino and
Johnson 1999; Morgan and Hunt 1994). It therefore is not only counterintuitive but
seemingly highly unlikely that commitment would display this sort of negative influence
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at the beginning of the relationship. However, as time goes by, it becomes more and
more likely that partnering firms will adapt this myopic view of their environment and
B2B relationship for the reasons discussed above. Drawing from this same line of logic
is the idea that the performance of a focal firm is a function of how that firm‟s relational
partner‟s strategies change or evolve over time (Singh and Mitchell 1996). Sing and
Mitchell (1996) explain that the characteristics of partnering firms that help each firm, as
well as the relationship, succeed in one phase of their relationship are the same
characteristics that enable them to fail when their environment changes. This failure is
contingent upon the relationship not allowing or rather not acknowledging the need to
allow their strategies to evolve over time. This failure is consistent with the notions of
relational myopia being described in this dissertation. It is from this logic that the
following hypothesis is presented:
H2: Over time, there will be a positive relationship between commitment and
relational myopia
Commitment and Complacency
Another dark side symptom believed to manifest within B2B relationships is the issue
of complacency. Chowdhury and Lang (1996) published a qualitative exploratory study
that investigated complacency and how it relates to small business failure. In this study
they used the definition of complacency found in the Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary (1961) as “satisfaction or self-satisfaction accompanied by unawareness of
actual dangers and deficiencies”. The authors suggest that this definition has two
possible implications. The first implication is that “unawareness” may be the result of
poor problem sensing ability in a firm where management is content with the status quo.
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The second implication is the idea that what used to work for a firm no longer does. In
other words, systems and process that used to be beneficial for the firm have begun to
either yield less or stop yielding entirely the beneficial outcomes firm management has
grown to expect. Complacency, in these cases, stems from the idea that firm
management or key firm personnel are unable to recognize the deficiency in their once
productive systems (Chowdhury and Lang 1996).
Shipley (1994) defines complacency as an internal unwillingness to change the status
quo and suggests complacency as an organizational problem that keeps marketing
personnel from being as effectual as possible within the firm. According to Austin
(1991), complacency is the lack of consistency or a decrease in the level of service
provided compared to that provided when the relationship was initially forged.
Regardless of the definition of complacency being utilized we can infer that
complacency encompasses feelings of satisfaction and an unwillingness or inability to
recognize the need for change. For example, two partnering firms that have met with
some degree of success may be lulled into believing the relationship is infallible and
without need of change. Firms begin to believe their success is the result of the channel
partnership as is and changing the characteristics of the relationship or monitoring it in
ways to guard against such things as complacency may seem redundant. An “If it ain‟t
broke, don‟t fix it” mentality may develop. Theoretical justification for the onset of
complacency again can be drawn from the behavioral theory of the firm. Miller (1990)
found that firm success often leads to a sort of programmed, structured response to the
environment which he describes as complacency and specialization. This is consistent
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with Cyert and March‟s generalizations which suggest that firms incorporate bias in their
environmental assessments that favor their past success.
Complacency and its relationship with commitment is derived from firms assuming
the “feel good” feeling they have toward the relationship and the results of the
relationship is perpetual and therefore not requiring vigilance or maintenance to ensure its
continuation. This is especially true if exchange partners have enjoyed some measure of
success early in the B2B relationship (Bergquist 2006; Hagen 1999). Firms may become
attached to their partnering firms and believe success is a given (Chowdhury and Lang
1996). Therefore, the idea of monitoring the specifics of the relationship or its
environment becomes somewhat counterintuitive and perhaps a waste of time.
This inaction effectively locks the firms into a relationship that potentially should be
terminated or in some other way redefined to better serve the partnering firms. However,
their commitment to the relationship and all of its dynamics keeps these firms from
taking the necessary steps to change the dimensions of their business relationship. The
passage from Haytko (2004) works to illustrate how complacency can handicap an
exchange relationship:
“Personal relationships do not always play a positive role in an organizational
environment. For instance, personal relationships may be powerful enough to
hold an interorganizational relationship together long after it should have been
terminated…” (p.313)
Complacency here stems from the inability to recognize a need for action. So long as
the firms are complacent toward the relationship they will not act against the relationship
to which they are committed. Tan and Akhtar (1998) found indirect support for this link
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between commitment and complacency. Specifically, they found that high levels of
commitment actually lead to mental exhaustion or “burnout” in the employer-employee
context. Extrapolating those results into the B2B relationship context, we can infer that
high levels of commitment between firms might lead to the firm level equivalent of
relational burnout or exhaustion and subsequent complacency.
Other authors have found a connection between commitment and complacency.
Specifically, Berquist (2006 p 17.) states:
“…Inertia caused by complacency, resistance to change and sheer size will be
like anchors on sinking ships. Unbreakable supply chains and alliances will be
like tethers. The perfect market will demand fluidity and agility, the ability to
scale up or down in response to changes in demand and the ability to form and
dissolve business relationships at a moment’s notice…”
Other authors have echoed this same sentiment regarding the dangers of commitment
and complacency. Hatzakis et al. (2005 p. 70) explains:
“…strong bonds with relationship managers led business and IT staff to a state of
inertia and complacency towards activating direct bonds with each other. We
argue that this may damage the prospects of business and IT colleagues to
identify with each other and their capability to discover and share
perspectives…”
These passages suggest that as the bonds become tighter inertia leads firms to stop
looking at their relationship and the environment around them critically. Also important
to note is that though not directly discussed the moderating influence time has on all of
the above passages can be inferred. Haytko (2004) mentions relationships enduring long
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after they should have ended. The element of time presents itself when interpersonal
relationships are strong enough to keep B2B relationships alive after their viable time has
past. Berquist‟s (2006) notion of inertia implies the existence of relationships continuing
after the environment has dictated change. Finally Hatzakis et al. (2005) echoes a similar
sentiment of inertia blinding individuals within the firm. This inertia is the complacent
view occurring over a period of time. A 55 year old male in charge of procurement for
his government agency said:
“Also, we all tend t enjoy the comfort of dealing with people we know and have
dealt with before but this comfort level can prevent us from exploring new options
and ideas”
This above passage may be interpreted as an interpersonal inertia which influences the
B2B relationship. This particular individual seems to recognize the potential for the
desire to do the same things in the relationship, like work with the same people over and
over again, to harm or hinder the organization‟s ability to obtain its goals.
Harris and Taylor (2003) also conducted a qualitative study that discusses the limited
role advertising agencies have on their client‟s establishment of an advertising budget.
Through the use of qualitative interviews the authors are able to illustrate the influence
time is believed to have on the relationship between commitment and complacency. For
example, the authors state:
“However, as time goes on, agency/client roles begin to follow a well-worn path
and thus, less involvement is necessary. Agencies may take their role for granted
and become complacent, thus making themselves less valuable as a strategic
partner…” (p. 350)
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The above passage describes the relationship between commitment and complacency.
The important point to recognize however, is that the influence commitment has on
complacency occurs over time (Verhoef, Franses, and Hoekstra 2002). Drawing from the
above discussion, describing how time influences the dark side the argument for the
moderating role of time can be derived. Just as shared values are also typically viewed as
a positive influence on a B2B relationship, commitment is also described as a positive
influence on a B2B relationship (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; Garbarino and Johnson
1999; Morgan and Hunt 1994). Firms are generally more apt to “put their best foot
forward” at the beginning of a B2B relationship so through their increased vigilance the
onset of complacency is less likely at the beginning of the relationship. However, as time
goes by, and the B2B exchange partners get to know each other and the relationship
becomes more comfortable it becomes more likely that B2B partners will begin to
assume a level of stability that may lull them into complacency. Time as a moderating
variable was also recognized in the interviews conducted for this dissertation. One
respondent, a 38 year old male in charge of purchasing for his department in a large
engineering firm said the following:
“My experience relates to the purchase of electronic equipment and traffic signal
parts. I have noticed that over the years, certain manufacturers have let their
quality fall to below acceptable levels…”
In this particular case it seems as if it took the passage of time in order for the dark
side symptom to manifest. The preceding discussion details the potential reasons for the
relationship between commitment and complacency as well as the moderating influence
of time. Therefore, referring to the discussion above pertaining to how commitment may
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influence the onset of the dark side symptom of complacency over time, the following
hypothesis is presented:
H3: Over Time there will be a positive relationship between commitment and
complacency
Commitment and Vulnerability
When firms allow themselves to become committed to other firms they may
potentially be creating a situation that allows for the onset of the dark side construct of
vulnerability. Svensson (2004) defined the vulnerability construct as the gap between the
focal firm‟s perceived dependence on another firm or customer and the focal firm‟s
perceived trust in another firm or customer. Attridge, Berscheid, and Sprecher (1998)
conceptualized a similar definition of vulnerability in the international joint venture
context. These authors define vulnerability as a focal firm‟s concerns about the
continuance of the alliance relationship and its partner‟s future provision of need
satisfaction.
Halinen and Tahtinen‟s (2002) process theory of relationship ending offers insight into
the onset of vulnerability. Specifically, the authors explain that predisposing factors may
already exist when firms enter into a B2B relationship which makes it more vulnerable to
breakdown. In other words, there may have been something about the structure or
foundation of the relationship that was present from the beginning of the relationship that
may ultimately lead to the failure of the relationship. Hailinen and Tahtinen (2002) also
describe precipitating events that may change how a current relationship is structured and
this change, according to them, may eventually lead to the end of the relationship. These
events may be sudden and dramatic or a series of events which hasten action toward
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relationship ending. This dissertation argues that relationship ending may or may not be
the result of the onset of the dark side but more importantly Halinen and Tahtinen‟s
taxonomy offers insight into vulnerability and how it could manifest in B2B
relationships. The process theory of relationship ending recognizes the likelihood of
predisposing factors or precipitating events that may act to damage the B2B relationship.
Using this framework, it is easy to see how otherwise functioning B2B relationships,
characterized by high levels of trust, commitment etc. may all of a sudden find itself
believing that their trust has been betrayed or that they are all of a sudden vulnerable to
the actions of their B2B partners in a way they had previously not realized.
The link between commitment and vulnerability has also been alluded to in the
business literature. Researchers investigating organizational commitment have found that
increased feelings of insecurity or vulnerability influence an employee‟s commitment
toward the employing organization negatively (e.g. Greenhalgh 1985; Mesner and Stebe
2004). These increased feelings may be the result of predisposing factors that trigger
these feelings despite the good intentions of the B2B partners involved.
Other researchers in the B2B literature conceptualize commitment as encompassing
vulnerability (e.g. Lacey 2007; Morgan and Hunt 1994; Wong and Sohal 2002). This
suggests that firms in their commitment to other firms also accept or understand their
increased vulnerability resulting from their commitment to another firm. Firms that are
committed to another firm often make this commitment in lieu of other alternatives
(Fullerton 2003; 2005). Therefore, exclusivity may then result binding the firms together
with the “want” aspect of commitment acting as relational glue effectively holding the
relationship together. Firms in such an exclusive agreement might then begin to feel
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vulnerable as they have effectively cut themselves off from other market opportunities.
Becoming strongly committed may be a precipitating event leading to the onset of
vulnerability as it was the act of becoming committed to their partnering firm that
eventually leads to the realization that switching costs are too high and effectively leave
one of the B2B firms incapable of taking advantage of other, perhaps better, market
opportunities. Had the firm not embraced such commitment they may have remained in a
position to take advantage of other opportunities and consequently would have no reason
to feel vulnerable.
This logic holds true for firms that have never been the victim of an opportunistic or
other harmful act by an exchange partner as well but almost certainly makes former
victims feel even more vulnerable the more committed they become. This isn‟t to say
that they do not trust their channel partners or are not committed but that firms engaged
in committed B2B relationships are extremely cognizant or aware of the potential for
opportunistic behavior at their expense and hence, the onset of the vulnerable feelings.
The 29 year old sales rep said the following about feeling vulnerable in her B2B
relationship.
“It bothered me when I did a lot for a customer and then they turn their back on
me as soon as they got a better deal. It made me not want to do as much for the
next customer because I didn’t want to be taken advantage of.”
Time is also expected to have a moderating influence on the relationship between
commitment and vulnerability. It has been mentioned that over time relationships
become more involved (Moorman, Zaltman, and Desphande 1992). Such involvement
exposes firm vulnerabilities, providing partnering firms with more opportunity for
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opportunistic behavior (Garyson and Ambler 1999; Hibbard et al. 2001). It requires the
passage of time for firms to become so integrated that they become willing to expose
their vulnerabilities. In other words, though commitment is initially viewed as a good or
positive influence on the B2B relationship, over time, commitment may encourage
greater integration of partnering firms which then leads to each firm being more
vulnerable to the actions of the other. Therefore, the passage of time may actually lead to
the onset of feelings of vulnerability among committed B2B relationship partners. Using
this logic, the following hypothesis is presented
H4: Over time there will be a positive relationship between commitment and
vulnerability
Commitment and Suspicion
Suspicion was a common theme that arose often during the qualitative interviews.
The 38 year old purchasing manager said the following:
“It seems like over time firms start to take you for granted and when that happens
they begin to feel like they can do whatever they want with you because you have
an established relationship with them…”
Similar to the purchasing manager‟s statement is that of a 64 year old quasi-retired
management consultant who has several years on both the buying and selling side of B2B
dyads. The following comment, on the following page, is a portion of an experience he
shared about an organizational buyer who used her powerful position with suppliers to
extort such things as gifts and travel compensation:
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“In cases of bad management there won’t be anybody monitoring the
relationship. I have personal experience with one buyer who used her position to
extort gifts and favors from her suppliers. Aside from the damage this does to the
relationship and the company’s name, it makes the sales rep suspicious when
dealing with her company but other companies as well”
These sentiments should leave no doubt regarding the potential about suspicion
developing over time in a B2B relationship. However, are these feelings always justified
and do the justification of the dark side symptom even matter as it pertains to relational
consequences and overall firm performance? Anderson and Jap (2005) warn against
caving into what they label the spiral of suspicion, or the act of suspecting or believing an
exchange partner is acting in a way contrary to either contractual or implied relational
norms without having the necessary evidence to conclude such behavior. Anderson and
Jap (2005) suggest that being overly guarded or suspicious of other exchange partners
could be damaging to the relationship. That is to say, being too suspicious of exchange
partner‟s behavior might actually lead to the behaviors a suspicious firm is trying to
guard against.
For example, an exchange partner meeting with a rival firm or sending market scouts
into an exchange partner‟s overseas territory isn‟t necessarily indicative of an exchange
partner acting exploitive or otherwise opportunistically, as might be interpreted, but
rather an exchange partner simply looking for market opportunities (Anderson and Jap
2005).
Given the above scenario, the advice offered by the aforementioned authors seems
reasonable. However, suspicion is not always the product of a firm‟s managers overly
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developing a sense of vigilance. It is possible that being suspicious of a partnering firm
may very well be warranted and appropriate. Given the transaction cost analysis
(Williamson 1975) assertion of opportunism when the opportunity for opportunism
presents itself, it makes sense that firms should at least have some sort of monitoring
mechanisms to guard against members of partnering firms taking advantage of situations
that might allow for opportunistic behavior. Of course opportunistic acts may be viewed
as precipitating events which may lead to relationship ending or the onset of suspicion
(c.f. Halinen and Tahtinen 2002). The above discussion refers to the increasingly
integrated nature of today‟s B2B relationships. Increased levels of integration certainly
expose focal firms to an increased chance of opportunistic behavior by members of
partnering firms. Therefore, the onset of the dark side of suspicion might almost seem
like a given in today‟s highly integrated B2B relationship.
As with the relationship between commitment and vulnerability, the crux of the
relationship between commitment and suspicion relies on the increased integration, over
time, between channel partners (Svensson 2004). Firms more highly integrated are
generally going to be more open to such things as opportunistic behavior on the part of
members of their partnering firms. Some qualitative evidence is given by the 64 year old
quasi retired management consult who, when asked about the nature of today‟s integrated
B2B relationships and the potential for problems with these arrangements said:
“Some firms are actually going away from relationships all together in an effort
to keep the relationships from becoming personal. This is because companies feel
that personal relationships may become the focus at the expense of company
profitability”
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These comments support the notion that firms are suspicious of relationships because
they recognize the potential for these relationships to harm the firm.
It makes sense that firms in committed relationships will typically have their guards
down compared to firms in relationships that are not as committed. This commitment to
the relationship implies a certain level of trust (Wetzels, Ruyter, and Birgelen 1998) or
belief committed relationship partners will not willingly do things detrimental to the
relationship. Therefore, in an effort to receive all the potential benefits of adopting a
relational exchange strategy they allow their exchange partners access to their systems
and methods. Consequently, the partnering firm finds itself more exposed and thus
vulnerable to deleterious actions that can potentially be used by their exchange partner(s)
to their detriment.
When firms find themselves overly exposed they may find themselves becoming
somewhat hypersensitive to changes in the relational dynamic. For instance, if the
partnering firm is not producing as much as they were projected or contracted too, not
meeting delivery or payment deadlines or if the partnering firm engages in some other
actions deemed inappropriate, it is sure to provoke suspicion between the focal firm and
the firm with which they have entered into a committed relationship. Of course,
partnering firms not delivering, producing or paying as expected will not become
apparent in the initial phases of the relationship. Some amount of time will have to pass
in order for these “suspicious” acts or actions to manifest in a way that creates suspicion
for the focal partnering firm. For example, a focal firm may view late delivery or late
payment in the initial stages of the relationship as an issue stemming from the “getting
acquainted” or time when each relational partner is figuring out, not only each other, but
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also how the dynamics of the relationship are supposed to work. However, after some
time, these “excuses” will no longer work as the seemingly innocent notion of “not
knowing” how things are supposed to work is no longer viable. The focal partnering firm
may begin to assume more deleterious reasons for the issues which will then lead to the
onset of suspicion. Therefore, time as a moderating influence on a positive relationship
between commitment and suspicion is proposed:
H5: Over time there will be a positive relationship between commitment and
suspicion
Trust and the Dark Side of B2B Relationships
Trust
Much of the RM literature has concluded the importance of trust as a necessary
ingredient for developing B2B relationships (e.g. Doney and Canon 1997; Dwyer,
Schurr, and Oh 1987; Moorman, Zaltman, and Desphande 1992) and is generally viewed
as a positive influence on the relationship itself. Bradach and Eccles (1989) suggest that
trust is an expectation that helps alleviate the fear that a channel partner will act
opportunistically. Trust is also required for the development of long term relationships
since, in the short term, there are often inequities that exist between channel partners.
Trust, therefore, acts as a sort of assurance mechanism that over the long term, short term
inequities will be resolved (Anderson and Weitz 1989).
Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh (1987) explain that all contingencies between exchange
partners are impossible to address with formal contracts. However, provided there is
trust between the exchange partners, addressing all possible contingencies is not required
for sustained cooperation between the partnering firms. The presence of trust also allows
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firms to serve customers better, is a more powerful governance mechanism than fear and
generates better performance for partnering firms (Kumar 1996). Doney and Cannon
(1997) describe trust as an “order qualifier” or a prerequisite to even be considered part
of a potential exchange partner‟s consideration set. A number of empirical studies have
shown trust as an important antecedent for the development of commitment to the
relationship itself (e.g. Kwon and Suh 2005; Moorman, Zaltman, and Desphande 1992;
Morgan and Hunt 1994; Verhoef, Franses, and Hoekstra 2002). Finally, in the alliance
literature Gulati (1995), using prior alliances as a surrogate for trust, empirically shows
that the number of prior alliances, or the greater the trust between firms, the less likely
alliances were to be equity based. The implication is that trust between firms can act as a
determinant of governance structure for future alliances.
Despite the surplus of evidence supporting the importance of trust as a relational
construct it has been widely conceptualized and thus defined differently throughout the
marketing, exchange, and relationship literatures (Wilson 1995). Despite the lack of
consensus regarding the definition of trust most of these definitions have adopted either a
behavioral or belief view of the construct (Moorman, Zaltman, and Desphande 1992;
Ring and Van de Ven 1994).
The view of trust as a belief generally entails a sentiment or expectation about the
trustee‟s trustworthiness. Trustworthiness is typically viewed as the result of an
exchange partner‟s expertise, reliability or intentionality (Moorman, Zaltman, and
Desphande 1992). Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) further explored these elements
though they were labeled ability, benevolence, and integrity. Ability is recognized as
“the group of skills, competencies, and characteristics that enable a party to have
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influence within some specific domain” (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman 1995 p. 717).
Benevolence is defined as the extent the trustee wants to do good by the trustor (Mayer,
Davis, and Schoorman 1995). Benevolence can be said to encompass a positive affect
between two trusting parties. The “good will” and genuine desire to help a partnering
firm succeed and reach organizational and other objectives is encompassed in the
benevolence aspect of trustworthiness. Integrity involves the trustor‟s belief that the
trustee adheres to a set of guiding principals that the focal firm finds acceptable (Mayer,
Davis, and Schoorman 1995). These elements of trustworthiness are believed to be
useful in measuring the relationship between trust and the dark side and are thus
discussed more thoroughly in chapter three or the operationalization section of this
dissertation.
The behavioral view of trust stems from an exchange partner‟s willingness to be
vulnerable (Coleman 1990; Moorman, Zaltman, and Desphande 1992). The behavioral
aspect of trust as described here manifests when firms actually put themselves in a
position of vulnerability, or perhaps, by the act of engaging in an exchange relationship,
put themselves at risk. Proponents of this view of trust suggest that though an exchange
partner might be trustworthy, without actually engaging in the relationship there is no risk
and thus, no need for trust. It is the risk that stimulates the onset of trust between the
firms not just their belief in their partnering firm‟s benevolence, ability or integrity.
Moorman, Zaltman, and Desphande (1992) defined trust as “A willingness to rely on
an exchange partner in whom one has confidence” (p. 315). This definition encompasses
both the belief and the behavioral views of trust. The willingness to rely implies an
action or behavior on the part of the trustor while having confidence in the trustee speaks
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to the trustor‟s belief in the trustee. The authors argue that a definition of trust that
encompasses both the belief and behavioral views is essential because without both views
trust can not exist. A willingness to rely on an exchange partner does not by itself imply
trust as power and control might be driving the reliance. Also, believing an exchange
partner to be trustworthy without a willingness to rely on them inhibits trusts ability to
manifest between the exchange partners (Moorman, Zaltman, and Desphande 1992). For
the purposes of this dissertation, this conceptualization of trust, as defined by Moorman,
Zaltman, and Deshpande (1992) will be utilized.
This is an appropriate definition for investigating trust and its relationship to the dark
side of B2B relationships. This is because of the belief that a firm‟s willingness to
become vulnerable to the actions of a partnering firm and these actions subsequently
having unexpected negative consequences is where the dark side resides.
The following discussion will explore potential relationships between trust and how
trust potentially influences the onset of the dark side of B2B relationships. Specifically,
the following discussion will propose relationships between trust and how it might hasten
the onset of the dark side symptoms between firms who have engaged in an exchange or
other B2B relationship.
Trust and Relational Myopia
Though perhaps counterintuitive a focal firm that has a high level of trust in a
partnering firm may influence the onset of the dark side symptom of relationship myopia.
Consider a focal firm that engages in a long-term B2B relationship with another firm,
specifically for the partnering firm‟s problem solving abilities. The partnering firm may
have equipment, knowledge, problem specific experience or some other resources
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available that enable them to solve the focal firm‟s problems. The partnering firm
probably also has a good reputation for treating their exchange partners well while
delivering products or service without issue or hassle. Relational myopia may become a
problem when conditions change in such a way that current specifics regarding the
relationship require in some changes or updating. This is consistent with Cyert and
March‟s (1963) generalizations regarding firm‟s perceptions and the incorporation of bias
which can restrict or perhaps narrow their view of the environment.
If a focal firm trusts their partnering firm to deliver solutions a certain way they might
not want their partnering firm to change their way of doing things even when these
changes are really updates to such things as equipment and processes. Therefore, the
partnering firm might resist the need to change or update how they deliver their solutions
to the focal firm, potentially forgoing efficiency and cost savings realized by changing
the method with which these solutions are delivered. Obviously, some amount of time
will need to pass in order for conditions to change in such a way as to allow for the onset
of relational myopia. More specifically, though the relationship may be ideally
constructed to take advantage of the environment when the relationship is first forged,
over time, the condition is likely to change which will require the firms in the relationship
to reassess the details and dynamics that govern the B2B relationship. If this doesn‟t
happen then the firms can be said to have adopted a myopic view of the relationship. In
this scenario the environment must first change in a way that dictates action. This change
can not happen without the passage of time and thus, the argument for the moderating
role of time is derived.

72

Relational myopia that is stimulated by the trust relational partners invest in each other
may also develop when firms put their trust in their exchange partner‟s good intentions.
As focal firms put their trust into their exchange partner to both deliver their product and
or services as agreed and to make these deliveries with the focal firm‟s best interest in
mind, the incentive to monitor both the relationship and relational partner wanes or
disappears altogether. As long as things go according to expectations a narrow view of
the relationship may develop and endure, over time, as there is nothing provoking a
change in view toward the relationship. This might not initially appear to be a problem.
So long as partnering firms are not taking advantage of the trust bestowed upon them
there may not appear to be any real dark side issue. However, over time, narrowed views
may not permit the type of evaluation of the relationship that could lead to such things as
efficiency increases, cost cutting initiatives, and the recognition of better, more profitable
exchange partners. In other words, as mentioned above, over time the relationship will
change and if the firms involved in the relationship do not take steps to assess their
needed reactions to the change in the environment, then it can be said that over time, the
B2B relational partners have adopted a myopic view of their relationship.
Though predominately anecdotal and sparse there is some literature that indirectly
alludes to these relationships between trust and relationship myopia. Merriden (1999)
explains that fast growth companies often view the relationships they have with a typical
type of consumer in one market the same way as they do in other markets. As firms
move from one market to another they have developed a sense of trust in the customers
they currently have. As a firm moves into the next market the myopic firm will allow
this sense of trust in the customers from the preceding market to dictate the view the firm
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will have of the customers in the newer market. Though this is not directly analogous to
the example described above it is a good illustration of how relationship myopia might,
over time, be brought on by trust. To aid in the support of this relationship, specific
questions were asked interview participants. The participants were asked about the long
view of the relationship vs. the short view and how the adoption of a view is related to
trust. The interview participants were also asked to discuss the good and bad sides of this
relationship. The 29 year old sales rep said the following:
“I have clients that trust me to not give them things they don’t want. They know I
know what they want and I know I know what they want so the relationship is
easier that way. It takes some time to get to this point though, you have to prove
you know them well enough before they’ll trust you like this.”
It seems intuitive that if firms are focusing all of their attention on their competition
then they have a very trusting relationship with their current relationship partners. Firms
would not be able to focus all of their attention on just their competition if they did not
trust in their partner‟s abilities and intentions to fulfill these obligations in a way deemed
appropriate and acceptable to the focal firm. Therefore, these competitive myopic firms
are probably also relationally myopic as a narrower focus on their competition leaves
little room for a broad view of their exchange relationships. Trust in this situation is an
enabling condition for the onset of relational myopia. It is from this discussion pertaining
to trust, relational myopia and the moderating role of time that the following hypothesis
is presented:
H6: Over time there will be a positive relationship between trust and relational
myopia
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Trust and Complacency
It is easy to see how a focal firm that trusts its partnering firm will hasten the onset of
complacency. The focal firm builds up confidence in their channel partner and
subsequently stops looking for other perspective channel partners that can fulfill the
needs of the focal firm. Relationship seeking and the subsequent building of the
relationship can be an expensive and frustrating endeavor (Hibbard el al. 2001; Palmatier,
Gopalakrishna and Houston 2006). It has been shown empirically that the greater the
investments in the relationship, the less partners are apt to leave the relationship
(Ranganathan, Seo and Babad 2006). Drawing from these results, it can be inferred that
firm‟s will not typically have the incentive to keep looking for another partner after
having found one capable of delivering what is needed. The amount of time and effort
required to find a suitable partner precludes these efforts after a firm finds a suitable
partner (Ranganathan, Seo, and Babad 2006). Therefore, so long as the partnering firm
lives up to the focal firm‟s expectations about what is to be delivered, the focal firm will
not keep scanning the environment for other opportunities and hence the onset of
complacency. That is to say, the costs associated with relational partnering can be
excessive. In an effort to safeguard the firm‟s assets, firms will stop investing in
relationship building activities after they have found trustworthy exchange partners.
Provided the focal firm trusts the partnering firm, the costs of relationship building
essentially dictates a complacent attitude. However, if the firm does not trust their
exchange partners then it is more likely that such a complacent attitude will not set in as
the firm will continue to look for better alternatives outside their current exchange
relationship as well as monitor their exchange partner‟s actions.
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The onset of complacency may also become an issue when a focal firm trusts in the
goodwill and intentions of their partnering firm that the attitude they have toward their
exchange relationship becomes complacent. This happens as firm‟s progress through a
relationship without any detrimental issues occurring between the firms severe enough to
damage the trust the firms have between each other. In other words, trust drifts into
complacency. It‟s easy to see how a firm engaged in such a relationship might develop a
complacent attitude toward the relationship when there are never any issues that call into
question a partnering firm‟s goodwill or intentions. The relationship then might become
stale over time (Doyle, Corstjens, and Michell 1980; Grayson and Ambler 1999;
Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshpande 1992). Though the firms never lose faith in each
other trust begins to morph into complacency as each firm begins to expect the status quo
(Robinson 2005). Once firms have become complacent toward their relational partner(s)
there is less effort and resources put toward the relationship in an effort to keep it vibrant
and functional (Halinen 1997). In other words, trust not only allows for the onset of
complacency but, as some authors suggest, actually becomes the complacent attitude
between the firms (e.g. Bantu-Gomez and Bantu-Gomez 2007; Robinson 2005).
Of course, as with the other relationships between relational constructs and dark side
sentiments discussed in this dissertation, the influence trust has on complacency is
expected to occur over time. As mentioned above, trust is expected to morph into
complacency (Robinson 2005). Obviously, in order for something to “morph” into
something else, a certain amount of time must first elapse. This is an intuitively plausible
assertion. Trust is typically thought of as a positive influence on B2B relationships and
the development of the B2B relationship itself (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; Moorman,
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Zaltman and Desphande 1992; Morgan and Hunt 1994). It does not make sense that trust
induced complacency would manifest during the initial phases of the relationship. In the
beginning firms will be more attentive and active in assuring the relationship is behaving
and producing as expected. Complacency can not set in unless the relational partners
have witnessed the types of behaviors expected from a trusted relational B2B partner.
That is, the firms must first develop trust in their partners. This takes time. Then trust
has to lull the partners into complacency. Again, this is expected to take time. Robinson
(2005) supports this belief concerning the moderating influence time has on the
relationship between trust and complacency. Specifically, he states “However, there is a
danger that trust can drift into complacency and a lack of attention to the service being
provided can result in a slipping of standards” (Robinson 2005, p. 18). The “drifting”
from trust into complacency implies the necessary component of time. From the
discussion above, regarding the relationship between trust and complacency, the
following hypothesis is deduced:
H7: Over time there will be a positive relationship between trust and
complacency
Trust and Vulnerability
The relationship between trust and vulnerability can be drawn from the definition of
trust being used in this dissertation as well as the many pieces of research that have
recognized the link between the willingness to trust a relational partner and subsequently
put oneself at risk (e.g. Barney and Hansen 1994; Bradach and Eccles 1989; Gambetta
1988; McEvily, Perrone, and Zaheer 2003; Moorman, Desphande, and Zaltman 1992).
The link between vulnerability and trust is so fundamental that some researchers use
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vulnerability to help define trust. For example, Deutsch (1962) defined trust as “actions
that increase one‟s vulnerability to another” while Banery and Hansen (1994) defined
trust as “the mutual confidence that no party to an exchange will exploit another‟s
vulnerabilities” (p. 176).
Moorman, Zaltman, and Desphande (1994) make the point that without vulnerability
there would be no need for trust as the application of trust implies the importance of
outcomes for the trustor. Therefore, based on the behavioral dimension of being willing
to take risks by believing the trustee will act and do as expected automatically implies the
positive link between trust and vulnerability.
As a focal firm places trust in the partnering firm they are not only believing the
partnering firm can do what is expected of them, they are also assuming some risk by
having a vested interest in the partnering firm actually fulfilling their obligations
(Moorman, Zaltman, and Desphande 1992). If a focal firm places trust in a partnering
firm they are making the firm vulnerable to some sort of consequence if the partnering
firm does not actually possess the ability to do what the focal firm expects. The
partnering firm may be incompetent regarding what is needed by the focal firm though
the focal firm may trust they are fully capable of delivering. The focal firm may feel a
sense of vulnerability when the partnering firm fails to deliver, perhaps due to loss of
expert personnel, equipment damage or some other contingency. As time passes, the
focal firm will begin to feel the loss associated with their partnering firm‟s inability to
perform the contracted tasks.
This argument also speaks to the influence time has on the relationship between trust
and vulnerability. A number of researchers have employed the passage of time as a
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variable that enhances the relational and long term orientation of firms in business to
business relationships (Ganesan 1994; Lusch and Brown 1996). The primary argument
for time‟s ability to enhance such relational variables as trust, communication, and
satisfaction stems from the notion that as time goes by and the relationship develops,
belief about the partnering firm(s) is replaced with experience. Specifically, as time goes
on, information about the partnering firm is released or discovered (Park and Russo
1996). Assurances of mutual trust are either confirmed or denied as measures of such
things as ability and trustworthiness can be assessed (Park and Russo 1996).
However, though some researchers have mentioned the possibility of firms not
meeting expectations (e.g. Anderson and Weitz 1989; Davies and Prince 2005; Park and
Russo 1996) most researches glance over the potential consequences of this relational
failure, assuming that unsatisfactory relationships simply terminate (Anderson and Weitz
1989). Therefore, enduring relationships are by default functional, well run
establishments.
It is the position of this dissertation that this is an unrealistic assumption. Many
dysfunctional relationships endure, over time, simply out of need or lack of alternatives.
If a firm invests in a B2B relationship simply to find out that the relationship is an
underperformer, or worse the relational partner will exploit their vulnerabilities, it is
assuredly cause for the termination of the B2B relationship. However, over time, and
after such investments have been made, firms may no longer have the ability to seek out
and develop another relationship with a different exchange partner. Also, the market may
no longer be able to provide better relational options, effectively forcing firms to
maintain less than optimal and/or desirable exchange relationships. A situation such as
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this seems likely to help usher in the dark side symptom of vulnerability. This is
consistent with the dependence perspective of B2B relationship performance. This
theoretical perspective suggests that B2B relationships that are asymmetrical typically
adversely affect firm performance as there are no barriers to the use of coercive power
(Palmatier, Dant, and Grewal 2007). As dependent firms realize they have exposed
themselves and partnered with a partner that is unable or unwilling to meet relationship
expectations and the focal firm does not have the ability to remedy the situation the focal
firm may begin to feel as if their trust was misplaced and consequently begin to feel
vulnerable.
It will take time for the focal firm to realize that they have partnered with a less than
ideal exchange partner. Over time, as the focal firm realizes their partner isn‟t ideal,
vulnerability may set in as the focal firm begins to wonder if their exchange partner is
hurting such things as efficiencies, productivity and profitability. Perhaps questions about
the viability of the exchange partner arise forcing the focal firm to wonder what will
happen to them if their exchange partner goes out of business. More succinctly, as a
focal firm realizes they have invested in a poor B2B relationship with a less than
desirable exchange partner they may begin to feel vulnerable as they wonder what
deleterious effects their poor relational choice is having on the viability of their firm. The
passage of time is needed in this situation to allow for the ineptitude of the partnering
firm to manifest and become apparent to the focal firm. Therefore:
H8: Over time there will be a positive relationship between trust and vulnerability
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Trust and Suspicion
From the above discussion on trust, it should become more apparent that engaging in a
RM strategy entails a certain amount of risk which requires a certain amount of trust on
the part of the partnering firms (c.f. Bradach and Eccles 1989; Coleman 1990; Moorman,
Zaltman, and Desphande 1992). Firms have to be willing to trust that investments in the
relationship will yield benefits not afforded to the firm by adopting a more discrete or
transactional exchange philosophy. Firms, have to be willing to trust partnering firms to
reciprocate investments to both build and maintain the relationship as a functioning entity
that again yields benefits not otherwise provided by a different exchange philosophy.
Finally, firms have to trust partnering firms not to take advantage of their exposed and
vulnerable position regarding information, or the exploitation of dependence asymmetries
that may have developed within the relationship.
Given the risk associated with entering trusting long term B2B relationships it
becomes more intuitive as to how suspicion might become a problem between partnering
firms over a period of time. It is certainly impossible to monitor the totality of a
partnering firm‟s actions (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987). If this was possible then trust
would not be an issue or a needed component for a successful relationship (Moorman,
Zaltman, and Desphande 1992). Monitoring mechanisms would not need to be put in
place to guard against any unforeseen actions or behaviors that the focal firm would like
to avoid. However, this is not the case and thus opens the door for certain activities or
actions to damage the strength of the relationship, including the trust between firms.
Such actions include opportunistic behavior (e.g. John 1984; Kwon and Suh 2005;
Williamson 1975) destructive, abusive or punitive acts (e.g. Baker 2006; Hibbard, Kumar
81

and Stern 2001; Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1998). These potentially harmful and
destructive behaviors that occur between channel members speak mainly to the integrity
of the partnering firm (e.g. opportunism) or benevolence of the partnering firm (e.g.
destructive or punitive acts). However, a partnering firm that is not able to deliver what
they say, or lack the equipment, expertise or resources to do what is expected are also real
concerns that are linked directly to a focal firm‟s trust in a partnering firm (Mayer, Davis,
and Schoorman 1995).
The manifestation of suspicion within the relationship is the product of one or both
firms having believed it has endured some sort of act (rightly or wrongly) that damaged
the trust between the firms. This is consistent with Halinen and Tahtinen‟s process
theory of relationship ending where precipitating events lead to the eventual end of the
relationship. Though this dissertation is not suggesting that every relationship which
experiences such an event will end, it does suggest that there is a relational consequence
when B2B relationships experience such events. For instance, as trust between firms
decreases suspicion between firms will increase. Obviously, one potential course of
action for dealing with a loss of trust is the ending or dissolution of the exchange
relationship all together, as mentioned above and this remedy is logical provided the firm
or firms can survive without each other.
However, in asymmetric relationships it may be that one partner is dependent on the
other. In situations like this, offended firms may have no choice but to accept a loss of
trust in their partners. Should such a situation arise the offended firms are likely to
engage in behaviors symptomatic of the onset of suspicion. For instance, firms may have
to re-arrange the business relationship and enact controls to safeguard against future
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destructive behaviors. A firm might decrease transaction specific investments, as well as
move toward more transactional exchange in an effort to decrease some of the
transparency of the firm. Communications may become less integrated in an effort to
reduce exposure of vulnerabilities to the partnering firm. Keeping a more watchful eye,
asking specific questions about the offending party‟s activities that weren‟t asked prior to
the loss of trust, demanding clearer more specific accounts of the offending party‟s
actions or just committing more time, personnel and resources toward guarding against
behaviors of the offending firm are all potential manifestations of the new suspicious
attitude of the offended exchange partner. It takes time for a focal firm to realize the
types of behaviors described above that provoke feelings of suspicion. Again, this has to
do with a partnering firm not having the ability to take advantage, invoke or levy any sort
of destructive act on the focal firm in the initial phases of the relationship. It is only after
the passage of time that firms will act destructively toward the relationship and relational
partners. Therefore, the moderating role of time is believed to significantly influence the
relationship between trust and suspicion.
H9: Over time there will be a positive relationship between Trust and Suspicion
Satisfaction and the Dark Side of RM
Satisfaction
Satisfaction within the consumer literature has been conceptualized as either
transaction specific satisfaction or cumulative satisfaction (Anderson, Fornell, and
Lehmann 1994; Dant, Brown, and Bagozzi; Garbarino, and Johnson 1999). Transaction
specific satisfaction entails a post choice evaluation of a specific purchase occasion
(Anderson, Fornell, and Lehmann 1994). Cronin and Taylor (1992) embraced this
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conceptualization of satisfaction in their study investigating service quality and its
relationships with consumer satisfaction, and purchase intentions. Wilson (1995) also
embraced a similar conceptualization of satisfaction when developing his integrated
model of buyer-seller relationships. Cumulative customer satisfaction can be viewed as
an overall evaluation based on the totality of the purchase and consumption experience
over time (Anderson, Fornell, and Lehman 1994).
However, within the marketing channels literature, satisfaction is most often
conceived of as an overall evaluation and affective response toward one‟s exchange
partner (Anderson and Narus 1984; Dant, Brown, and Bagozzi; Gaski, and Nevin 1985;
Scheer and Stern 1992). This conceptualization of satisfaction is derived from an
appraisal of all aspects of an exchange relationship one partner has with another
(Anderson and Narus 1984). The adoption of this conceptualization of satisfaction seems
most appropriate in a relational exchange context as evaluating outcomes and
consequences according to each transaction runs counter to the relational exchange
philosophy.
Using this conceptualization of satisfaction, Scheer and Stern (1992) were able to
show that positively framed contingent rewards result in greater satisfaction than
negatively framed contingent rewards or contingent penalties. Gaski and Nevin (1985)
also used this conceptualization of satisfaction in their investigation of the effects of
exercised and unexercised power within a channels setting. This study found that
exercising coercive sources of power will have a more negative influence as compared to
just the presence of these coercive sources. While exercising non-coercive sources of
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power will more positively influence satisfaction than the simple presence of these noncoercive (reward) sources of power.
Anderson and Narus (1990) found that trust has a positive influence on relationship
satisfaction in the channels context while conflict influences satisfaction negatively.
Also, in this study, the authors found that positive outcomes, compared to outcomes
obtained from previous relationships or knowledge of similar relationships also had a
positive influence on satisfaction.
Contrary to Anderson and Narus (1990) who found trust to be antecedent to
satisfaction is Ganesan (1994) who found that satisfaction is actually antecedent to trust.
Still, other researchers have satisfaction in conjunction with trust as a measure of
relationship quality between two partnering firms (e.g. Crosby, Evans, and Cowles 1990;
Leuthesser 1997).
Though this overall assessment of the exchange relationship has been the most widely
utilized conceptualization of satisfaction within the channels and exchange literatures,
Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar (1999) make a distinction between economic and noneconomic satisfaction. Economic satisfaction is defined as a channel member‟s positive
affective response to the economic rewards that flow from the relationship with its
partner, such as sales volume and margins (Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 1999 p.
224). Noneconomic satisfaction is defined as “a channel member‟s positive affective
response to the noneconomic, psychosocial aspects of its relationship, in that interactions
with the exchange partner are fulfilling, gratifying, and easy” (Geyskens, Steenkamp, and
Kumar 1999, p. 224). Noneconomic satisfaction, in contrast to economic satisfaction, is
more concerned with the process and continues dynamics of the relationship and less on
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the tangible performance outcomes associated with economic satisfaction. Just as with
the components of the relational constructs discussed above, this distinction within the
satisfaction construct is further explored in the operationalization section or Chapter three
of this dissertation.
Though this conceptualization of satisfaction is insightful it has not been widely
adopted in the channels and exchange literatures; perhaps, because the above definition
of satisfaction or the notion of “overall” satisfaction is said to subsume both economic
and noneconomic satisfaction (Dant, Brown, and Bagozzi). As the majority of research
investigating the satisfaction construct in the relational exchange context is concerned
with the influence of all forms of satisfaction the adoption of this “overall”
conceptualization seems appropriate and is the conceptualization adopted for this
dissertation.
Satisfaction and Relationship Myopia
Perhaps the most evident of Cyert and March‟s (1963) application of the behavioral
theory of the firm lies in the relationships between satisfaction, relational myopia and
complacency. Cyert and March‟s generalizations for the firm explain that firms will
routinize recurring processes as well incorporate biases that reflect past experience.
Those generalizations also state that firms will continue to behave as they have until they
perceive problems. In conjunction with these generalizations suggest so long as things
are going well the firm will simply do as it always has and forgo any actions that may
lead to any significant changes in the B2B relationship or its processes. Specifically,
satisfaction may lead to relational myopia when a firm becomes too comfortable or
satisfied with the results of the relationship itself. For instance, an economically satisfied
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firm that is deriving its satisfaction with the channels relationship primarily from the
economic rewards resulting from the relationship might easily adopt a narrow focus of
the relationship if it looks only at the economic aspects of their business relationship.
Such firms might view their channel partners as a revenue producing agent and only a
revenue producing agent. In such a situation the focal firm might not realize the shared
values, be as committed or trust their partnering firm as much as another firm that
embraces a more holistic view of their channel relationships. Relational myopia,
therefore, is brought on by the primarily economic focus of the relationship. However,
focusing only on the economic aspects of the relationship is definitely narrow or
shortsighted as today‟s highly integrated channel relationships have a level of dynamics
not common to most discrete relationships.
In a similar vein, firms that are non-economically satisfied may also become
relationally myopic. Relationship myopia manifest when partnering firms become so
consumed with this aspect of the relationship that they neglect the reason for the
partnership in the first place. RM and relational exchange is, after all, a business strategy
which has been cited many times as helping firms reach financial objectives (e.g. Allen
1988; Bejou 1997; Gummesson 1987; Priluck 2003). The myopic perspective is that
firms can become so satisfied with the positive affect produced by the relationship that
their commitment is more to this aspect of the relationship and not the attainment of firm
or financial objectives. To be focused primarily on the positive affect of the relationship
describes a shortsighted view of the relationship and thus, the relationship between
noneconomic satisfaction and relational myopia:
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It is also believed that when firms are satisfied with all aspects of the relationship, both
economic and non-economic, they can still adopt a myopic view of their exchange
relationship. When firms are satisfied they may be lulled into a sort of comfort that
doesn‟t necessarily preclude monitoring of the relationship but it also doesn‟t require it.
If firms are satisfied with the results of their exchange relationship they may lack the
incentive to stay vigilant about it. In such a scenario it is likely then that firms, seeing
results that produce satisfaction, fail to see the opportunities for improvements. So long
as they are satisfied they fail to see areas for improvement, cost cutting initiatives and
potentially better relationship choices. So long as firms are this satisfied, they will not
take the long view of the relationship which by default means the adoption of a short
view which is indicative of the relational myopia construct being described here.
Finally, the influence the passage of time has on the relationship between satisfaction
and relational myopia needs to be mentioned. Time is needed in order for satisfaction to
manifest within the relationship. After exchange partners act in a way that is expected
and is consistent with the contractual and behavioral demands of the other partner(s)
within the relationship the focal firm then has reason to become satisfied. Likewise, time
also needs to pass in order to have satisfaction influence the onset of relational myopia.
Only after firms have become satisfied that they will begin to behave in the ways
mentioned above that describe the onset of relational myopia, as influenced by
satisfaction. This is due to the belief that it takes time for the lulling effects of
satisfaction to set in and subsequently provoke the onset of relational myopia. The
relationship between satisfaction and relational myopia over time is supported by the
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qualitative results collected during the interviews for this dissertation. The 64 year old
quasi-retired management consultant responded with:
“It does seem as if companies, when they become satisfied with their business
partners, will often start accepting everything their partners say. They just go
along with their ideas because it seems to be working….”
This passage can be interpreted as supporting the relationship between relational
myopia and complacency as it infers both a narrowed view of the relationship by one
firm simply accepting their partner‟s view but it also implies complacency by that same
partner by not putting forth the effort to know if their partner‟s view of the relationship is
appropriate or not.
H10: Over time there is a positive relationship between satisfaction and
relational myopia
Satisfaction and Complacency
As stated by many marketing scholars as well as marketing text books, a satisfied firm
does not necessarily imply a loyal or happy partnering firm (e.g. Johnston and Marshall
2006; Torres and Kline 2006). Therefore, it stands to reason that satisfied firms might be
nothing more than content in their current channel relationships (Skogland and Siguaw
2004). It is therefore no logical stretch to suggest that complacency may manifest in
exchange relationships that can be characterized as nothing more than satisfied. Kumar
Olshavsky and King (2001) found that levels of satisfaction influence loyalty. That is,
the more satisfied the customer the more loyal they are said to be. Extrapolating these
results to the B2B relationship context, it can be said that how satisfied a firm is with
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their exchange partner influences the probably of that partner becoming complacent
versus staying vigilant and active in maintaining the relationship.
When satisfied firms are enjoying success they have no motivation to continue to
monitor the environment in search of better alternatives or other business opportunities
that might prove more beneficial to the focal firm (Hibbard et. al 2001). Just because
firms begin to realize financial success, does not mean they could not realize more if they
continue to monitor the environment and their relationship in search of such
opportunities. However, satisfied firms don‟t necessarily embrace this incentive as they
are realizing success which may act as a hindrance against this sort of behavior.
Ping (1993) found that firms that are satisfied in their exchange relationships are less
apt to leave these relationships. Other researchers have found that the more satisfied a
customer is the more committed they are to the salesperson or firm (Johnson, Barksdale,
and Boles 2001). Hocutt (1998) found that the more satisfied a customer is with a
salesperson the more committed to that salesperson the customer is. Finally, Priluck
(2003) found that customers who are engaged in a relationship will be more satisfied with
poor product performance than customers not engaged in a relationship.
All of these pieces describe scenarios that, on their face, look positive, but might
actually breed the onset of complacency. The above mentioned literature describes
customers that are willing to cope with less than optimal performance, or remain
committed to a relationship simply out of their satisfaction with it. These pieces show the
influence satisfaction has on “not” looking for other relationships and thus the onset of
complacency.
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Another plausible scenario that links satisfaction to complacency can be constructed
via the notion that depending on the amount of satisfaction, it may not be a strong enough
influence to produce anything more than a non-negative evaluation of the exchange
partner (Kumar, Olshavasky, and King 2001; Torres and Kline 2006). If the amount of
satisfaction is low then it is plausible that the focal firm, though not unhappy with their
current exchange partner, isn‟t necessarily overjoyed with the current state of the
exchange relationship either. This may be due to any number of reasons; the current
exchange partner is not the focal firm‟s first choice, the exchange partner is helping to
meet objectives but not exceed them, there is nothing unique or special about the
exchange partner and the service or products they provide but are suitable for the focal
firms needs etc. If such a scenario exists then the focal firm may have what they need in
an exchange partner but nothing more. The focal firm may not see the use in working to
enhance this type of relationship or have the motivation to do so. Therefore, the onset of
complacency becomes more probable.
Referring to the age of the relationship, though researchers have shown relationship
age to positively influence satisfaction in the exchange relationship (Flavian, Guinaliu,
and Torres 2005; Verhoef, Franses, and Hoekstra 2002), it is also believed that as time
passes the more satisfied firms are likely to be with their exchange partners. The more
satisfied firms are the less apt to look around for other alternatives, essentially “settling”
on the exchange partners they have without consideration of potentially better exchange
partners. A sort of “if it ain‟t broke don‟t fix it” attitude may develop keeping the firms
from constantly seeking process improvements or other relational benefits and outcomes
not being realized by the relationship in its present form. It is from this logic that the
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influence of time can be introduced as a moderating variable between satisfaction and
complacency. Therefore:
H11: Over time there is a positive relationship between satisfaction and
complacency
Satisfaction and Vulnerability
Satisfied firms may feel vulnerable because of their lack of touch regarding the rest of
the alternative relationships possible. Also, such firms may not have their finger on the
pulse of the dynamics of the channel or exchange relationship and therefore, over time,
may lose their barometer of what is going on between the two firms. The sense of
vulnerability stems from the notion that satisfied firms are aware of this lack of
knowledge or involvement and though they are satisfied with the results and perhaps
have no intention of becoming more relationally focused, over time, satisfied firms still
feel vulnerable regarding its exchange relationship.
Obviously, for such firms the corrective action would be to get more involved with the
relationship itself and move the relationship from a passive satisfaction where the firm is
content to let things be, so long as the results are good, to a more active satisfaction
where the firm, though satisfied with the current results, actively seeks ways for
improvement. However, not all firms have the ability, resources or knowledge to do this
while others are willing to accept the vulnerability in lieu of dedicating needed resources
toward becoming more relationally focused. Therefore, such firms, as time goes by, are
somewhat forced to accept the positive benefits of the relationship without ever having
their finger on the pulse of the relationship; Hence the hastening of a sense of
vulnerability for the satisfied firm. That is to say, firms may not have any issue with their
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lack of awareness concerning their B2B relationships initially, but over time are expected
to develop feelings of vulnerability as they realize they have very little control or even
understanding of their B2B relationships that are potentially significant contributors to
the focal firm‟s viability, profitability and over all performance. It is intuitive that such
feelings of vulnerability will manifest in firms like the ones described because firms will
naturally want to have as much control as possible over the things that influence them the
most. Satisfaction might lull firms into a “hands off” sort of attitude toward the
governing of the relationship with their B2B partners but this attitude is believed to
eventually lead to feelings of vulnerability as firms realize their satisfaction with the
relationship has led them to a position of little or no control over the relationship and
consequently left them vulnerable to the actions of their exchange partners. From this
logic, the following hypothesis is presented:
H12: Over time there is a positive relationship between satisfaction and
vulnerability
Satisfaction and Suspicion
Just as satisfied firms may feel vulnerable due to their lack of touch regarding the rest
of their relationships they may also begin to feel suspicious of their exchange partners.
The sense of suspicion stems from being satisfied without being engaged. Perhaps there
are firms that for any number of reasons seek a passive relationship that focuses on
results and not the dynamics of the exchange relationship. Therefore, so long as the
results are as expected the firms remain satisfied but again, as with the relationship
between satisfaction and vulnerability, discussed above, they remain out of touch and
unaware. It then makes sense that though satisfaction with the results of the relationship
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may be the primary goal of the focal firm, not knowing what is stemming or producing
these results may begin to breed feelings of both vulnerability and suspicion. Also, as
with the relationship between satisfaction and vulnerability, time, is again expected to
play a moderating influence on the relationship between satisfaction and suspicion. Just
as above, time is required to lull firms into feelings of satisfaction and this “hands off”
attitude toward the relationship. As time goes on and the firm becomes more and more
detached from the relationship for the reasons described above, suspicion is expected to
grow.
It might be argued that satisfaction is not the reason for the onset of suspicion in such
a scenario but that other forces are at work, in conjunction with the onset of satisfaction
that is the real catalyst of the dark side symptom(s). The counterargument to this line of
thinking is that it was the satisfaction with the results of the relationship that lead to the
disengagement or otherwise apathetic stance toward anything except the status quo
regarding the results of the exchange relationship. So, from a relational perspective, it
can be argued that if firms do not become satisfied with their exchange partners and
relationships they will stay vigilant with regard to things like monitoring, actively
pursuing improvement and making sure things are working the way they are supposed to.
When firms become satisfied with things, the incentive to remain active may wane which
thus, helps provoke the onset of both vulnerability and suspicion. Therefore, the succinct
argument for this logic is that if firms do not allow for the onset of satisfaction then
vulnerability and suspicion will not be able to develop and therefore:
H13: Over time there is a positive relationship between satisfaction and
suspicion
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The Dark Side of RM and its Influence on Relationship Strength
Relationship strength can be described as a relational construct that embodies the
overall depth and climate of a B2B relationship (Johnson 1999). The assessment of a
B2B relationship is said to hinge on such things as how well each relational partner
fulfills expectations, predictions, goals and the desires of the partnering firms (Jarvelin
and Lehtinen, 1996) and these assessments are believed to manifest in a relationship
partner‟s evaluation of the strength of the B2B relationship. It is believed that the dark
side constructs, discussed above, will influence the strength of the relationship in much
the same way they are believed to influence performance. A more detailed discussion of
relationship strength and its relationship to the four dark side constructs is discussed
below.
Relational Myopia and Relationship Strength
Relationship myopia will have the potential to hinder the decision making ability of
two partnering firms effectively reducing their ability to take corrective action against
market hazards. Relational myopia may also inhibit partnering firm‟s ability to take
advantage of market opportunities. While accounting for these inabilities, it should be
apparent that opportunity costs associated with missed opportunities represent a potential
for significant financial loss for one or both of the partnering firms. The potentially more
serious issue is the firms‟ inability to guard against market hazards. The manifestation of
this issue may result in large financial outlays to compensate for an issue that was never
addressed when it was still on the horizon. Typically, preventative action is less costly
than corrective action. So again, relationship myopia may lead to a larger outlay of funds
than had the relationship not become myopic.
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Stock (2002), when addressing the issue of myopia in the logistics context, warns
practitioners and academics alike of the dangers of myopia as he alludes to its potential
negative influence on performance. Specifically, he warns not to adopt too narrow a
focus of the discipline as it may not realize its responsibilities to other areas of the firm as
well as keep the discipline from reaching its full potential.
Anderson and Narus (1990) suggest that satisfaction with a business relationship can
serve as an indicator of relationship success or relationship strength. This
conceptualization of satisfaction is rooted in the partnering firms meeting each others‟
performance expectations (Anderson and Narus 1990; Johnson 1999). Using satisfaction
as a measure of relationship strength might represent a significant opportunity costs due
to performance expectations potentially falling short of performance potential. In other
words, being satisfied with expectations might imply the dedication of just enough
energy and resources to meet expectations but not enough energy and resources to meet
performance potential. Though researchers have used satisfaction as a proxy for
relationship strength (e.g. Anderson and Narus 1990; Johnson 1999; Mohr and Spekman
1994) what might be revealed is simply a firm obtaining a level of mediocrity that allows
the relationship to continue. The narrow view of relationship strength is thus rooted in
using satisfaction synonymously with strength. If the firms adopt a broader view of what
is possible and what relationship strength is, aside from just the attainment of
expectations, greater financial rewards might then be possible. However, as long as firms
rely on the meeting of expectations as a measure of success, it can be argued that they are
adopting a narrow or shortsighted view of relational success. This proposition can be
theoretically justified by drawing from Cyert and March‟s behavioral theory of the firm
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and the generalization that suggests firms‟ perceptions have bias that reflect their past
experience and future expectations. If firms have adopted such a narrow view of the firm
it may have been from past success which the firm then focuses on. If the firm becomes
focused on their past success and trying to recreate the conditions that provided for that
success they may miss current market opportunities or market hazards. Also, myopic
firms may believe their past success is an indicator of present conditions and believe that
they, as well as their B2B relationships are strong, when in fact, they are not. This
narrow view of relationship success is myopic and may lead the firm to believing that this
narrow view is actually a sign that the relationship is strong, even though it may not be.
The interviews conducted for this dissertation addressed this potential for confusion. The
55 year old government worker said:
“People think that since the relationship is basically on auto pilot that everything
is going good…”
This statement clearly supports the logic that relationship myopia may in fact get
confused for relationship strength. From this discussion a positive relationship between
relational myopia and relationship strength can be presented
H18: There is a positive relationship between relational myopia and relationship
strength
Complacency and Relationship Strength
Like relational myopia, complacency is also believed to have a positive relationship
with relationship strength. This stems from potential confusion regarding relationship
strength and relational inertia. It is easy to see how B2B relationships that have
experienced a degree of success will transfer this success to the strength of their
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relationship. In other words, as goes the outcomes so goes the perception of relationship
strength. There is a potential danger in this sentiment however. Miller (1990) found that
the factors that helped a firm become successful, over time, leads the firm to become
simpler and more narrowly focused. As the firm fails to receive or accept feedback that
would deter them from this simpler point of view they may begin to believe that their past
success is guaranteed and they have figured how to ensure this success.
Transferring this attitude to their relationships logically leads to the belief that the
firm‟s relationships are also very strong. Danger arises when the environment changes
and these changes demand adjustment to the B2B relationship. If firms who have
become complacent, resting on past success, fail to see this need they may continue on
without realizing they are in effect allowing the relationship to weaken even though the
perception of the B2B relationship is that it is very strong.
This scenario implies a positive relationship between complacency and relationship
strength. That is to say, firms who have allowed themselves to become complacent may
confuse this complacent relationship with a strong one. Interview participants were able
to support this hypothesized relationship between complacency and relationship strength.
The 38 year old in charge of purchasing said:
“I definitely think companies will just assume success. I think it has to do with
the investment in the relationship. If my company has been buying from a
company for so many years and there are never any problems, it’s almost as if
they assume no problems means things are going well. They forget that all that
really means is that things aren’t going bad”
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Drawing from the content of the above interview, as well as the above discussion the
following hypothesis is presented.
H19: There is a positive relationship between complacency and relationship
strength
Vulnerability and Relationship Strength
It is contended that the greater the feelings of vulnerability for a focal firm, the more
diminished the firm‟s perception of the strength of their relationship. This diminished
perception of the relationship stems from the firm‟s dedication of resources toward
alleviating feelings of vulnerability instead of dedicating these resources toward
maximizing the efficiencies that might be realized through the relationship. In other
words, instead of trying to be the best relational partner possible, which may provoke
feelings of a strong relationship, firms that feel vulnerable might try to reduce these
feelings of vulnerability by investing resources into eliminating exposures and
monitoring their partnering firm(s) and the environment. These actions seem analogous
to dependence balancing actions described by Heide and John (1988). Heide and John
(1988) explain that firms are motivated to reduce their dependence on partnering firms
and do so through offsetting investments. Both Ganesan (1994) and Inkpen and Beamish
(1997) found support for these dependence balancing actions. If firms are motivated to
monitor their exchange partner then it is probably that the relationship is not going to be
as strong as the monitoring partner believes it can be or even should be.
At the time of this writing, there is no known B2B research that has directly
investigated the relationship between feelings of vulnerability and its potential influence
on relationship strength. However, El Ansary and Stern (1972) have shown that the more
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a firm depends on another firm to achieve its goals the less control the firm has over its
own actions. This relationship suggests that the fewer alternatives a firm has (ergo, the
less power it has) the more vulnerable it is (El Ansary and Stern 1972). Drawing from
this argument, Boag and Dastmalchian (1988) suggests that the more vulnerable a firm,
the less its ability to formulate and implement strategies for prosperity and survival. It
follows then that firms will not feel as if they have a strong relationship if feelings of
vulnerability are provoked as a result of being in the relationship itself. The relationship
between vulnerability and relationship strength was explored during the interviews
conducted for this dissertation. Not surprisingly, this relationship was overwhelmingly
supported in the responses given to the question about the impact feelings of vulnerability
have on the B2B relationship. Below is a representative response from the participants
given by the 29 year old sales rep:
“When you trust someone or let things just run their course, all too often you
might be making yourself open to things that you don’t want like system changes,
price changes, contract changes, and things like that. I think that when you are
suspicious of your partner you might not ever be able to trust that they are going
to do what is right for you and it ultimately hurts the relationship as a whole”
Though Hibbard, Kumar and Stern (2001) do not overtly explore the vulnerability
construct in their work investigating destructive acts, it can be inferred that some of the
responses to these acts are born out of feelings of vulnerability. Specifically,
disengagement from and venting to a channel partner may occur out of feelings of
necessity. A firm may realize that it was exposed to their channel partner and their
partner took advantage of this exposure. It makes sense that if this is the case,
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disengagement or venting is done out of an effort to remove the exposure and the feelings
of vulnerability. Whether the response to the destructive act is disengagement or venting,
the response may be the result of the realization that they are vulnerable or that firms
have taken advantage of that vulnerability. Consequently, such scenarios are believed to
have a detrimental influence on the B2B relationship.
H20: There is a negative relationship between vulnerability and relationship
strength
Suspicion and Relationship Strength
Similar to the relationship between vulnerability and relationship strength, the
relationship between suspicion and relationship strength stems from a firm dedicating
time, money and other resources to guard against what it is suspicious of. If the offended
firm was not suspicious then these resources could be dedicated to something that would
yield gains for the firm and the relationship instead of dedicating resources toward
preventing a loss. Therefore suspicious firms, or relationships characterized as
suspicious, will not be able to take advantage of the efficiencies provided by adopting a
relationship marketing strategy. In other words, the more relational the firms, the more
such things as costs are shared between firms, the more likely firms are to indicate a
strong B2B relationship. As firms step back from relationalism to guard against
unwanted behaviors they are then forced to bear more of the costs that were at one time
shared as well as indicate a damaged B2B relationship. Firms will also spend money and
invest resources to make up for the loss of efficiencies once realized when the firm was
not suspicious of its exchange partner. In summary, the onset of suspicion, justified or

101

not, inevitably costs firms engaged in the relationship in organizational performance as
well as damaging relationship strength.
Like many of the other relationships discussed in this dissertation, the link between
suspicion and relationship strength has not been thoroughly investigated in the channels,
marketing or other B2B literatures. However, with the assumption that feelings of
suspicion will occur for an offended firm upon the discovery of opportunistic behavior, it
is possible to draw from the opportunism literature to help construct the theoretical
negative relationship between suspicion and relationship strength.
Wathne and Heide (2000) explain that opportunism will affect value creation in
different ways. Opportunistic behaviors that may arise between partnering firms are such
things as engaging in behaviors that are prohibited or extracting concessions from a
partnering firm (Wathne and Heide 2000). These opportunistic behaviors are overt and
have the potential to damage the offended firm‟s perception of the relationship.
Investments in monitoring the behaviors of the suspicious firm will be committed,
subsequently damaging the firm‟s overall performance as well as relationship strength.
Aside from the investment of time money and other resources the behavioral implications
of suspicion also may damage a firm‟s perception of relationship strength. Specifically,
upon becoming suspicious of a partnering firm, the offended firm alters its behavior to
guard against suspicious activity. Instead of working to maximize the efforts of the
relationship their behavior may be directed toward defense against suspicious activity.
Instead of promoting increased integration between firms, the offended firm may retreat
from their suspicious partner. The firms are then forced to transact with less transparency
and with less integration. The potential results are less efficiency and increased
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transaction costs which will ultimately hurt their performance as well as the strength of
the relationship.
Jap and Anderson (2003) found that confidence between two transacting individuals
makes the relationship perform better in every respect. Though suspicion is not
mentioned in this article, it is safe to assume that confidence in one‟s partner has an
inverse relationship with suspicion in one‟s partner regarding such things as the
functionality of the relationship. Zineldin and Dodourova (2005) also imply that the
more suspicious one firm is of another, the more likely their alliance will end in failure.
Therefore, it makes sense to assume that the greater the suspicion in the relationship the
worse the relationship strength. Drawing from the discussion on suspicion and
relationship strength, the following hypothesis is presented.
H21: There is a negative relationship between suspicion and relationship
strength
Relationship Strength and Performance
Performance
Relationship marketing has long been viewed as an appropriate and effective tool for
bolstering both firm and relationship performance (Morgan and Hunt 1994; Sheth and
Parvatiyar 1995). This is intuitive as the motivation or incentive to enter into such
relationships seems absent without the partnering firms benefiting in some way. That
firms are motivated to enter into a B2B relationship in an effort to obtain some sort of
benefit or increase in positive outcomes is not in question. However, just exactly what
constitutes positive performance is still very much an unsettled matter within the
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relationship and B2B literatures (Ailawadi, Dant and Grewal 2004; Valos and Vocino
2006).
Valos and Vocino (2006) conducted a thorough review of how researchers have
gauged channel performance. The authors identified several seemingly dichotomist
choices researchers have made when investigating channel performance. For instance,
non-financial vs. financial, frequent vs. infrequent, short term vs. long term, behavioral
vs. output, subjective vs. objective, qualitative vs. quantitative, external vs. internal and
strategic vs. tactical channel performance measures have all been utilized at some point to
assess channel performance (Valos and Vocino 2006).
In the B2B context, some measure of objective financial performance (e.g. ROI, sales,
profits) may intuitively seem the most appropriate measure of performance. However,
though increased financial benefits are assuredly a motivation for a firm to enter into an
exchange relationship, it might not be the primary reason. For example, a focal firm may
be inefficient, in (say) logistics and supply chain management. In an effort to reconcile
this deficiency the firm partners with a logistics firm that is tasked with increasing the
efficiency of the focal firm. Though financial rewards will likely result should the focal
firm improve its efficiencies, the primary reason for the relationship isn‟t increased
financial rewards so much as it is the establishment of efficient logistical systems. The
firm‟s financial rewards, in this example, are secondary while increased efficiencies are
primary objectives. From this logic, it makes sense that the focal firm will measure
relationship performance using efficiency metrics while financial metrics, if used at all,
will serve as a secondary measure of resulting relationship benefits. In other words, the
primary purpose of performance measurement is to provide feedback that will aid the
104

firm in its efforts to realize specific firm goals, financial or otherwise (Kumar, Stern and
Achrol 1992).
Certainly financial measures are an important element in assessing the return of a
business relationship. It has been argued however that using financial measures of
performance in isolation is myopic because they fail to measure the full complement of
organizational goals associated with a B2B relationship (Chakravarthy 1986; Eccles
1991; Kaplan and Norton 1992). Coupled with the fact that researchers are often forced
to develop perceptual measures of performance due to the fact that objective financial
measures are often difficult to obtain (Ailawadi, Dant, and Grewal 2004), the reasoning
for such a wide array of performance measures utilized in the B2B literature becomes
more understandable.
In an effort to develop a reliable and valid measure of partnering firm performance
Kumar, Stern, and Archol (1992) drew from Quinn and Rohrbaugh‟s (1983) work which
identified four different models of organizational effectiveness. Kumar, Stern and Achrol
(1992) assert that in order for a firm to maintain equilibrium and a continuance of the
system, the firm must adequately meet the criteria for each of these performance models.
The first of these models is the rational goal model which describes the firm‟s main
objectives as productivity and efficiency or the maximization of outputs relative to
pertinent conditions such as obstacles and costs (Quinn and Rohrbaugh 1983). The
measurement of these objectives can be assessed through the evaluation of profits and
sales (Kumar, Stern, and Achrol 1992). The rational goal model encompasses much of
the objective financial measures often ascribed to performance measurement. The second
model is the human relations model. This model focuses on cohesion and morale of
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organizational members (Quinn and Rohrbaugh‟s 1983). Within a B2B context, this
model suggests that firms need to be concerned with the social aspects of its exchange
relationships (Kumar, Stern, and Achrol 1983). The internal process model is the third
model and stresses the notion of an organization as being the combination of
interdependent parts (Kumar, Stern, and Achrol 1992). Key aspects of this model are
firm loyalty and compliance. High levels of both loyalty and compliance are said to
evoke coordinated actions between partnering firms and thus enable the attainment of
organizational and relationship goals (Kumar, Stern, and Achrol 1992). Finally the
fourth model is the open system model. This model views firms as openly pursuing such
things as growth, learning and differentiation (Buckley 1967). Within a channels context,
the open systems model can be viewed as a focus on growth and adaptation (Kumar,
Stern and Achrol 1992).
The description of these four models illustrates the wide conceptualization of
performance that encompasses more than just objective financial measures. Logically,
the acceptance of these four areas or models of performance implies a belief that there is
more to performance than just financial outcomes and hence the need for a performance
instrument derived from a comparatively broad theoretical perspective.
Kumar, Stern, and Achrol‟s (1992) resulting performance measure is said to be more
comprehensive than performance evaluations relying on a single sales measure or easily
manipulated customer satisfaction measure (Kumar 1996). Though often not identical,
many researchers have adopted a similar multi-faceted multi-dimensional perspective that
incorporates many performance measures which encompass many conceptualizations of

106

the performance construct (e.g. Hibbard, Kumar and Stern 2001; Lewis and Lambert
1991; Mohr and Spekman 1994).
For instance, Lewis and Lambert (1991) when investigating the relationships among
performance, dependence and satisfaction within a franchising context, evaluated
performance by assessing firm operations, organization, finance and development. Mohr
and Spekman (1994) incorporated subjective measures of partnership satisfaction along
with objective sales measures when evaluating partnership success. Hibbard, Kumar and
Stern (2001) also evaluated performance using both subjective relational measures
(competence, compliance, growth and satisfaction) along with subjective measures of
objective performance like sales and profits when investigating the influence destructive
acts have on B2B relationships. Johnson (1999), likewise, used a composite performance
measure when evaluating the influence strategic integration on performance. Performance
was measured by assessing both subjective relational indicators as well as gathering
information on subjective perceptions of objective performance. Bello and Gilliland
(1997) used measures of strategic, selling and economic performance to evaluate the
influence output controls, process controls, and flexibility has on export channel
performance.
Some researchers have evaluated performance from strictly a rational goal perspective
(e.g. Archrol and Etzel 2003; Dant, Brown, and Bagozzi; Lado, Dant, and Tekleab 2008;
Lusch and Brown 1996) while other researchers have integrated relational outcomes
along with the economic and efficiency indicators of the rational goal model when
discussing performance (e.g. Koza and Dant 2007; Robicheaux and Coleman 1994).
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In the absence of a universally recognized performance measure, the use of such a
wide array of performance measures seems likely to continue. Understanding that
performance encompasses such things as efficiency, organizational, relational and
financial goals, trying to derive one universal performance measure is arguably
inappropriate. Some economic performance measures may be negatively influenced
through the adoption of a relationship strategy while some relational measures of
performance may actually be enhanced through the adoption of a RM strategy. In fact, it
could be argued that in some scenarios the manifestation of the dark side stems from the
achievement of desired relational outcomes at the expense of needed economic outcomes.
Therefore, it is the position of this dissertation that performance should be evaluated
from the rational goal model. The rational goal model subsumes many of the objective
and perceptual economic and financial measures of performance (Kumar, Stern, and
Achrol 1992). The rational goal model focuses on efficiency and productivity and
contributes most to the understanding of a firm‟s bottom line. Consequently, the rational
goal model is also believed to be the biggest indicator of a firm‟s viability in the market.
This is not to say that other areas of performance are not important and telling in their
own right. However, firms need to achieve certain economic and financial outcomes in
order to remain in business. Therefore, it can be argued that unless certain economic
goals are reached, relational, organizational or other measures of performance become
irrelevant since the firm may go out of business.
Reinartz and Kumar (2000) found some indirect support for this notion in their
investigation of the profitability of long-term customers. The authors found that though
many have suggested that relationship marketing is financially beneficial for a firm this
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notion does not hold up when tested empirically. More specifically, the authors found
that long-term customers are not more profitable for a firm than short-term customers,
profits from long-term customers do not increase over time, long-term customers do not
actually pay higher prices than short term customers and the cost of serving long-term
customers is actually higher than serving short term customers. Firms may have spent a
lot of time and money developing relationships that are assumed to result in increased
financial rewards but, at least according to Reinartz and Kumar (2000), this is not the
case. This paper illustrates how adopting a relationship marketing strategy might actually
be harmful to a firm in economic terms as well as illustrate the need to monitor the
economic and financial performance of the relationship. Regardless of the success of a
B2B relationship, as measured on any other metric, one has to assume that if a
relationship is damaging the economic and financial health of the firm, the firm then will
work to improve the economic results of the relationship or terminate it. Regardless of
how good the relationship is, there is no motivation or incentive for a firm to maintain a
B2B relationship without the necessary economic and financial benefits.
Using this logic, this dissertation will keep in the spirit of other B2B researchers who
have investigated the performance construct from the rational goal model (e.g. Archrol
and Etzel 2003; Dant, Brown, and Bagozzi; Lado, Dant, and Tekleab 2008; Lusch and
Brown 1996) by utilizing this perspective of performance for this dissertation.
Relationship Strength and Perceptual Performance
As has been discussed above, it is believed that firms may transfer their perceptions of
the relationship to the performance of the relationship and the firm‟s overall performance.
That is to say, if a firm believes their relationship is strong they will also believe their
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relationship is performing well. If firms believe their firm is performing well it is
believed that this belief will transfer to the perceptions of their firm level performance.
To further illustrate the point, consider a scenario where a B2B relationship is perceived
as strong. It is believed that this belief will first, obviously, translate into a perception
about the beliefs of relationship performance which will also be poor. This makes sense
if one considers a relationship where one relational partner has retreated from a relational
posture in their B2B relationships in order to guard against such things as vulnerability
and suspicion. It is highly likely that these firms will dedicate resources toward
maintaining their guard and will be highly cognizant of these expenditures. If one
realizes how much they are putting into not being taken advantage of they will most
certainly realize that if they didn‟t have to guard against such things, they could put
resources into relational performance which would certainly yield a better performing
relationship. Since the relationship is normally a tool firms use to help achieve goals it
makes sense that if the tool is working well they will realize this in the final outcomes as
well. However, if the tool is not performing optimally it is difficult to see how someone
would perceive the outcomes as being optimal. This scenario implies a direct relationship
between relationship strength and performance. Therefore:
H22: There is a positive relationship between relationship strength and
performance
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Chapter Three: Methodology
Research Setting
For this dissertation, the decision was made to recruit anybody managing a buyerseller relationship on the buying side of the dyad to participate in the dark side empirical
study. This is not to imply that the person had to be in charge or carry the title of
manager but they had to have substantial or significant influence in the management of
the buyer-seller relationship. Although this is a wide criterion, the dark side, as described
in this dissertation, is believed to manifest across industries and influence all kinds of
B2B relationships.
Pre-Test
Most of the items used to derive the scales used to measure the dark side have been
adopted from varying disciplines and context. Therefore, though the adaptation of these
items is believed to be appropriate, it is not enough to rely on previous measures of
reliability and validity to conclude the relational and dark side scales are both reliable and
valid. Therefore, a pre-test comprising of N=100 respondents was conducted. The pretest allows for a preliminary assessment of both reliability and validity. In all cases, more
than 4 items per construct were included in the questionnaire to allow for pruning of
items after the pretest. The results of the pre-test are discussed further in chapter four of
this dissertation.
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Data Collection Procedure
Several data collection techniques were used to collect data for this empirical study.
First, for the pre-test, a door-to-door method was utilized. This involved the author of
this dissertation physically visiting each firm, making contact with management and firm
employees in an effort to determine who the most appropriate individuals to complete the
survey were. Appropriate respondents were those individuals that in some way help
maintain the B2B relationships for their organization. After determining the
appropriateness of each employee to act as a respondent an explanation of the author‟s
affiliation, reasons for the study and a request for participation in the study was
discussed. The author delivered the questionnaire in person together with a selfaddressed postage paid envelop to the prospective respondent so the respondent can place
the completed survey in the mail. A business card with the author‟s name, phone
number, email address and mailing address was also provided in case the respondent had
questions or wanted the author to come and retrieve the questionnaire in person.
The firms initially approached were determined by such things as how far the author
had to travel and how far each firm was from the next potential respondent. Also, firm
specifics were be considered. More specifically, an effort was made to make sure a
diverse group of firms were selected to participate in this study.
Several online versions of the survey were also constructed. A word document and a
typeable PDF file were made available to aid in the distribution of the survey. Also, the
use of an online survey hosting website was utilized again, to take advantage of the
potentially good distribution made possible through online resources. These online
versions of the survey were distributed through various online forums. Specifically, B2B
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forums were visited as well as utilizing online networking sites like Facebook and
MySpace. Professional networking events were attended and finally undergraduate
marketing students at a large southeastern university were given the opportunity to gain
extra credit if they could produce complete and verifiable surveys from qualified
respondents. The results of these data collection efforts are discussed in detail in chapter
four of this dissertation.
Questionnaire
Since only one side of the dyad was sampled, common method bias was a concern.
However, sampling from both sides of the dyad, though preferred, is not always feasible
so one must devise other methods of dealing with the potential for common method bias
(Podsakoff et al. 2003). One method of combating common method bias where data for
the predictor and criterion variables can not be collected from different sources or at
different times is to separate the predictor and criterion variables psychologically. As
suggested by Podsakoff et al. (2003), one way of separating these variables
psychologically is to create a cover story that makes it appear as if the measurement of
the predictor variables are not connected with or related to the measurement of the
criterion variables. Another method of combating common method bias is to guarantee
participant anonymity (Podsakoff et al. 2003). Throughout the surveys used in this
dissertation (i.e. pre-test and main study survey) as well as the cover letter accompanying
the survey, participant anonymity was stressed. The predictor and criterion variables are
also psychologically separated and a cover story created for the different surveys
according to Podsakoff et al.‟s (2003) recommendations.
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The first portion of the questionnaire (see appendix one) is intended to capture the
relational sentiments of the respondents with one of the B2B exchange partners. That is,
the beginning of the questionnaire poses questions designed to get a sense of the
respondent‟s perception of how relational their partnership with their B2B partner
actually is. This is accomplished by asking questions, adopted from the literature, that
assess the respondents belief about the shared values, commitment, trust, and satisfaction
constructs.
After inquiring about the respondents relational sentiments regarding the specific
partnership with their B2B partner, in section two of the survey, respondents are asked to
recall a specific issue that developed as the result of their B2B partner acting in a way
that was not acceptable to the firm. The purpose of this line of questioning is to gauge
sentiments of vulnerability and suspicion that may have developed along with the issues
stemming from the incident. The respondents will be asked to briefly describe the issue,
when it occurred or began to develop, how much or what was at stake and whether or not
the issue is a reoccurring problem. It should be noted however that this dissertation did
not employ the critical incident method often employed in a lot of B2B research (e.g.
Bitner, Booms, and Tetreault 1990; Roos 2002). The critical incident methodology
focuses on one very specific event. While any critical incident that may have provoked
the onset of dark side sentiments should be recalled by the respondent, the purpose of this
portion of the questionnaire is to cue the respondent to how negative issues stemming
from the relationship itself may have developed over time. Following the questioning
that asks the respondents to recall specific incidents that may have lead to specific issues
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within the relationship the respondents were asked several items designed to measure the
onset of the dark side symptoms of suspicion and vulnerability.
Section three of the survey is designed to measure feelings of relational myopia and
complacency. Respondents are first provided a brief set of instructions which are also
meant to act as a “cueing” statement. The statement explains to the respondents that all
relationships, including business relationships, change over time and that the following
section seeks the respondent‟s opinion about the current state of their relationship with
their B2B partner. The statement then instructs the respondents to please consider all the
issues and events that have occurred between their establishment and their B2B partner.
The respondents are then asked to respond to several items designed to measure
sentiments of relational myopia and complacency.
Section four of the survey is designed to tap into the respondent‟s perception of how
strong their relationship is with their B2B partner as well as how well they are
performing. This is done by inquiring about perceptual measures of performance.
The final portion of the questionnaire asks basic demographic information about the
respondent, their establishment and the length of time they have been in a relationship
with the focal exchange partner. Table one below illustrates the origin of these scales,
their reported reliability, whether or not measures of validity have been established as
well as the items themselves.
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Table 1 Survey Sources, Reliability, Validity & Items
Shared Values
Component

Source

Reliability

N/A

Hunt, Wood &

0.78

Chonko (1988)

Validity
Convergent Validity:

Established

Discriminant Validity:

Established

Nomological Validity:

Established

Scale Items
Please indicate the degree to which you believe that (1) your Red Bull
supplier would agree with the following statements, and (2) you would
agree with the following statements: (two part question, anchors:
Strongly agree/Strongly disagree)
1. Managers in this business often engage in behaviors
that I consider to be unethical ( R )
2. In order to succeed in this company, it is often necessary
to compromise one's ethics ( R )
3. Top Management in my company has let it be known in no
uncertain terms that unethical behavior will not be tolerated
4. If a manager in my company is discovered to have engaged in
unethical behavior that results primarily in personal gain
(rather than corporate gain), he or she will be promptly reprimanded
5. If a manager in my company is discovered to have engaged in
unethical behavior that results primarily in corporate gain
(rather than personal gain), he or she will be promptly reprimanded)
Commitment
Component
Affective
Commitment

Source

Reliability

Allen and Meyer

0.87

(1990)

Validity
Convergent Validity:

Established

Discriminant Validity:

Established

Nomological Validity:

Established

Scale Items
1. I would be very happy to not ever have to change exchange partners
2. I enjoy referring my supplier to others
3. I really feel as if my supplier's problems are my own
4. I think that I could easily become as attached to another
supplier as I am to this one ( R )
5. I do not feel like part of the family with my supplier ( R )
6. I do not feel "emotionally attached" to my supplier ( R )
7. My supplier has a great deal of personal meaning for me
8. I do not feel a strong sense of belonging to my supplier ( R )
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Table 1 continued
Commitment
Component
Normative

Source
Allen and Meyer

Commitment

Reliability
0.79

Convergent Validity:

(1990)

Validity
Established

Discriminant Validity:

Established

Nomological Validity:

Established

Scale Items
1. I think that establishments these days change suppliers
too often
2. I do not believe that an establishment must always be loyal to their
suppliers ( R )
3. Jumping from supplier to supplier does not seem
unethical to me ( R )
4. One of the major reasons we continue to have a relationship
with our supplier is because loyalty is very important and therefore
we feel a sense of moral obligation to remain in the relationship
5. If we got a better offer from another supplier we would
not feel it was right to leave our current supplier
6. We believe in the value of remaining loyal to one supplier
7. Things were better in the days when establishments stayed with
only one supplier at a time
8. We do not feel that remaining loyal to one supplier is sensible anymore ( R )
Trust
Component

Source

Reliability
0.82

Convergent Validity:

Validity
Established

Integrity

Kumar, Scheer &

(Honesty)

Steenkamp

Discriminant Validity:

Established

1995

Nomological Validity:

Established

Scale Items
1. Even when our supplier gives us a rather unlikely explanation,
we are confident that they are telling the truth
2. Our Supplier has often provided us information that has later
proven to be inaccurate (R )
3. Our supplier usually keeps the promises that it makes to
our establishment
4. Whenever our supplier gives us advice on our business
operations, we know that it is sharing its best judgment
5. Our establishment can count on our supplier to be sincere
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Table 1 Continued
Trust
Component
Benevolence

Source
Kumar, Scheer &
Steenkamp

Reliability
Not

Convergent Validity:

addressed

Discriminant Validity:

Established

Nomological Validity:

Established

1995

Validity
Established

Scale Items
1. Though circumstances change, we believe that our supplier will
be ready and willing to offer us assistance and support
2. When making important decisions, Red Bull is concerned
about our welfare
3. When we share our problems with Red Bull, we know that it
will respond with understanding
4. In the future, we can count on Red Bull to consider how its
decisions and actions will affect us
5. When it comes to things that are important to us, we
can depend on Red Bull's support
Component

Source

Ability

Ghosh, Whipple

(Expertise)

& Bryan (2001)

Reliability
0.86

Convergent Validity:

Validity
Established

Discriminant Validity:

Established

Nomological Validity:

Established

Scale Items
1. I believe Red Bull is capable of delivering products that
meet our needs
2. I believe our supplier is an expert in the position that they hold
3. Generally speaking, our supplier's representatives are poorly trained ( R )
4. People with relevant work experience are employed by
our supplier
5. Our supplier does things competently
6. Unfortunately, our supplier does things poorly ( R )
7. Our supplier's employees perform their tasks with skill
8. Our supplier does things in a capable manner
Satisfaction
Component
Non-economic
Satisfaction

Source
Dickson & Zhang

Reliability
0.93

2004

Validity
Convergent Validity:

Established

Discriminant Validity:

Established

Nomological Validity:

Established

Scale Items
1. Our supplier is a good partner to deal with
2. We are satisfied with the products we get from our supplier
3. In general we are satisfied with our dealings with our supplier
4. We will continue having a relationship with our supplier if we can
5. We are satisfied with the service we get from our supplier l
6. Most of the disagreements we have had with
our supplier were settled to our satisfaction
7. Our supplier is very interested in helping us make our business profitable
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Table 1 Continued
Satisfaction
Component
Economic

Source

Reliability

Dickson & Zhang

0.89

Satisfaction

(2004)

Validity
Convergent Validity:

Established

Discriminant Validity:

Established

Nomological Validity:

Established

Scale Items
1. We are satisfied with the sales of our supplier's products
2. We are satisfied with the performance of our relationship with our supplierl
3. We are satisfied with the extent to which our sales targets has been met
4. Regarding the economic aspect of our relationship with our supplier
we are pleased with its performance
5. Regarding the economic aspect of our relationship with our supplier
we are pleased with its reliability
Interdependence
Source

Reliability

Magnitude

Component

Heide and John

0.72

Asymmetry

(1988)

Direction

Validity
Convergent Validity:

Established

Discriminant Validity:

Established

Nomological Validity:

Established

All Components measured with same scale
Scale Items
Buyer Dependence
If for some reason our relationship with Red Bull ended…
1. The loss would hurt our sales of non-supplier products as well
2. We could compensate for it by switching our efforts to other
products we carry ( R )
3. It would be relatively easy for us to develop a relationship with a
different supplier (R )
4. We would suffer a significant loss of income despite our best efforts
to replace the lost income
Supplier Dependence
If for some reason we ended our relationship with Red Bull…
1. Such a loss would seriously hurt the sales of our supplier in this area
2. Our supplier could easily compensate for it by finding another
establishment in this area ( R )
3. There are other establishments in this area that would quickly partner
with our supplier ( R )
4. Such a loss would seriously damage our supplier's reputation in this area
5. Such a loss would negatively affect the availability our supplier
drinkers have come to expect
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Table 1 Continued
Vulnerability
Component

Source

N/A

Perlin et al.

Reliability
0.79

(1981)

Convergent Validity:

Validity
Established

Discriminant Validity:

Established

Nomological Validity:

Established

Scale Items
1. We have little control over the things that happen in our relationship
with our supplier
2. There is really no way we can solve the problems in our relationship
with our supplier
3. There is little we can do to change our relationship with our supplier
4. We often feel helpless when dealing with Red Bull
5. What happens to us is mostly dependent on us,
not our supplier( R )
6. We can accomplish just about any goal our establishment
sets out to ( R )
Component
N/A

Source
New Scales

Reliability

Validity
Not established

Not

Convergent Validity:

Established

Discriminant Validity:

Not established

Nomological Validity:

Not established

Scale Items
7. Our supplier could act in a way that would hurt
my establishment
8. Regarding how our supplier behaves in our relationship, they can get away
with not doing what we expect of them
9. We do not have the ability to stop our supplier's behavior,
even if it hurt our establishment
Suspicion
Component

Source

N/A

Vitell, Rallapalli

Reliability
0.67

Convergent Validity:

Validity
Established

& Singhapakdi

Discriminant Validity:

Established

(1993)

Nomological Validity:

Established

Scale Items
1. I do not believe our supplier always adheres to
all applicable laws and regulations
2. I do not believe our supplier always accurately
represents their credentials
3. I do not believe our supplier is always honest in serving us
as a client
4. I believe our supplier would participate in a conflict of
interest without prior notice to all parties involved
Component

Source

Reliability

N/A

Levine &

0.70

Validity
Convergent Validity:

Established

McCornack

Discriminant Validity:

Established

(1991)

Nomological Validity:

Established

5. I often feel as if our supplier is not completely
truthful with me
6. Our supplier is basically honest ( R )
7. Our supplier seldom lies to me ( R )
8. Our supplier rarely tells us what they are thinking
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Table 1 Continued
Suspicion
Component

Source

Reliability

N/A

New Scales

Not

Convergent Validity:

Validity
Not established

Established

Discriminant Validity:

Not established

Nomological Validity:

Not established

Scale Items
9. I do not believe our supplier always considers my
establishments best interest when acting
10. I believe our supplier at times, acts in ways that
could be harmful to our relationship
11. I believe our supplier, at times, acts in ways that could be
harmful to my establishment
12. I believe our supplier, at times, takes our
relationship for granted
13. I believe our supplier, at times, uses our relationship
against us for their own gain
Relational Myopia
Component

Source

Reliability

N/A

Henard &

0.70

Validity
Convergent Validity:

Established

Szymanski

Discriminant Validity:

Established

(2001)

Nomological Validity:

Established

Scale Items
1. Our supplier uses flexible systems of delivery that have
been adapted for our establishment
2. Our supplier has available novel distribution
systems (for example online ordering) for my establishment to use
3. Our supplier offers my establishment a diversified product range
4. Our supplier uses modern stock and control
systems when doing business with my establishment
Component

Source

Reliability

N/A

Johannessen

Established

Validity
Convergent Validity:

Established

Olsen

but not

Discriminant Validity:

Established

& Lumpkin

reported

Nomological Validity:

Established

(2001)
Scale Items
5. Our supplier has offered our establishment new products
since the beginning of our relationship with them
6. Our supplier has offered our establishment new services
since the beginning of our relationship with them
7. Our supplier has offered our establishment new or updated
delivery methods since the beginning of our relationship with them
8. Our supplier has offered our establishment new or updated
ordering methods since the beginning of our relationship with them

121

Table 1 Continued
Relational Myopia
Component

Source

Reliability

N/A

Costa & McCrae

0.87

(1985)

Validity
Convergent Validity:

Established

Discriminant Validity:

Established

Nomological Validity:

Established

Scale Items
9. When it comes to our relationships, we prefer variety to routine ( R )
10. When it comes to our relationships, we prefer to
stick with things that we know
11. When it comes to our relationships, we dislike change
12. When it comes to how our relationships operate, we are
attached to conventional ways of doing things
Component

Source

Reliability

N/A

New Scales

Not

Convergent Validity:

Validity
Not established

Established

Discriminant Validity:

Not established

Nomological Validity:

Not established

Scale Items
13. When it comes to our relationship we often find
new ways of doing things ( R )
14. The relationship we have with our supplierl
lacks a long-range perspective
15. When it comes to the relationship my establishment has with
our supplier, things normally happen the same way every time
Complacency
Component

Source

N/A

Kahne (2005)

Reliability
0.67

Convergent Validity:

Validity
Established

Discriminant Validity:

Established

Nomological Validity:

Established

Scale Items
1. Our supplier does not waste time on change initiatives
2. Our supplier does not worry about the future of our relationship
3. Our supplier does not usually make any changes
4. Our supplier often makes major changes ( R )
Component

Source

Reliability

New Scales

Not

Convergent Validity:

Established

Discriminant Validity:

Not established

Nomological Validity:

Not established

Scale Items
5. Regarding the relationship we have with our supplier we do not worry
about future trouble in the relationship
6. Regarding the relationship we have with our supplier we are planning
to make changes to how the relationship works ( R )
7. Regarding the relationship we have with our supplier I do not believe
we would recognize the need to change anything if the need developed
8. I do not believe my establishment
continues to look for other suppliers
9. I do not believe my establishment would recognize
a better supplier if one was available
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Validity
Not established

Table 1 Continued
Relationship Strength
Component
N/A

Source

Reliability

Wong & Sohal

0.90

(2006)

Validity
Convergent Validity:

Established

Discriminant Validity:

Established

Nomological Validity:

Established

Scale Items
1. What is your oveall assessment of the strength of your
relationship with your supplier's sales rep
2. How strong would you like the strength of your
relationship with your supplier's sales rep to be?
3. What is your overall assessment of the strength of
your relationship with your supplier as a company?
4. How strong would you like the strength of your
relationship with your supplier as a company to be?
Component

Source

Reliability

Herington,

Not

Convergent Validity:

Johnson

Established

Discriminant Validity:

Not established

Nomological Validity:

Not established

& Scott (2007)

Validity
Not established

Scale Items
5. Over time I feel that the strength of my relationship with my
supplier has become
Performance
Component

Source

Reliability

N/A

Lusch & Brown

0.916

1996

Validity
Convergent Validity:

Established

Discriminant Validity:

Established

Nomological Validity:

Established

Scale Items
In regard to other energy drink/establishment relationships in your
industry, how would you rate your relationship's performance with your
exchange partner in terms of
1. Sales growth
2. Profit growth
3. Overall profitability
4. Labor productivity
5. Cash Flow
Time
Component

Source

Reliability

Dark Side Study

Not

Convergent Validity:

Established

Discriminant Validity:

Not established

Nomological Validity:

Not established

Scale Items
1. How long has your organization been involved in a relationship
with your exchange partner _____months ______years
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Validity
Not established

Relational Antecedent Measures
All of the items used to measure the relational constructs in this dissertation have been
obtained from previously established scales presented in the extant literature. All of these
relational scales, adapted from the extant literature, have been subjected to psychometric
assessment in the past. Below is a more detailed discussion regarding each scale used to
assess the relational constructs operationalized within this dissertation.
Shared Values
Morgan and Hunt (1994) adopted the Corporate Ethical Values scale utilized in Hunt,
Wood and Chonko (1989) to measure Shared Values. This scale follows Enz‟s (1989)
two stage procedure for item measurement. That is, the survey items are asked in a two
stage procedure. First, the respondents are asked to what degree they agree with a
measurement item and second to what degree they believe their relational partner would
agree with the statement. Morgan and Hunt (1994) then calculated shared values by
subtracting the difference between the two responses.
This dissertation will follow this procedure by adopting the Corporate Ethical Values
scale from Hunt, Wood and Chonko (1989).
Commitment
Commitment continues to gain acceptance as a multidimensional component construct
consisting of an affective, normative and continuance component (Allen and Meyer
1990). Measures of affective and normative commitment are believed to be good but
distinct measures of the more global commitment construct and are therefore discussed
separately in more detail below.
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Affective commitment is rooted in the emotional attachment a channel partner has for
another (Fullerton 2003). As mentioned above, the majority of marketing studies
investigating this construct have operationalized the affective component (Fullerton
2003; Fullerton 2005). In fact, Morgan and Hunt (1994) adopted their scale for
measuring commitment directly from the Allen and Meyer (1990) affective commitment
scale. Considering the authors description of commitment or the enduring desire to
maintain a valued relationship, this adoption of the affective commitment scale seems
appropriate.
Normative commitment is rooted in the organizational behavior literature and was
originally conceived of as the belief about an individual‟s responsibility to their
organization (Allen and Meyer 1990). The roots of the operationalization of the
normative component of commitment can be traced to Wiener and Verdi (1980) who
proposed a three item scale measuring the normative sentiments of commitment.
Respondents were asked to indicate if they feel a person should be “loyal to his
organization, should make sacrifices on its behalf, and should not criticize it” (Wiener
and Verdi 1980, p. 86). Though the normative component of commitment was originally
operationalized in the organizational behavior literature it has received attention in the
marketing and B2B literatures. For example, normative commitment has been found to
positively influence bank employee‟s intention to stay with their employer while
negatively influencing their complaining behavior (Bloemer and Odekerken-Schroder
2006). Gruen, Summers, and Acito (2000) found that normative commitment positively
influenced members of professional association‟s coproduction or desire to be involved
in the association‟s workload.
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This dissertation attempts to capture sentiments of both affective and normative
commitment by incorporating both affective and normative commitment items into the
scale used to measure commitment. In chapter four of this dissertation, a detailed
discussion of the logic and methodology used to determine which items were most
appropriate is given.
Trust
Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) describe the facets of trustworthiness;
benevolence, ability, and integrity, as antecedents to trust and thus separate and distinct
from trust. This is an interesting distinction that other researchers have also made (e.g.
Barney and Hansen 1994; McEvily, Peroone, and Zaheer 2003). The basic notion is that
if an exchange partner is trustworthy it means that they are worthy of having trust placed
upon them (McEvily, Peroone, and Zaheer 2003). The reader can infer the distinction
simply from the difference in the words. Being trustworthy means being able to be
trusted or having trust placed upon you while trust itself derives its meaning from other
descriptors.
Barney and Hansen (1994) also explain that the concept of trustworthiness refers to, in
this context; the exchange partners to be trusted while trust refers to an element or
attribute of the relationship between these exchange partners. That is to say, if exchange
partners are trustworthy, the relationship can then have trust. However, though the
distinction between trustworthiness and trust may be intuitively appealing it is not
consistent with how many exchange and B2B researchers have defined the trust
construct.
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Many researchers working in the B2B exchange context believe elements of
trustworthiness are so vital to their concept of trust that they are either directly or
indirectly referred to in their definitions. For example, Doney and Canon (1995) directly
incorporate the concept of benevolence within their definition of trust (not
trustworthiness). Other definitions are not so overt regarding their integration of these
aspects into their definition but do seem to, at least indirectly, incorporate at least one of
these elements into their definition. For example, the belief that another company will
perform actions that will result in positive outcomes for the firm, from Anderson and
Narus‟s (1990) definition, integrates the focal firm‟s trust in their partnering firm‟s ability
to perform as well as the belief that the partnering firm will not take unexpected actions
that would result in negative outcomes; refers to the integrity and benevolence aspects of
trustworthiness.
There are some researchers who have integrated these aspects of trust into their
definitions as well as operationalized them separately. For instance Kumar, Scheer, and
Steenkamp (1995) recognized the distinction between these aspects of trust and
conducted their investigation of how interdependence influences two of these aspects,
benevolence and integrity (labeled honesty) separately. Also, Ghosh, Whipple, and
Bryan (2001) recognized the ability aspect of trust when they investigated the aspect they
labeled expertise.
This dissertation draws from these two works to develop measures of the three aspects
of trust discussed here. Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp (1995) measured benevolence
and integrity, this dissertation adapts these measures directly from this work. Though,
Ghosh, Whipple, and Bryan‟s (2001) expertise or ability measure is used in the education
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context, the eight scale items are general enough that the measures can be adapted for use
in the dark side context described in this dissertation. Thus, the trust scale used for this
dissertation is derived from and made up of, previous measures of trust which capture the
components of ability, integrity and benevolence.
Satisfaction
Many researchers investigating B2B issues have operationalized the satisfaction
construct as a composite construct consisting of both economic and non-economic
aspects. Economic satisfaction is primarily focused on the performance and productivity
of the exchange relationship. Being economically satisfied can be described as the type
of satisfaction focused on the outcomes of the process, not the process itself. If the
exchange relationship is yielding positive outcomes regarding such things as sales,
profitability and market share then the channel partners are more likely to be
economically satisfied. On the other hand, channel partners enjoying a good functional
channel or exchange relationship are more likely to indicate noneconomic satisfaction
with the exchange relationship. Exchange partners that express non-economic
satisfaction have recognized the benefits of improved processes, efficiencies, and/or the
positive affects associated with their exchange partner and exchange relationship.
Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar (1999) suggest that economic and noneconomic
satisfactions are influenced differently by the antecedents that cause satisfaction as well
as the consequences fostered by satisfaction. In their satisfaction meta-analysis, the
authors are able to support this claim by providing evidence for the differential effects
noneconomic satisfaction has on trust compared to economic satisfaction which was
shown to have no influence on trust. Also, a channel partner‟s use of promises was
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shown to have a positive influence on economic satisfaction but a negative influence on
noneconomic satisfaction.
Many, if not most, B2B researchers do seem to recognize the distinct importance of
each facet of the construct as most continue to incorporate elements of economic and
noneconomic satisfaction in varying proportions of their satisfaction measure (Dant,
Brown, and Bagozzi)
This dissertation recognizes the conceptual differences between the two aspects of
satisfaction and believes that measuring each element of satisfaction is not only
warranted but also appropriate for this proposed research context. Therefore, this
dissertation, like much of the research that has previously investigated satisfaction within
the B2B setting (e.g. Dant, Brown, and Bagozzi; Gaski and Nevin 1985; Scheer and
Stern) will incorporate elements of economic and noneconomic satisfaction into the
overall satisfaction measure.
Dickson and Zhang (2004) also operationalized these two aspects of satisfaction in
their study of supplier-retailer relationships in China‟s distribution channel for foreign
brand apparel. The measures of both economic and noneconomic satisfaction have been
adapted from this study (see Table one for scale items).
Dark Side Measures
As the measurement of the dark side constructs is new to the B2B context,
established scales in the B2B literatures, to this point, do not exist. Therefore, some of
the items have been adapted from various disciplines and research context while
others have been derived from the constitutive definitions of each dark side
construct. Therefore, though the scales used in this dissertation have all been adapted
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from previous literature, the adaptation is often indirect and out of context. Having said
that, it is believed that though these scales are taken from different literatures
investigating different phenomena within different contexts, that after adaptation, they are
the most appropriate and suitable for investigating the dark side constructs described in
this dissertation.
Relational Myopia
In spite of the plethora of marketing literature describing and discussing the issue of
myopia, there is, at the time of this writing, no known literature that has operationalized
and empirically studied the myopia construct. Therefore, the scale developed here to
measure relational myopia was derived from various scales as well as a number of items
derived from the constitutive definition of the relational myopia construct. Items were
adapted from two separate innovation scales used elsewhere in the marketing literature.
Four items from the Henard and Szymanski (2001) process innovation scale as well as
four items from Johannessen, Olsen, and Lumpkin‟s (2001) innovation measure were
adapted for use in this dark side context. These items were chosen from the belief that
they capture the short-sightedness or narrow viewed sentiment of the myopia construct.
This has to do with the notion of “newness” or the introduction of something new being
synonymous with being innovative. That is, in relational terms, being innovative can be
seen as the antithesis or opposite of myopic. Innovative relationships assuredly take time
to work on new processes or improving existing ones. This sort of innovative nature can
be viewed as taking the long view of the relationship as such innovation is only worth
while to those who see opportunity in the long term and wish to make sure their
relationship changes and evolves in a way that is best able to take advantages of
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opportunities as they are presented. The myopic relationship would not be as innovative
as, by definition, they have adopted the “short view” of the relationship and therefore
don‟t necessarily frown on innovation but their perspective doesn‟t allow for the
recognition of the benefits innovative ideas may afford the B2B relationship. It is from
this logic that items from these innovative scales are adapted for use in this context.
Items were also adapted from the IPIP – NEO personality inventory. Again, items
originally developed to ascertain an individual‟s personality may not initially seem
appropriate for measuring a firm‟s proclivity toward adopting a relationally myopic view
of its relationships with other B2B partners. However, if one considers that firms are
essentially the summation of individuals and throughout the RM literature firms are
described as behaving like individuals and many of the constructs and theories used to
explore interfirm behavior are derived from fields examining the individual, adapting
items that measure the traits of individuals for the B2B context does not seem
inappropriate.
The IPIP-NEO personality inventory, developed by Costa and McCrae (1985), is an
operationalization of the “Big five” five factor model of personality. The big five
consists of the Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness and
Conscientiousness factors of personality. The items selected from this inventory to help
assess relational myopia are used in the IPIP-NEO to help assess an individual‟s
openness to experience. These items help evaluate an individual‟s preferences toward
things like routine and their dislike of change. Adapting these items to the B2B context
and then marrying them with the items from the supervisory control scale looks to
produce a single scale capable of assessing a firm‟s tendencies to drift toward rote or
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routine processes and their inability to make changes to these processes as time passes
and circumstances dictate such changes which are symptoms or characteristics of the
relational myopia construct. Finally, three items were derived from the constitutive
definition of the relational myopia construct. Please see table one for a complete lists of
these items.
Complacency
As with the other dark side constructs, the scale used to measure complacency was
drawn from work outside the B2B context, not investigating the issue of complacency.
However, just as with the myopia construct, the work done by Kahne (2005) is believed
to be useful, upon adaptation, for measuring the issue of complacency, or a complacent
attitude toward one‟s relationship with an exchange partner. Kahne‟s (2005) work dealt
primarily with developing a measure of an individual‟s sense of urgency. However,
within this same work he found items that measure an individual‟s complacent attitude
toward their organization. Adapting these measures to the B2B and dark side context
provides a suitable scale for measuring the dark side construct of complacency.
Finally, relying heavily on the constitutive definition of the complacency construct
within this dissertation, seven items were derived in an effort to provide a greater battery
of items with which to construct the most appropriate complacency scale possible for
measurement within the B2B context. These items are so labeled in Table one above.
Vulnerability
The vulnerability scale developed for this dissertation was derived by evaluating
several scales, in many disciplines, that when adapted, are believed to best capture the
vulnerability construct within a B2B context. Ultimately this dissertation adapted the
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seven items from Pearlin‟s Mastery Scale (Perlin et al. 1981). This scale was originally
intended for measuring feelings of control or mastery over one‟s environment and life but
has been adapted to help measure such things as job insecurity and powerlessness in the
organizational behavior context (e.g. Ashford, Lee, and Bobko 1989). These items also
help capture sentiments of vulnerability as it taps into such things as feelings of
helplessness and control over one‟s environment. Feelings of helplessness and exposure
are synonymous with vulnerability and are captured by the mastery scale. Therefore, it is
the stance of this dissertation that after adaptation, the items in this scale, and the derived
scale items, a good measure of vulnerability within the B2B context is formed. Please
see table one for individual items.
Suspicion
Finally, as with all the other dark side constructs, the scale to measure suspicion is
also derived from scales not originally intended to measure the notion of suspicion in the
dark side context. However, that does not mean that the scales used to derive the dark
side suspicion scale are inappropriate after adaptation to the B2B dark side context.
The general honesty and integrity scale is taken from work conducted by Vitell,
Rallapalli, and Singhapakdi (1993). This scale uses items like “One should always
adhere to all applicable laws and regulations” or “One should always accurately represent
one‟s education, training, and experience”. These items can be modified to capture
feelings of suspicion by deductively linking suspicion as the opposite of honesty and
integrity. That is, if a focal firm does not have faith in their exchange partner‟s honesty
and integrity, it is likely that they do not feel as if this same exchange partner won‟t take
advantage of vulnerabilities and other weaknesses. Therefore, modifying this scale to
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capture the opposite sentiments of honesty and integrity should help capture the notion of
suspicion.
Four items from the Generalized Communication Suspicion Scale (Levine and
McCornack 1991) are also adapted to help capture suspicious sentiments within the B2B
setting. This scale was originally developed by Levine and McCornack (1991) to assess
an individual‟s propensity to assume the deceptive intentions of others. As suspicion in
the B2B context is concerned with the suspicious activity of exchange partners, the items
in this scale, after adaptation, seem appropriate for use in this research. As with the other
dark side sentiments, items were also derived from the constitutive definition of the
construct to help form a more complete and appropriate suspicion scale for use in the
B2B context. Please see table one above for a complete listing of the items used to
measure suspicion in this dark side B2B context.
Relationship Strength Measures
Though there are many B2B studies that have examined the strength of the B2B
relationship, finding a suitable scale, already accepted in the literatures and also
appropriate for this research context, actually posed something of a challenge. This is
because relationship strength has often been viewed as a higher order construct made up
of several first order relational constructs (Dwyer and Oh 1987). Specifically,
relationship strength has often been measured by first measuring other elements of the
relationship such as trust, commitment and satisfaction (e.g. Donaldson and O‟Toole
2000; Dwyer Schurr, and Oh 1987; Golicic and Mentzer 2006; Hausman 2001). The
issue here is that these three constructs are all antecedent constructs included in this
model. Using the most common measures of relationship strength, which are really
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measures of the second order antecedent relational constructs, implies a circular logic or
reasoning that would make interpreting the results of the model, as they pertain to
relationship strength, practically impossible. However, after a lengthy search several
items not attached to these relational constructs have been published and utilized in the
business to business literature. Wong and Sohal (2006) measured relationship strength
with four items. Respondents, in their study were asked to evaluate how strong they
think their relationship is with both their partnering firm and the partnering firm‟s
representative. Respondents were also asked to indicate how close they would like the
relationship with their partnering firm and firm representative to be. This allows for the
assessment of the gap between where the relationship is and where respondents would
like it to be. Finally, one global item from Herington, Johnson and Scott (2007) was used
to assess how respondents view the overall strength of their relationship. Please refer to
appendix one, Section II, items 31-35 to see these items in the pre-test and appendix two,
Section II, items 13-17 to view these items in the main study survey.
Performance Measures
Perceptual measures of performance will be assessed. These measures are based on
Lusch and Brown (1996) perceptual measures of performance. All but one item has been
adapted for use in this dark side study. The item asking respondents to assess liquidity
has been omitted as it is believed that this measure isn‟t pertinent to this relationship
context and although many of the respondents will have a good idea about the liquidity of
their establishment, they might not have a good idea about the liquidity of the
relationship itself. Please see table one for the complete list of perceptual measures of
performance used in this dissertation.
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Time (Length of Relationship) Measure
It is important that the time variables be scaled appropriately as to properly tease out
the influence time has on this industry should there actually be a moderating effect.
Therefore, for the purposes of this dissertation the time scale will be measured in years in
order to provide an adequate scale capable of capturing the influence time has on the
onset of the dark side. A single item asking how long the firm has been engaged (or was
engaged) in the B2B relationship with their exchange partner will be asked.
Empirical Analysis
A detailed description of the empirical analysis follows in chapter four. Special
attention is given to the empirical methods used to assess convergent and divergent
validity as well as overall construct validity. The methods used to assess both the
measurement and structural models are discussed along with the presentation of the
empirical results.
Rival Models
As no structural equation model can claim to be completely correct an alternative
model approach (Joreskog 1993) should be utilized to compare the theoretical model with
potential rival models. A series of rival models were developed and compared to the
proposed model with which this dissertation is based. A detailed description and
discussion of how well these models compare to the proposed model follows in chapter
four.
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Chapter Four: Results
Pre – Test Results
Two methods of data collection were used to collect the necessary one-hundred
surveys needed to complete the pre-test analysis of the survey instrument. The first
method involved the author of this dissertation utilizing a “door to door” approach where
firms throughout the local metro area were visited in an attempt to get permission to
leave the survey with a qualified potential respondent. As discussed in chapter three of
this dissertation anybody who had significant influence in the management of a buyerseller relationship, on the buying side of the dyad, was considered qualified to fill out the
survey. Given the length of the survey it was not feasible to wait for the survey to be
completed on the spot. However, the participants were given two options for the delivery
of the completed survey. The author could return to the establishment and pick it up or
the participants could mail the completed survey directly to the author‟s office at the
University. The participants were given a self-addressed postage paid reply envelope to
aid in the latter method of delivery. The second method of data collection involved the
use of students. Students in two undergraduate marketing sections were given the option
of extra credit for each returned survey up to a pre-specified maximum number of points.
As most of the undergraduate students were not qualified to fill out the survey themselves
they were asked to have people they know and were qualified to fill out the survey
complete the form. The students were asked to provide contact information of their
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respondents so that the surveys could be double-checked and validated. Fifteen surveys
from the pool of student returned surveys (N=43) were drawn and the contact information
on the surveys was utilized to contact the person who completed the survey and verify
that they were indeed qualified to fill out the survey. They were also asked if they had
any questions about the study. All of the contact information proved accurate and none
of the student returned surveys had to be disqualified for validation reasons. For the pretest, the survey was constructed in a way to look like two separate surveys that had no
relationship to each other. The participants were led to believe they were filling out two
separate surveys for two separate research projects. Constructing the survey in this way
is believed to separate the predictor and criterion variables in the respondent‟s mind
which is supposed to guard against common method bias (Podsakoff et al. 2003).
Data collection for the first one hundred surveys used for the pre-test, took
approximately five months. It is not believed that this amount of time between initial
survey distribution and completion of survey collection would have any impact on the
responses provided by the participants. The following are the results of the statistical
analysis conducted to assess the reliability and validity of the items and constructs in the
survey instrument used for this dissertation.
Relational Antecedents Assessment (Pre-Test)
Pre-Test Reliability
Reliability for all of the antecedent relational variables was determined by using two
common methods of assessing item reliability in structural equation modeling;
Chronbach‟s alpha and the composite or Jorsekog‟s reliability. Both Chronbach‟s alpha
and the composite reliability show all the scales used to measure the antecedent relational
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constructs exceed the conventional 0.700 threshold of reliability see table two below for
results.
Table 2 Pre-Test Reliability of Antecedent Relationship Constructs

Shared Values
Commitment
Trust
Satisfaction

Chronbach's Alpha
0.781
0.794
0.842
0.880

Composite Reliability
0.828
0.787
0.845
0.880

Number of Items
before Pre-test
Analysis
5
16
18
12

Number of Items
after Pre-Test
Analysis
5
12
15
10

The shared values items were adapted from the Corporate Ethical Values scale from
Hunt, Wood and Chonko (1989). As mentioned in chapter three of this dissertation this
scale follows Enz‟s (1988) two stage procedure for item measurement. More
specifically, respondents were first asked to indicate to what degree they believed the
supplier that they had decided to consider when completing the survey, would agree with
the first statement. The second question was a repeat of the first with the exception of the
respondent being asked how much they, themselves, would agree with the statement
given. The difference of these items as well as the absolute value of the difference of
these items was calculated and used for the pre-test analysis of the shared value
constructs. Though there are ten items in the survey used to measure shared values (see
Appendix one, section I, items 1 - 5), only the absolute value of the difference between
the supplier response and respondent (buyer) was evaluated yielding what is essentially a
five item scale. The pre-test analysis showed a reliable scale with the ten items given;
therefore, the ten items used in the pre-test were retained for the subsequent main study.
The two normative and affective facets of commitment both had eight items each on
the pre-test survey that were derived from the Allen and Meyer scale (1990) of affective
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and normative commitment. After the data were collected and the analysis run it became
apparent that dropping one item from the normative commitment scale and three items
from the affective commitment scale would yield the most reliable and more
parsimonious commitment scale. .
Both the benevolence and integrity facets of trust had five items each in the pre-test
survey. The items used to measure both of trust facets derived from those used in Kumar,
Scheer, and Steenkamp (1995). The ability facet of trust, derived from items used in
Ghosch, Whipple, and Bryan (2001), had eight items in the pre-test survey. The pre-test
analysis showed that trimming three items from the ability portion of the trust scale
would yield a more reliable and again, more parsimonious scale for use in the main study.
Therefore, the decision was made to drop the three items that did not add to the reliability
of the scale. All of the benevolence and integrity items were maintained in the trust scale
for use in the main study.
Satisfaction is made up of two facet components; non-economic and economic
satisfaction. In the ongoing effort to use the most reliable and yet most parsimonious
scales possible, two items were dropped from the seven item non-economic satisfaction
portion of the scale used in the pre-test. These items were originally used in the work by
Dickson and Zhang (2004). The added benefit of parsimony makes the decision to drop
these items that much more intuitive provided the smaller scale is more reliable than the
larger one, which is the case for the research context in this dissertation. However,
economic satisfaction only has five items included in the pre-test survey. These five
items were kept as they all appear to add to the reliability of the larger satisfaction scale.
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Pre-Test Validity
Convergent validity of the antecedent relational constructs was assessed by first
conducting a single factor confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) for each of the relational
constructs as well as a confirmatory factor analysis of the antecedent portion of the
measurement model. The results of the single factor confirmatory factor analyses are
listed in table three below.
Table 3 Pre-Test CFA Results

Constructs
Shared Values
Commitment
Trust
Satisfaction

Chi Square
Statistic
33.413
2629.86
4330.719
3280.417

Pr > ChiSquare
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001

RMR
0.009
0.046
0.032
0.048

RMSEA
0.040
0.093
0.082
0.148

CFI
0.998
0.923
0.958
0.963

NNFI
0.990
0.833
0.930
0.888

The chi-square statistic is a measure of overall fit. A large value of chi-square
signifies that the observed and estimated matrices are considerably different. Low chisquare values are indications that the actual and predicted matrices are not statistically
different. A non significant chi-square statistic is desired because the test is between
actual and predicted matrices. The chi-square statistic for all of the antecedent relational
variables is significantly large which indicates that the estimated and observed matrices
are indeed different which indicates that each single factor CFA is indeed a poor fit. It
should be noted however that the tendency of the chi-square to reject any specified model
with a sufficiently large sample is quite high. In response or in an attempt to correct for
this tendency researchers have begun to assess other fit indices. The RMR (root mean
square residual) is the square root of the average of the residuals between the observed
and estimated input matrices. Since this model uses correlations, the RMR is in terms of
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an average residual correlation. The RMR is useful for this model since it is using
correlations instead of the covariance matrix. This is because the correlations are all on
the same scale unlike covariances which may differ from variable to variable depending
on the unit of measure (Hair et al. 1998). The RMSEA (or root mean square error of
approximation) is the discrepancy per degree of freedom like the RMR; the difference is
that discrepancy is measured in terms of the population, not just the sample used for
estimation (Hair et al. 1998). The value is representative of the goodness-of fit that could
be expected if the model were estimated in the population, not just the sample drawn for
the estimation (Hair et al. 1998). According to Hair et al. (1998) values ranging from
.05-.08 are acceptable while Hu and Bentler (1999) state that values of less than .06 for
both the RMR and RMSEA indicate satisfactory model fit.
Bentler‟s Comparative Fit Index (CFI) represents a comparison between the estimated
model and the null model. Larger values generally indicate a better fit. The NNFI index
combines a measure of parsimony into a comparative index between the proposed and
null models (Hair et al.1998). According to Hair et al. (1998) values for both the CFI and
the NNFI should exceed 0.90 to indicate acceptable fit while Hu and Bentler (1999)
recommend a stricter threshold of 0.95.
The results shown in table three above reveal some potential issues with the relational
constructs. Specifically, several of the fit indices fall well outside the accepted thresholds
discussed above (e.g. the RMSEA for Satisfaction or the NNFI for Commitment).
However, it is possible that N=100 is not a large enough sample size to provide
confidence in these CFA‟s. Although the power analysis for this dissertation, conducted
according to the methodology prescribed by MacCallum, Browne, and Sugaware,
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indicate that a relevantly small sample is needed to run the structural model (N=20)
proposed in this dissertation, other sources suggest that a larger sample is needed.
Specifically, Hair et al. (1998) recommends that to ensure appropriate use of maximum
likelihood estimation techniques that a minimum sample of N = 200 is needed as this is
considered the critical sample size required to have confidence in the results. Also,
Jackson (2001), in his article, which discussed the use of estimating sample size based on
the number of estimated parameters vs. simply increasing the sample size all together
found that sample sizes between 200-400 yielded the best results. Given the size of this
pre-test model (i.e., N=100) and the general consensus that a sample of at least 200
hundred is needed the argument can be made, though without certainty, that this smaller
sample of only 100 might not be sufficient for producing interpretable results when
running these CFA‟s. Therefore, though these results are cause for concern, the decision
to proceed to the larger antecedent CFA model is made with the understanding that if
subsequent analyses do not resolve these measurement issues, then the results produced
while testing this model may be erroneous so interpretation of the results should take
place with these issues in mind and with caution.
The next step in the pre-test analysis was to run a larger CFA including all of the
antecedent constructs. The chi-square statistic is significant at 1039.056. The CFI and
NNFI are 0.6197 and 0.5518 respectively. However, The RMR and RMSEA, though still
outside the range of acceptable fit indices are slightly better at .0952 and 0.1268
respectively. These issues are again believed to be attributable to the small sample size.
However, in an effort to be as thorough and complete as possible the assessment of
discriminant validity was also conducted. The method used to assess discriminant
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validity is the method originally suggested by Fornell and Larchker (1981) and is
commonly referred to as the average variance extracted or AVE method for assessing
discriminant validity. This method compares the squared correlations between two
constructs to the average variance extracted for each of the constructs of interest. If the
average variances extracted by the correlated latent variables are greater than the square
of the correlation between the latent variables then discriminant validity is considered to
be obtained.
Table 4 Pre-Test Discriminant Validity for Relational Antecedent Constructs

Construct (a)
Shared Values
Shared Values
Shared Values

Construct
(a) AVE
Construct (b)
0.428 Commitment
0.428 Trust
0.428 Satisfaction

Construct Correlation Squared
(b) AVE
estimate Correlation
0.349
-0.040
0.002
0.551
-0.139
0.019
0.600
-0.150
0.023

Commitment
Commitment

0.349
0.349

Trust
Satisfaction

0.551
0.600

0.144
0.141

0.021
0.020

Trust

0.551

Satisfaction

0.600

0.380

0.144

As can be seen in the above table all the antecedent relational constructs have AVE
figures that are higher than that of their squared correlations, indicating that discriminant
validity has been achieved. However, the fact that there are AVE figures below 0.50 is
troubling as this indicates that more than half of the variance in the items can be
accounted for by something other than the items themselves. Under the worst possible
interpretation, this could indicate that the items being used are not good measures of the
constructs they are designed to measure, at least in this dissertation‟s context. However,
after a larger, more appropriate sample size was obtained these issues were largely
resolved. This resolution as well as the discussion of the dark side pre-test analysis
follows below.
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Dark Side Assessment (Pre-Test)
Pre-Test Reliability
As with the antecedent relational constructs discussed above, reliability for the dark
side constructs was assessed by figuring both the chronbach‟s alpha score for each
construct as well as the composite reliability scores. Table six below lists these reliability
scores for each of the dark side constructs.
Table 5 Reliability of Antecedent Relationship Constructs

Construct
Relational Myopia
Complacency
Vulnerability
Suspicion

Chronbach's
Alpha
0.734
0.891
0.868
0.913

Composite
Reliability
0.717
0.877
0.875
0.917

Number of Items
before Pre-test
Analysis
15
9
9
13

Number of Items
after Pre-Test
Analysis
4
4
6
7

As can be seen in the table, all of the dark side constructs have excellent reliability
and exceed the commonly accepted threshold of 0.70. What can also be ascertained from
the table is the need to prune or drop some items from each dark side scale. relational
myopia and complacency underwent the most radical changes after the pre-test reliability
analysis but vulnerability and suspicion also presented measurement issues that required
modifications of their respective scales.
Unlike the antecedent relational constructs discussed above, these dark side
constructs do not have scales that are already well entrenched in the B2B literatures.
Therefore, as mentioned in chapter three of this dissertation, the items for each scale had
to be either adapted from unrelated social science disciplines or derived from the
constitutive definition of each construct. Both of these methods were employed to derive
each of these dark side scales. The scales being employed here do not exist for this B2B
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context so the high reliability scores are both surprising and encouraging. However, the
changes to the scales are more significant than simply dropping items. Though this may
appear radical at first, given the novelty and pioneering nature of this research it is not at
all unexpected and supports the reasoning for the lengthy and substantial pre-test.
Of the original 15 items used to measure relationship myopia in the original pre-test
survey only four were kept and used in the subsequent main study. The need for this
significant pruning was revealed during the reliability analysis where, although other
items helped produce a reliable scale, a deeper content analysis, which involved reevaluating the wording and phrasing of each item, showed that many of the items
originally proposed as measures of relational myopia were in fact measuring something
else. Therefore, the four items retained show good reliability and are believed to be the
four best items for measuring relationship myopia. However two new items, derived
from the constitutive definition of relationship myopia were added to the scale in an
effort to adequately sample from relationship myopia domain. It is conceded that this
addition of items to the main study survey without prior pre-testing was something of a
gamble but content analysis of the subsequent items provided confidence that these new
items are consistent with the four items previously retained which showed excellent
reliability. Please see appendix two, section II items 11-12 for the additional relationship
myopia items.
The complacency scale, like the relational myopia scale, underwent significant
changes after the pre-test reliability analysis. Of the original nine items originally used to
measure complacency, none were retained after the pre-test reliability analysis.
However, as mentioned above, content analysis revealed that some of the relationship
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myopia items looked to be measuring something other than relational myopia.

This

argument was most apparent when looking at items five through eight (Appendix two,
Section II, Items 7-12). These items asked about supplier behavior since the beginning of
the relationship. In other words, has the supplier changed things as time has gone by or
have they always done everything the same way? These four items are believed to be
more appropriate for the measurement of complacency, not relationship myopia and thus,
were moved and relabeled as complacency items. As can be seen in the table above,
these items also show good reliability but, just as with relationship myopia, an effort must
be made to sample from the entire complacency domain so again, two new items were
added to the complacency scale to be used in the following main study survey. These
items are shown in appendix two, section II numbers 2-3, with the rest of the main study
survey.
Of the original nine vulnerability items used in the pre-test survey six were retained
after the reliability analysis. Of the original 13 suspicion items used in the pre-test
analysis, seven were kept for further analysis. These decisions were based on what items
presented the most reliable set of measures of the vulnerability and suspicion construct.
Pre-Test Validity
The next step, after the reliability assessment, is to evaluate the validity of each dark
side construct. This validity assessment was done in three phrases. The first phase was
an evaluation of the constructs at the construct level. That is, an evaluation of how well
the items were measuring what they are supposed to be measuring. This was
accomplished by conducting four single factor confirmatory factor analyses (CFA). The
following phase meant measuring the entire dark side measurement model and the third
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phase involved the discriminant analysis of the dark side constructs. The results of these
analyses are discussed below and the results of the single factor confirmatory analyses
are listed in table six below.

Table 6 Fit Indicies for Dark Side Single Factor CFA

Construct
Relational Myopia
Complacency
Vulnerability
Suspicion

Chi-Square
Statistic Pr > Chi-Square
19.2665
<.0001
2.2997
0.0870
67.8109
<.0001
21.2042
<.0001

RMR RMSEA CFI NNFI
0.0084 0.0427 0.9981 0.9885
0.0014 0.0139 0.9999 0.9996
0.0098 0.0574 0.9977 0.9826
0.0041 0.0450 0.9996 0.9914

As can be seen in table six above, with the exception of the significant chi-square
statistics, all of the single factor CFAs show excellent fit indices for the trimmed or
pruned dark side scales. Coupled with the strong reliability number these fit indices lend
support for the notion that these four scales are indeed measuring these new and novel
constructs of interest.
After conducting these single factor CFAs the next step was to measure these four
constructs at once in a single dark side CFA designed to assesses the usefulness of the
dark side measurement model. The chi square statistic was significant at 14,918 p<
0.0001. The RMR is 0.0539, the RMSEA is 0.1043, the CFI is 0.8942 and the NNFI is
0.8933. Though these numbers are, for the most part, close to the established thresholds
they are still a little outside what is typically acceptable. These fit indices need to be
interpreted with caution as the sample size used to derive these numbers may be too small
for the assessment of a measurement model. However, with the strength of the reliability
analysis and single factor CFA‟s the decision is made to move ahead to the discriminant
validity portion of the pre-test analysis.
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The assessment of discriminant validity was done using the AVE method, detailed
above. The results of the dark side pre-test assessment of discriminant validity are listed
in table seven below.
Table 7 Dark Side Pre-Test Discriminant Validity
Construct (a)
Constructs (a)
AVE
Construct (b)
Complacency
0.690
Relational Myopia
Complacency
0.690
Vulnerability
Complacency
0.690
Suspicion

Construct (b)
AVE
0.475
0.565
0.614

Correlation
estimate
0.395
0.588
0.321

Squared
Correlation
0.156
0.346
0.103

Relational Myopia
Relational Myopia

0.475
0.475

Vulnerability
Suspicion

0.565
0.614

0.132
0.230

0.017
0.053

Vulnerability

0.565

Suspicion

0.614

0.605

0.366

As can be seen in table seven above all of the AVE measures are above the squared
correlation estimate between the constructs. These figures show that all of the constructs
have obtained adequate discriminant validity. However, like the relational constructs
discussed above, one of the constructs, namely relational myopia is close but still
marginally below the 0.50 threshold. This indicates that more than half the variance
affiliated with the items from this scale can be attributed to something other than the item
itself. This is troublesome but given the AVE figure of 0.475 and its proximity to the
accepted value of 0.50 and the relatively small sample size of 100, the decision was made
to move to the next phase of the analysis.
Relationship Strength Assessment (Pre-Test)
Pre-Test Reliability
The reliability of this five item relationship strength scale was only .676. It was
believed that the addition of the global relationship strength measure would add
reliability and validity to the smaller four item relationship strength scale. However, this
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proved not to be the case as a smaller four item relationship strength scale, without the
global measure, yields a much stronger and reliable scale.
Pre-Test Validity
The Chronbach‟s alpha score for the four item relationship strength scale is 0.765 and
the composite reliability score is 0.775. The single factor CFA yielded a significant chisquare statistic (p > 0.001, 126.0525), RMR = 0.0246, RMSEA = 0.11, NNFI = 0.9485
and a CFI of 0.9910. These CFA fit indices for the pre-test are promising though slightly
outside accepted thresholds. Citing the above discussion regarding a larger sample size,
the decision was made to keep these four items (without the global item) for the
subsequent main study. The relationship strength construct is not run in a larger CFA as
there is no theoretical correlating relationship between relationship strength and the other
constructs in the model. Thus, the pre-test analysis of the relationship strength construct
at this point, is complete.
Performance Assessment (Pre-Test)
Pre-Test Reliability
The reliability for the five item performance scale was extremely high on both
measures of reliability. Both the Chronbach‟s alpha score and the composite reliability
score were .919 accounting for rounding error. Given the strength of the reliability
figures, enough confidence in the reliability of the performance measure exists to shift the
analysis toward the validity assessment.
Pre-Test Validity
The single factor performance CFA did have a significant chi square at 41.625 (p >
0.001) but the RMR, RMSEA, CFI and NNFI were all well within acceptable thresholds
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(0.005, 0.046, 0.999 and 0.997 respectively). As with relationship strength, there is no
theoretical correlating relationship between performance and any other construct within
the structural model. Thus, performance was not subjected to discriminant analysis. At
this point, the pre-test analysis of performance is complete. Since Time is a single item
construct it is not subjected to the pre-test assessments of reliability or validity.
Main Study Results
The pre-test analysis showed that the survey could be pruned or shortened for the
main study portion of this research project. A slightly shortened survey was constructed
and distributed via several data collection methods for this main study. Table eight
below shows how many items were in the original pre-test survey and how many were
removed after the pre-test analysis. This substantial pruning saved a considerable amount
of space and fewer items is believed to have helped guard against respondent fatigue.
Table 8 Number of Items Before and After Pre-Test
Number of
Number of
Items before Items after
Pre-test
Pre-Test
Construct
Analysis
Analysis
Shared Values
5
5
Commitment
16
12
Trust
18
15
Satisfaction
12
10
Relational Myopia
15
4
Complacency
9
4
Vulnerability
9
6
Suspicion
13
7

A total of 305 usable surveys were collected and used for the main study analysis.
These surveys were collected with various data collection methods. These distribution
methods are discussed in the section below.
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Main Study Distribution Methods
Several online versions of the smaller survey were constructed. A word document and
a typeable PDF file were put together and the use of the online survey hosting site Survey
Monkey was also employed. These online versions of the survey were distributed
through several online forums. Specifically, B2B message boards were frequented in an
attempt to solicit respondents but this effort yielded zero complete responses. Online
networking environments such as Facebook and MySpace were also employed. Bulletins
were posted on the Facebook and MySpace pages of two of this dissertation‟s author‟s
friends and family asking if qualified respondents would be willing to take the time to fill
out the survey. This effort was able to produce 55 complete surveys from qualified
respondents. Based on the, age, education and known vocations of the people contacted
directly via these forum it is believed that this method produced a response rate well over
50% as approximately 250 people would have been made aware of the survey but of
those people, it is believed that anywhere between 75-90 people were actually qualified
to complete the survey. Also, an email blast was sent to a network of management
consultants which consists of approximately 3,500 people worldwide though only 17 of
the 305 responses were from outside the U.S. Of the approximately 3,500 management
respondents that received the email asking for participation, only 27 qualified
respondents returned a completed survey. It should be noted however, that it is believed
that a relatively small number of these 3,500 are actually qualified to complete the survey
as the majority of these people have a background in the selling side of B2B
relationships, not the buying side. The author of this dissertation also attended
networking events and fairs in an effort to find qualified respondents willing to complete
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the survey. At these events hard copies of the survey were distributed but mention of the
online surveys was also made in an effort to make things as easy for the respondents, or
potential respondents as possible. This effort was able to produce 23 complete surveys
from qualified respondents. Approximately 15-20 people typically attend these events.
The author of this dissertation attended four of these events which would yield a response
rate of approximately 28% if everyone attending was qualified to fill out the survey.
However, not everyone attending these events was qualified to complete the survey so
estimating a response rate for this method of collection at something greater than 30%
seems reasonable.
Finally, two undergraduate marketing sections were afforded extra credit for every
survey they returned complete from a qualified respondent. These sections were initially
given hardcopies of the survey with a self addressed postage paid envelope and a cover
letter briefly explaining the affiliation of this dissertation‟s author and purpose of the
study. These students were also given the option of downloading one of the internet
versions of the survey or directing respondents to the Survey Monkey website where an
online version of the survey was being hosted. These student returned surveys required
contact information for the respondents so that the author of this dissertation could
confirm the responses and respondents were legitimate. It is important to note that all
respondents were reassured that their personal information would be kept confidential but
in order for the students to receive extra credit the contact information had to be
provided. The extra credit was also contingent upon actual confirmation of the
respondents. The author of this dissertation randomly selected 25 student returned
surveys and contacted the respondents listed on the survey in an effort to confirm the
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legitimacy of the survey. All 25 surveys proved legitimate and no further action was
taken to confirm the legitimacy of the student returned surveys. The students in the two
undergraduate marketing sections, approximately 100 students, were able to produce 200
returned surveys. It is impossible to know the exact response rate for the student
administered surveys as they had access to online versions of the survey that could be
distributed without the author‟s knowledge. However, it is also reasonable to believe that
the majority of the time, the majority of students would not administer a survey unless
they were fairly sure the survey would get completed by a qualified respondent. The
students were given instructions not to go to places that they did not know or talk to
people with whom they were not familiar. The extra credit was explained as a method
for them to take advantage of their current relationships. Respondents, who already have
a relationship with the student, are incentivized by the opportunity to help the student,
which is often a much greater incentive than anything offered by many B2B researchers,
so it is reasonable to believe that this method produced a response rate above 50%.
The 25 contacted respondents represent approximately 7.5% of the student returned
surveys.
Non Response Bias
Some of the distribution techniques discussed above utilized what can be described as
a “blast” or a technique where several hundred to several thousand people received some
form of electronic notification (e.g. email, post, bulletin notification) asking for
participation. It is believed that using these sorts of techniques are good, efficient ways
to get the survey instrument in front of large numbers of qualified people in a quick, cost
effective manner. The down side of these methods is that it is impossible to track, with
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100% accuracy, how many qualified potential respondents actually see the survey and
have the opportunity to respond but don‟t. However, the number of potential respondents
who received the hard copy of the survey was tracked more carefully. Four hundred and
fifty hard copies of the survey were distributed. Of these surveys, 135 surveys were
returned. Thirteen surveys however had to be disqualified due to various reasons such as
incompleteness, the respondent not being qualified or not having enough information to
fill out the survey. This leaves a total of 122 complete surveys from qualified
respondents for a hard copy response rate of 27%. This number is consistent with many
B2B research projects of a similar nature (e.g. Rauyruen and Miller 2007; Palmatier et al.
2008). Coupled with the potential response rates discussed above it is reasonable to
believe that, even though it is impossible to know for sure, the response rate for this
dissertation is consistent with other, similar B2B research project. This, of course means
that the study response rate is something significantly less than 50% which necessitates
the need for an evaluation of non-response bias.
In order to assess the non-response bias, eight non-demographic questions and two
demographic questions from the original survey were put into a small one page nonresponse survey. Roughly one item per construct was selected at random and the two
demographic questions were also selected at random. This one page, ten question survey
was designed to take only a couple of minutes and would be used to statistically evaluate
the differences, if any, between respondents and non-respondents. Since a detailed list
was kept of everyone who was handed an actual hard copy of the survey the author of the
study went back to several non-respondents and asked for participation in the smaller one
page study. After receiving thirty (N=30) complete, non-respondent surveys a
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multivariate analysis of variance was conducted (MANOVA) across all variables to see if
there were differences between respondents and non-respondents. The results indicated
no significant differences across any of the non-demographic or demographic variables
(F = 2.457 p > 0.05) between respondents and non-respondents. With no significant
differences between the respondents and non-respondents being discovered the analysis
of the main study could commence with confidence in the generalizablity of this research
project‟s results.
As with the pre-test, the analysis of the measurement model was broken up into three
different parts. First the reliability and validity of the antecedent relational variables was
assessed. This is followed by the reliability and validity assessment of the dark side
constructs and finally the reliability and validity of the relationship strength and
performance constructs individually. Again, the time measurement is a single item and
not subjected to these measurement model analyses. After these measurement model
analyses are conducted the assessment of the structural model takes place. The results of
these analyses are discussed below.
Relational Antecedent Assessment (Main Study)
Main Study Reliability
The results of the reliability assessment of the antecedent relational constructs can be
seen in table ten below.
Table 9 Reliability of Relational Antecedent Constructs
Composite
Chronbach's Alpha
Reliability
Shared Values
0.803
0.813
Commitment
0.802
0.805
Trust
0.931
0.945
Satisfaction
0.952
0.953
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Number of Items
5
12
15
10

As can be seen in the table, all of the antecedent relational constructs show good
reliability using either the chronbach‟s alpha score or the composite reliability score.
These scores allowed the analysis to move forward to the next step in the relational
antecedent assessment.
Main Study Validity
With confidence in the reliability of the items the next step in the analysis of the
antecedent portion of the measurement model was to assess the single factor structures
through the use of single factor confirmatory factor analyses (CFA). The results of these
single factor CFAs are shown in table ten below.
Table 10 Main Study Relational Single Factor CFA Fit Indicies

Shared Values
Commitment
Trust
Satisfaction

Chi-Square
10.840
170.920
531.765
223.095

Pr > Chi-Square
0.001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001

RMR RMSEA CFI NNFI
0.010 0.031 0.956 0.995
0.135 0.075
0.994 0.996
0.013 0.163
0.995 0.795
0.026 0.032
0.999 0.998

Aside from the significant chi-square statistics, the only fit indices outside their
accepted thresholds are the RMSEA for trust and the NNFI for trust. All of the other fit
indices produced during the single factor CFA‟s all look to be very close, or well within
conventional thresholds. Having said this, the fit indices for trust that fall outside their
accepted thresholds are troubling. However, given the strength of the other fit indices
and the proximity of these fit indices to their accepted thresholds the decision was made
to continue with these constructs in the hope that the remaining measurement model
analyses would provide enough evidence to guide the proper action regarding these
scales. For instance, the remaining measurement model analyses may have suggested
157

dropping certain items or the continuation with the analysis of the structural portion of
the model with the measurement model left as is. However, any results produced during
the analysis of the structural model that are concerned with these constructs would have
to be interpreted with caution if no further action had been taken regarding these items
and scales.
After the single factor CFA‟s the next step was to run the larger CFA consisting of the
entire antecedent measurement model. The CFA run with all the above listed constructs
produced the following fit indices: The chi-square was significant at 32310.425 (p >
0.001) with an RMR of 0.042, an RMSEA of 0.073. The CFI is 0.895 while the NNFI is
0.845. Two of the fit indices for the larger CFA are troubling enough to warrant a deeper
investigation and re-evaluation of the items being used to measure the four antecedent
relational constructs. Specifically, the CFI and NNFI are far enough out of their
acceptable thresholds that moving forward without first addressing these issues would
leave the interpretability of the results difficult and in doubt. In an effort to resolve these
issues the decision was made to go back and re-evaluate the relational constructs at the
item level. This involved an item by item evaluation of the standardized loadings and
their contribution to the constructs average variance extracted. These tools, used in
conjunction with a content analysis of each item, as they relate to the underlying
theoretical foundations supporting this dissertation, helped determined which items were
contributing the greatest utility regarding the measurement of each relational construct
and which items should be dropped from the analysis.
This re-evaluation showed that the first two shared values items were not contributing
to the usefulness of the shared values scale as their standardized loadings were low
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compared to the other three items. The decision was made to drop these first two shared
values items from the scale and to proceed with the analysis using only a three item
shared values scale. Since shared values became only a three item scale and thus
modified from its original five item scale an effort was made to go back and re-evalute
the scale at the single factor level. Since the shared values scale is now only three items a
single factor CFA is not possible. This is one of the draw backs of using such a limited
number of items to measure any one given construct. However, this handicap is more
than overcome by the strength of the full antecedent measurement mode. A reliability
assessment is possible however and was conducted for the revised three item scale. The
revised chronbach‟s alpha score is 0.835 and the revised composite reliability score is
0.839. The revised three item scale also accounts for more than 60% of the variance
extracted.
The scales used to measure commitment also had its share of measurement issues.
The twelve item scale was unable to extract more than 50% of the variance which is a
troublesome figure as this means more than half of the variance can be accounted for by
something other than the scale. An exploratory factor analysis was conducted and
although the EFA supports a two factor structure, which is consistent with the dimensions
of commitment being measured in this dissertation (e.g. normative and affective) the true
usefulness of the EFA was its revealing several items which were handicapping the
commitment scale. Specifically, the affective portion of the commitment scale had five
items to this point. The decision was made to drop the first two items as the rotated
factor matrix and the standardized loadings show that these first two items contribute
very little to the measurement of commitment. Similar results were revealed for the
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normative portion of the commitment scale. For similar reasons, the decision was made
to drop the first, second, fourth and sixth items. Though the rotated factor matrix does
support a two factor structure the six items retained have enough cross loadings to
support continuing the analysis with commitment being measured as a single construct
capturing elements of both normative and affective commitment. The revised single
factor CFA for the smaller six item commitment scale resulted in a chi-square statistic of
311.688 an RMR of .029 an RMSEA of .071 a CFI of .996 and a NNFI of .947. The
revised reliability scores were 0.753 and 0.746 for the chronbach alpha score and
composite reliability score respectively.
An exploratory factor analysis was also conducted for trust. Similar to commitment,
the EFA revealed a two factor structure. Also like commitment however, is the large
number of cross loadings for several items between the two factors. A second EFA was
run where the factor structure was constrained to only one factor. As expected, most of
the items which showed high loadings for the previous two factor structure also loaded
high on the single factor. In an effort to isolate the items that were contributing most to
the measurement of trust a close examination of the item‟s standardized loadings along
with the results of the EFA was conducted. Using these two methods together it became
apparent that the most useful and parsimonious trust scale would be produced by
retaining the third and fifth item from the integrity scale, the first and fifth item from the
benevolence scale and the third and fifth item from the ability scale. Together these six
items produced a trust scale capable of accounting for more than 50% of the variance
extracted as well converging onto one single factor. The fit indices for the smaller six
item trust scale were also very good. The chi-square was significant at 1245.157 but the
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RMR and RMSEA were both acceptable at 0.032 and 0.073 respectively. The CFI and
the NNFI were also acceptable at 0.986 and 0.959 respectively. The chronbach alpha
score for reliability was 0.879 while the composite reliability was 0.924.
The EFA for satisfaction included the items for both non-economic satisfaction and
economic satisfaction. Interestingly, these two scales do not diverge as only one factor
was extracted. An examination of the single factor structure and the item‟s standardized
loadings showed that the first three non-economic satisfaction items and the second and
fourth economic satisfaction items worked best together to produced one satisfaction
scale that converges capable of capturing elements of both non-economic and economic
satisfaction. The revised satisfaction CFA yielded a chi-square statistic of 1345.567. The
RMR and RMSEA were within or close to acceptable thresholds at 0.017 and 0.098
respectively while the CFI and NNFI were both well within acceptable thresholds at
0.987 and 0.957 respectively. The revised reliability scores were also promising at .094
for the chronbach alpha score and 0.96 for the composite reliability score.
With renewed confidence in the smaller, more parsimonious scales a revised CFA was
run for the entire antecedent measurement model. The chi-square was significant at
7160.642 p < 0.0001. Aside from the chi square, all other fit indices were either close to
within acceptable thresholds. The RMR was 0.035 while the RMSEA was 0.080. The
CFI and NNFI were 0.947 and 0.917 respectively. The above reliability and fit indices
provide enough evidence of convergent validity for the antecedent constructs and
antecedent measurement model that moving forward to the next step in the analysis was
done with confidence. The next step in the analysis of the antecedent measurement
model is the assessment of discriminant validity.
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The method used to assess discriminant validity for the entire antecedent measurement
model is again the AVE method suggested by Fornell and Larcker (1981). The results of
this analysis are on the following page, in table 11.
Table 11 Discriminant Validity for the Antecedent Measurement Model

Construct (a)
Shared Values
Shared Values
Shared Values

Construct
(a) AVE
0.634
0.634
0.634

Construct Correlation Squared
Construct (b) (b) AVE
estimate Correlation
Commitment
0.516
0.417
0.174
Trust
0.676
0.315
0.099
Satisfaction
0.765
0.317
0.100

Commitment
Commitment

0.516
0.516

Trust
Satisfaction

0.676
0.765

0.621
0.615

0.386
0.378

Trust

0.676

Satisfaction

0.765

0.642

0.412

As can be seen in the preceding table, discriminant validity has been achieved for the
antecedent relational measurement model. At this point, confidence in the antecedent
measurement model is obtained so moving on to assessment of the dark side
measurement model is now appropriate.
Dark Side Assessment (Main Study)
Main Study Reliability
As with all the other constructs evaluated to this point, the mediating dark side
constructs were evaluated by calculating the chronbach‟s alpha score as well as the
composite reliability score and seeing how these scores compare to the established
thresholds pertaining to these scores. The initial reliability scores for the dark side
constructs are promising with the exception of complacency which at 0.678 was not able
to exceed the 0.70 threshold. This promoted a re-evaluation of the complacency
construct. It should be noted that this construct had two additional items added after the
pre-test evaluation. A look at the standardized loadings for each item of the complacency
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scale revealed the two additional items were loading quite poorly. Another reliability
analysis, run with the four items held over from the pre-test analysis was conducted. The
results showed that these two items were indeed hurting the reliability of this scale as the
new, four item scale, showed a chronbach‟s alpha of .831 and a composite reliability
score of .832. The results of the reliability analysis are shown below in table 12.
Table 12 Reliability of DarkSide Constructs
Chronbach's Composite Number of
Alpha
Reliability
Items
Construct
Relational Myopia
0.793
0.852
6
Complacency
0.831
0.832
4
Vulnerability
0.908
0.909
6
Suspicion
0.935
0.936
7

Main Study Validity
The results of the revised reliability analysis provide confidence that the dark side
scales are reliable enough to move forward to the validity analysis of these same dark
side constructs. The next step in the main study analysis is the assessment of both
convergent and divergent validity for the dark side constructs. This is accomplished by
first evaluating the single factor structure via single factor confirmatory analyses. The
results of the initial single factor confirmatory factor analyses are shown in table 13
below.
Table 13 Fit Indicies of Dark Side Constructs for Single Factor CFAs

Construct
Relational Myopia
Complacency
Vulnerability
Suspicion

Chi-Square
117.565
155.838
526.214
58.431

Root Mean
Bentler &
Square
Bentler's
Bonett's
Pr > Chi- Residual RMSEA Comparativ (1980) NonSquare
(RMR)
Estimate e Fit Index normed Index
<.0001
0.018
0.092
0.9929
0.8934
<.0001
0.016
0.122
0.9903
0.9418
<.0001
0.017
0.135
0.9954
0.9317
<.0001
0.010
0.080
0.9908
0.9724
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The results of the single factor CFA‟s are, for the most part, promising. However, the
RMSEA estimates are slightly out of convention for both complacency and vulnerability.
However, based on the strength of the other fit indices, and the exploratory nature of this
research, the decision is made to relax, slightly, the fit index criterion for the above
indices. This relaxation of the fit indices should be interpreted as a slight relaxation in
that if an index is only slightly above or below accepted thresholds, it will not hinder the
progress of this research project. It should not be interpreted as all of the indices being
given a wider birth regarding their acceptability.
The chi-square statistic for the initial dark side CFA was significant at 10643.5425 (p
> 0.0001) with an RMR of 0.0542, a RMSEA of 0.0778 a CFI of 0.9201 and a NNFI of
0.8832. These fit indices represent marginal fit at best given the low NNFI. However the
other fit indices are encouraging and the argument could be made to proceed with the
analysis with the dark side portion of the structural model being left as is. However, an
examination of the standardized loadings of each item show that not all items are loading
adequately and, if dropped, might help bolster the strength of the dark side model as well
as provide dark side scales that will account for a greater share of the variance extracted.
It is with this logic that another dark side CFA analysis was conducted. The second
analysis was done without the weaker items believed to be hurting the overall dark side
measurement model fit. Relationship Myopia dropped its fourth and fifth item while
vulnerability dropped only its fifth item and suspicion dropped only its first item. This
analysis produced a chi-square statistic of 6814.8917 (p > 0.0001) while the RMR and
RMSEA are 0.062 and 0.075 respectively. The CFI and NNFI were both improved by
dropping these weaker items. The CFI is now 0.938 and the NNFI is 0.917. On the
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strength of these new findings, the decision is made to proceed with the analysis with the
four complacency items, four relational myopia items, five vulnerability items and six
suspicion items. Before the analysis can continue however, a revised assessment of the
reliability and CFA statistics for the new, slimmer scales should take place. These
revised reliability and single factor CFA results are shown in the table below.
Table 14 Revised Dark Side Reliability & CFA Fit Indices
Indicies
Complacency
Relational Myopia
Number of Items
4
4
Chronbach's Alpha
0.796
0.760
Composite Reliability
0.802
0.764
Chi -Square Statistic
167.150
195.680
RMR
0.020
0.024
RMSEA
0.129
0.030
CFI
0.988
0.990
NNFI
0.9262
0.9794

Vulnerability
5
0.883
0.886
38.999
0.010
0.062
0.999
0.9860

Suspicion
6
0.921
0.929
44.134
0.006
0.046
0.999
0.9929

All of the revised single factor dark side constructs show fit indices well within the
accepted thresholds, less the chi-square statistic. Based on the larger dark side CFA and
the strength of these revised single factor CFA‟s the decision is made to proceed to the
assessment of discriminant validity. Discriminant validity is again assessed by using the
AVE method of discriminant validity. The results of this analysis are shown in table 24
on the following page of this dissertation.

Table 15 Dark Side Discriminant Validity Assessment
Construct (a)
Construct Correlation Squared
Construct (a)
AVE
Construct (b)
(b) AVE
estimate Correlation
Complacency
0.504
Relational Myopia
0.587
0.079
0.156
Complacency
0.504
Vulnerability
0.609
-0.342
0.346
Complacency
0.504
Suspicion
0.687
-0.364
0.103
Relational Myopia
Relational Myopia

0.587
0.587

Vulnerability
Suspicion

0.609
0.687

0.015
-0.039

Vulnerability
0.609
Suspicion
0.687
0.552
* All of the AVE figures are greater than their respective squarred correlation figure
indicating adequate discriminant validity
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0.017
0.053
0.366

The results of the assessment of discriminant validity are encouraging as they show
that not only do all of the dark side constructs diverge they all also account for more than
50% of the variance extracted. This analysis provides enough evidence of the strength of
the dark side measurement mode. The following analysis evaluated the reliability of the
relationship strength construct
Relationship Strength Assessment (Main Study)
Main Study Reliability
The reliability of this construct proved adequate at 0.776 for the chronbach‟s alpha
and .7948 for the composite reliability score. These figures are enough to move the
analysis to the validity portion of the assessment.
Main Study Validity
The single factor CFA also proved good as the chi-square statistic is significant at
87.284 (p > 0.0001) the RMR is 0.038, the RMSEA is 0.078, the CFI is 0.9996 and the
NNFI is 0.9796. These fit indices provide enough confidence in the relationship strength
items to move forward to the assessment of the performance construct.
Performance Assessment (Main Study)
Main Study Reliability
The reliability of performance is at 0.917 for the Chronbach‟s alpha and 0.919 for the
composite reliability score. These figures, as with the reliability figures for performance
in the pre-test, are very strong, providing confidence in the measure and the ability to
move the assessment to the validity portion of the main study performance assessment.
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Main Study Validity
The single factor CFA proved good as the chi-square statistic is significant at 99.123
(p > 0.0001) the RMR is 0.015, the RMSEA is 0.043, the CFI is 0.995 and the NNFI is
0.948. Since time is a single item constructs, it is again, not subjected to these
assessments of reliability and validity. At this point the analysis will move forward to the
assessment of the structural model.
Structural Model Assessment
Hypothesis 1-17 propose relationships among antecedent relational constructs and
mediating dark side constructs that are moderated by time. Moderation in this SEM
context was tested using the method proposed by Little, Bovaird and Widman (2006).
Little, Bovaird and Widman suggest orthogonalizing powered and product terms for use
in moderation testing in the SEM context. Orthogonalizing or residual centering is
accomplished by first creating a product term from the antecedent construct and the
proposed moderating construct. For this dissertation, this means multiplying the items
for each antecedent relational construct with the single item time variable. For example,
this dissertation has three shared values indicators and one time indicator, measured in
years. Multiplying the single item time variable and the three shared values items
produces three product terms. These product terms, are then regressed onto the firstorder effect indicators for both shared values and time. For instance, if the first shared
values indicator (SV1) is multiplied by the only time indicator (T) the resulting product
term is labeled SV1T. The regression equation is as follows:
SV1T = bo + b1SV1 + b2SV2 + b3SV3 + b4T
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The residuals for this regression equation then become indicators for the moderating
variable in the structural equation model. This process is then repeated for each of the
remaining two shared values * time product terms. The residuals for the three product
terms are the three indicators for the newly created shared values/time latent construct.
The remaining regression equations used to derive these indicators are below:
SV2T = bo + b1SV1 + b2SV2 + b3SV3 + b4T
SV3T = bo + b1SV1 + b2SV2 + b3SV3 + b4T
This new latent construct represents the moderating effect time has on the
relationships between shared values and the dark side constructs. This orthogonalizing or
residual centering procedure is repeated for each of the antecedent relational constructs
that are hypothesized to have a positive relationship with the four dark side constructs
over time. After all of the residuals have been calculated they are then entered into the
larger structural equation model which was designed to analyze the relationships among
relationship strength and perceived measures of performance, the dark side constructs and
relationship strength as well as the time moderated relationships among the antecedent
relational constructs and the four dark side constructs. Although this structural model
was run all at once, the results are presented below in three separate sections in an effort
to present results that are clearer and more easily understood. The first of the three
sections, presented in table 16 below are the results from the portion of the structural
model concerned with the time moderated relationships between the antecedent relational
constructs and the dark side constructs followed by a discussion interpreting these results.
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Table 16 Antecedent-Dark Side Relationships Moderated by Time
Independent Antecedent Relational Constructs
Dependent Dark
Side Construct
Relational
Myopia
Hypothesis
Std Loading
UnStd Loading
Std Error
t value
Complacency
Hypothesis
Std Loading
UnStd Loading
Std Error
t value
Vulnerability
Hypothesis
Std Loading
UnStd Loading
Std Error
t value

Shared Values

Commitment

Trust

Satisfaction

H1***
1.406
2.103
0.1669
11.02**

H2***
1.127
0.889
0.180
4.952**

H6 ***
0.424
0.741
0.180
4.108**

H10***
0.141
0.390
0.148
2.638**

H3***
15.163
2.650
0.094
28.341**

H7***
5.627
2.158
0.320
6.738**

H11***
1.934
1.172
0.368
3.1874**

H4
-4.883
-2.392
0.131
-18.2990

H8
-1.789
-1.936
0.334
-5.804

H12
-0.617
-1.060
0.314
-3.3816

H5***
2.517
2.400
0.138
17.354**

H9***
1.648
1.924
0.332
5.793**

H13***
1.448
1.047
0.313
3.350**

Not
Hypotheized

Not
Hypotheized

Suspicion
Hypothesis
Std Loading
UnStd Loading
Not
Std Error
Hypotheized
t value
** p < 0.01
***provides support for hypothesis
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Shared Values and Relational Myopia
Hypothesis one proposes a time moderated positive relationship between shared
values and relational myopia. The results of this dissertation support this hypothesis,
providing evidence to support the notion that over time, B2B partners who have similar
values may become relationally myopic. More specifically, these data suggest that firms,
as time passes, may develop a form of “group think” that permeates throughout the
relationship. Relational myopia may manifest as a firm‟s inability or unwillingness to
continually monitor their environment objectively and relying on behaviors that support
the status quo. In other words, firms may become so rooted in the process and
conventions that govern their B2B relationships that they lose the ability to adapt or
change their relationships as the environment dictates.
The consequences of relational myopia may manifest in greater opportunity costs as
firms fail to take advantage of better B2B relationship opportunities that afford such
things as greater efficiency and market opportunity. Relationally myopic firms fall into
what can be described as a relational rut and although effort is still expended toward
relationship maintenance relational myopia keeps firms from critically evaluating
relational processes and supports the acceptance of the status quo. Consequently, the
relationally myopic firm does not recognize opportunities for such things as streamlined
processes, better relational partners or other market opportunities.
Commitment and the Dark Side
H2 suggests a time moderated relationship between commitment and relational
myopia. This hypothesis was supported commitment showed a significant, timemoderated relationship with relational myopia. The scale used to measure commitment
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incorporated items to capture sentiments of both affective and normative commitment.
The significant relationship between commitment and relational myopia then suggests
that both normative and affective commitment positively influence the onset of relational
myopia over time.
The relationship between affective commitment and relational myopia is most
probably the result of the good feelings B2B partners have for one another. The
affectively committed firms won‟t be looking for ways to improve on something that they
feel is already doing well. If affectively committed firms in a B2B relationship stop
critically evaluating their relationships and their processes because they don‟t want to
betray the good feelings they have about the relationship, then the argument is that over
time, as B2B partners feel better about their relationship, the less critical of it they
become.
Normatively committed firms are committed to their B2B relationships more out of a
sense of duty than from positive affect as is the case with affectively committed firms. If
a firm is doing something out of a sense of obligation they may lack the incentive to stay
abreast on the details that govern relationship dynamics.
Normatively committed firms may lack the ability, desire or incentive to take a more
active role in the governing of the B2B relationship. It makes sense that in these
normatively committed relationships the normatively committed firm will simply allow
their relationship partner to do most of the work regarding how the relationship will be
run and the normatively committed firm will simply adopt this vision as their own. This
shared vision of the relationship is of course narrower in scope than if both firms brought
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their different and unique experiences together and is an example of how normative
commitment can, over time, lead to the onset of relational myopia.
H3 shows that there is indeed a time moderated relationship between commitment and
complacency. This suggests that firms who are committed to their B2B partners will,
over time, become more complacent toward the relationship itself. The onset of
complacency suggests a sort of comfort which may lull the affectively committed firm
into the perpetual acceptance of the status quo. This may happen as firms who feel good
about the relationship won‟t want to do things to upset what is providing such positive
feelings about the relationship. Firm managers may believe the relationship is
performing well or in some other way, make firm mangers feel good and have confidence
in how the relationship is set up and being run. Though this may not appear like a bad
thing, problems may emerge as the environment changes. For example, a committed firm
may have developed such an attachment to their relational partner, perhaps from stellar
performance at the beginning of the relationship, that over time, the firm begins to
assume these results are given and therefore does not recognize the need to take action
when something happens. In this situation it is not unrealistic to think that the good
feelings one firm has for another has led them to believe that their partners are not only
superior but will always be superior and therefore, have become complacent toward the
governing and monitoring of their B2B relationship.
As discussed in chapter two of this dissertation researchers in the B2B literatures have
conceptualized commitment as a relational construct that actually encompasses feelings
of vulnerability (e.g. Lacey 2007; Morgan and Hunt 1994; Wing and Sohal 2002). As
firms become more committed they expose themselves to their relational partner‟s which
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implies a sort of relational risk that that can only be described as vulnerability. The
results of this dissertation do not support this hypothesis (H4) for committed firms. This
suggests that as firms become more committed they fail to recognize their vulnerable
position within the B2B relationship. This is understandable given the good feelings that
characterize the committed relationship. It might be that firms that recognize their
vulnerability are not going to be as committed to their B2B partners because of the
anxiety and potential tension that feelings of vulnerability may produce. In other words,
it might be that firms that feel vulnerable toward their B2B relationship partners are
incapable of feeling high levels of commitment because of the negative feelings the
recognition of vulnerability provoke.
H5 proposes a time moderated relationship between suspicion and commitment. The
results of this dissertation support this hypothesis. Commitment does show a significant
and positive relationship with suspicion over time. It seems as if, over time, relational
partners who are committed to their B2B partners will not start to feel vulnerable but do
become suspicious of their B2B partners. This may have to do with events or issues that
develop in the B2B relationship that, although resolved, may leave the B2B partner
wondering about what their exchange partner is actually doing or if they are capable of
doing what is expected of them. For example, a committed firm may have to deal with
late shipments from their B2B partner. If the buying firm in the dyad is large enough and
has enough suppliers one supplier may not be enough to provoke feelings of
vulnerability. However, this situation does not excuse the late shipment and thus
provokes feelings of suspicion.
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The link between commitment and suspicion may also stem from one relational partner
allowing the relationship to develop to a point where their partner takes the goodwill and
good nature of the relationship for granted or abuses the good feelings by believing they
are no longer responsible for meeting contractual obligations. If a member of the
relationship dyad begins to believe the positive affect or good feelings within the
relationship is a cue for lax relationship norms then they might start to believe that such
things as ridged deadlines, formal rules and regulations are really flexible guidelines to be
used for mere guidance but not strict adherence. If this behavior manifest then it makes
sense that the other side of the dyad might become suspicious of the relationship partner.
Trust and the Dark Side
The relationship between trust and relational myopia is proposed in H6 of this
dissertation. The results for this hypothesis are supported in this dissertation as the
relationship between trust and relational myopia was shown to have a significant and
positive relationship over time.
Trust, in this B2B context is concerned with the trust one relational partner has in their
partner‟s propensity to act in the best interest of their partner and the relationship as a
whole as well as their ability to complete contractually assigned tasks. The significant,
time moderated relationship between trust and relational myopia is intuitive as it suggests
that over time, if one relational partner believes that their partner is continually acting in
the best interest of the relationship they will continue to do so until given a reason not to.
A relational partner might think to themselves, “They are doing things well and the
results are good, therefore, I‟ll let them keep doing things the way they do them now”.
Though this attitude may seem appropriate it really implies the onset of relational myopia
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as the relational partners sort of assume a similar, narrow vision of the relationship. In
contrast, an attitude that says “Our relationship partner is doing things well but I wonder
how we can do things better” implies the exact opposite of relational myopia but this
attitude may be more difficult to adapt and apply in the B2B context. It is probably much
easier to just let things function as they always have after people have become
accustomed to routines and processes. Also, constantly questioning what seems to be a
good system may send the message that trust is an issue and by suggesting improvements
a firm in a B2B relationship runs the risk of offending their exchange partner. In this
context, it makes sense that adopting a myopic view of the firm may be the path of least
resistance as well as a conflict avoidance strategy.
The results for H7 are supported as the results of this dissertation show a positive and
significant relationship between trust and complacency over time. This positive
relationship suggests that as time passes firms who believe in their relational partner‟s
abilities, as well as their good intentions, are more likely to allow for the onset of
complacency. This may seem intuitive firms who believe in their relational partner‟s
ability to execute assigned tasks as well as their good intentions may lose the incentive to
remain vigilant toward the monitoring of the B2B relationship. The focal firm may begin
to believe their relational partner(s) will carry most of the load regarding relationship
processes and performance. In other words, as time passes and the capable relationship
partner continues to perform, it is possible that the other member of the B2B relationship
will simply sit back and allow their relationship partner to do most of the work. A “stay
out of the way and let them do it” attitude may manifest which is really indicative of
complacency.
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H8 was not supported as the relationship between vulnerability and trust showed a
significant but negative relationship over time. These results are surprising given the
implied relationship between trust and the willingness to be vulnerable. Having said that
however, the author of this dissertation, while distributing the surveys and conducting the
qualitative interviews, found that respondents consistently failed to acknowledge any sort
of dependence or interdependence with their exchange partners. Sentiments such as “I
don‟t need anyone” or “You can always go with someone else” kept reemerging. This is
important in recognizing the potential explanation for why there failed to be a positive
relationship between trust and vulnerability. B2B relationship managers who fail to
acknowledge dependence may not see the behaviors of their B2B partners as something
that can significantly influence their firm. The fact that they recognize they have other
relational options and don‟t perceive switching costs or other obstacles getting in the way
of a simple relational switch may mean that they won‟t allow themselves to become
exposed to the point of feeling vulnerable. Another potential explanation is that any B2B
relationship of any duration demands exposures but that does not mean the B2B
managers recognize or acknowledge these exposures and subsequent vulnerabilities.
Whether it be sense making or an objective evaluation of their position in the B2B
relationship, it became apparent during the data collection phase of this dissertation that
B2B managers do not recognize or accept their own vulnerabilities as they pertain to their
B2B relationships, regardless of the amount of trust they may or may not have had in
their B2B relationship partners.
The proposed relationship between suspicion and trust is captured in H9. This
hypothesis was supported as there is a positive and significant relationship between trust
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and suspicion that appears to manifest over time. Though a relational partner may not
feel vulnerable regarding their position in a B2B relationship, they may still feel
suspicious of their relational partner‟s behaviors and actions. It is intuitive that over time
B2B partners will be forced to act in ways that are outside their norms. Relational
partners may not know why or what is causing these behavioral changes and though they
might be benign and not motivated through deleterious pursuits, the fact that they are
different may be enough to provoke suspicion.
Satisfaction and the Dark Side
H10 – H13 hypothesizes positive, time moderated relationships between satisfaction and
the four dark side constructs. Three of the four relationships showed significant positive
relationships that manifest over time. The positive relationships between satisfaction and
relational myopia and complacency may seem fairly intuitive. Satisfaction does not
typically bring with it motivation for change and this lack of motivation is believed to
really be the catalyst for the onset of both relational myopia and complacency. The
results of this dissertation support this statement as the relationships between these two
dark side constructs and satisfaction were significant.
The relationship between suspicion and satisfaction is a little less intuitive as it is a
positive relationship over time. If a firm is satisfied with their B2B relationship they may
lose incentive to stay engaged in the governing of the relationship itself. As this speaks
to the onset of complacency, the lack of engagement may have side effects as well. If a
firm relaxes how involved it is with its B2B relationship, over time, the realization may
emerge that they have let their guard down as well as relinquished control of the
relationship. This realization may then lead to feelings of suspicion toward the focal
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firm‟s relationship partners. The relationship partners may not be guilty of any wrong
doing, it is simply the partnering firm‟s realization that they have engaged in a hands off
or mostly hands off approach toward the governance of the B2B relationship that leaves
them feeling suspicious of their B2B partner‟s behaviors.
The relationship between satisfaction and vulnerability showed significance but in the
opposite of the direction hypothesized. The onset of vulnerability implies dissatisfaction
with the relationship. In keeping with this logic it does not make sense that firms who are
satisfied with their relationship will also feel vulnerable at the same time. Dissatisfaction
may have to manifest before firms will admit to feeling vulnerable in their B2B
relationships. This criterion does not need to apply to suspicion as firms may still be
satisfied with their relationship only it‟s tempered by feelings of suspicion. It would all
depend on the specific situation but it is not unreasonable to think that a firm can be
satisfied with their B2B relationship but at the same time suspicious of it. However,
being satisfied with the B2B relationship and allowing for the onset of vulnerability may
be a little more difficult for firms involved in a B2B relationship to reconcile.
Since all of the proposed moderated relationships showed significance in either the
positive or negative direction, there is no need to consider any main effect relationships.
The focus now turns to the relationships between the dark side constructs and relationship
strength. Below, in table 17 are the results from the structural analysis that pertain
directly to this portion of the structural model.
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Table 17 Relationships Between Relationship Strength and the Dark Side Constructs
Relational
Dependent Construct
Complacency
Myopia
Vulnerability
Relationship Strength
Hypothesis
H18***
H19
H20
Std Loading
0.373
-0.413
1.350
UnStd Loading
2.459
-0.118
0.374
Std Error
0.111
0.080
0.573
t value
22.143**
-1.478
0.6515
** p < 0.01
***provides support for hypothesis

Suspicion
H21
-1.110
-0.432
0.343
-1.263

The Dark Side and Relationship Strength
H18 – H21 propose relationships between the dark side and relationship strength. H18
and H19 suggest positive relationships between relational myopia and complacency while
H20 and H21 propose negative relationships between relationship strength and
vulnerability and relationship strength and suspicion respectively. As expected the
relationship between relational myopia and relationship strength showed significance in
the positive direction.
What is surprising is that the other three dark side constructs failed to show a
significant relationship between themselves and relationship strength. This may be
because these other dark side constructs don‟t influence a B2B manager‟s perception of
the strength of their relationship in quite the same way as relational myopia or this
specific research setting was not conducive for teasing out any influence these dark side
constructs had on the B2B manager‟s perceptions regarding their B2B relationship.
Another possibility is the relationship strength measure used for this dissertation. The
scale used for this dissertation was not consistent with typical relationship strength
measures due to relationship strength often being a second order construct comprised of
lower order constructs such as trust and commitment. Since these relational constructs
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were used in the antecedent portion of the structural model a combined trust and
commitment scale could not then be put in the outcome portion of the structural model,
thus the need for the less cited relationship strength scales used in this dissertation.
However, though these combined trust and commitment scales could not be used in
the structural model, a combined scale, comprised of trust and commitment, was
constructed and regressed against the dark side constructs. The results of the regression
analysis are in table 18 below.
Table 18. Dark Side-Relationship Strength Regression
Beta Coefficient
T-value Significance
Relational Myopia
0.121
8.967
0.000
Complacency
0.303
2.981
0.000
Vulnerability
-0.039
-1.042
0.298
Suspicion
-0.294
-7.814
0.000

The results of the regression analysis are not surprising. The results support the
relationship between complacency and relational myopia. This might mean that firms
who have allowed for the onset of this dark side construct may be confusing relationship
strength with relational myopia and complacency. In other words, it may be that when
firms have become comfortable in their relationship, as they have grown to believe
relational processes are at a point that is beyond improvement, they subsequently rest on
the status quo. Firms may believe they are at a point where their relationship is at a point
of absolute strength. In other words, as firms become comfortable they believe this
comfort is actually a sign of strength which may then feed deeper levels relational
myopia and complacency.
The results support a negative relationship between suspicion and relationship strength
and although not significant, the relationship between vulnerability and relationship
strength is trending negative. If firms have realized the onset of these dark side
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symptoms they undoubtly will be perceived as damaging to their B2B relationships.
Vulnerability and suspicion are not comfortable feelings and not something that is
typically accepted in any relationship. Vulnerability and suspicion can be seen as things
that work against relationship strength as any firm that has recognized these symptoms
are feeling them because their relationship is not as strong as they previously believed.
The idea that a firm feels vulnerable in their B2B relationship may mean that they feel
their relationship is not that strong and potentially ending. If the firm is the more
dependent firm then they maybe troubled by the potential for relationship ending. If
firms are suspicious it is because firms believe their B2B partners are working or
behaving in ways that are contrary to accepted and perhaps expected relational norms.
Adherence to these norms undoubtedly contributes to relationship strength so it makes
sense that behaviors that are contrary to these norms may provoke suspicion. It also
explains the negative relationship between suspicion and relationship strength as the two
almost assuredly manifest according to a shared inverse relationship.
Relationship Strength and Performance
The last hypotheses, H22 suggest a positive relationship between relationship strength
and performance. The results indicate that this hypothesis is supported. The
standardized loading is 0.186 and the unstandardized loading is .4543. The standard error
is 0.085 and the t value is 5.305. The idea of there being a positive relationship between
relationship strength and performance is not something new (e.g. Crosby, Evans and
Cowles 1990; Kumar, Hibbard and Stern 1994; Kumar, Scheer and Steenkamp 1995) and
again, not something that is conceptually difficult to accept. If a firm believes they are
performing well they will also believe their relationships are performing well which
181

logically implies strength in the B2B relationship. Likewise, a firm that believes their
relationships are functioning well will transfer these beliefs regarding the relationship
onto their overall firm level performance. It is possible for firms who believe their
performance is poor to still indicate strong B2B relationships. These firms may attribute
their poor performance to such things as the economy or issues within their own firm.
However, it is more likely that in situations where performance depends on combined
efforts the relationship must also function well in order for performance goals to be
obtained. Firms do not typically enter into B2B relationships unless they need an
exchange partner to obtain organizational goals it then follows that in most B2B
relationships relational partners will first have to believe their B2B relationships are
functioning well before they will believe their firm level performance is maximized.
To this point, the results pertaining to all of the areas of the structural model have been
discussed except for the overall model itself. Below, in figure three is a representation of
the entire structural model illustrating the significant and positive paths.
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Figure 3: Structural Model Illustrating Significant Path Coefficients
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As can be seen from the fit indices, listed in figure three, on the proceeding page, the
model shows reasonably good fit. The RMSEA is slightly higher than accepted
thresholds but only slightly. The same is true of the CFI and NNFI. These two fit indices
are slightly lower than the more strict thresholds prescribed by Hu and Bentler (1999) but
are within the acceptable thresholds prescribed by Hair et al. (1998). Given the
exploratory nature of this dissertation it is not unreasonable to relax the thresholds of
acceptability for these fit indices slightly to account for the expected increased variances
which commonly accompany the use of new and untested scales and the exploration of
new constructs. Therefore, the above fit indices reveal what is by all measures a useful
dark side model which, through the process of this dissertation, has contributed to and
insightful knowledge regarding the dynamics and nuances of B2B relationships and the
implementation of a RM strategy.
The non-significant results regarding the relationships between relationship strength
pose opportunities for further supplemental analyses which may provide insight into why
these relationships failed to yield significant results. A discriminant analysis was
conducted with relationship strength as the dependent or grouping variable with the dark
side constructs entered as the independent variables. The results were interesting and are
listed in table 19 below.
Table 19 Discriminant Analysis for the Dark Side and Relationship Strength
Strong
Weak
Relationship
Relationship
Mean
Mean
F-Test Significance
Relational Myopia
4.440
4.150
1.865
0.173
Complacency
3.090
4.530
33.027
0.000
Vulnerability
3.200
4.350
16.461
0.000
Suspicion
3.340
5.030
38.463
0.000
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As can be seen in table 19 above, the only construct not to show significant
differences between the strong versus weak relationship strength groups was relational
myopia. Of course this is the one variable that showed a significant and positive
relationship with relationship strength during the analysis of the structural model. The
other three variables show significant differences between the strong and weak
relationship strength groups. This means that the respondents who were reflecting upon
what they view as a weak relationship were more likely to indicate the onset of
complacency, vulnerability, and suspicion. This is consistent with the results of the
structural model assessment. The belief is that the differing effect sizes across the strong
and weak relationship strength groups may be enough to cancel out the actual effect the
dark side sentiments have on the weaker relationships. More specifically, since the
strong relationships are less likely to indicate the onset of the dark side compared to the
weak relationships, it then makes sense that taken together, a significant dark side
influence would not result during the assessment of the structural model. However, since
the mean for relational myopia was sufficiently high for both the strong and weak
relationship strength groups, it then makes sense that this effect showed a significant
influence on relational myopia during the assessment of the structural model.
The final stage of the structural model assessment is to compare the hypothesized
model to a series of competing models, which act as alternative explanations to the
proposed model (Hair et al.1998). Comparing the proposed model to competing models
provides insight into whether or not the proposed model is acceptable, regardless of
overall fit, because no other similarly formulated model can achieve a better fit (Hair et
al. 1998). Below is the first rival model that examines the relationships between the
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antecedent constructs and only two of the dark side constructs, relational myopia and
complacency. These two are examined together because it can be argued that these two
are the more relational of the dark side constructs. That is, these two constructs are
believed to manifest in B2B relationships where the relationship, for the most part, has
proceeded well. More specifically, the dark side is believed to be able to occur in
relationships where the partners think everything is going as good as can be expected.
The dark side doesn‟t necessarily need to be presented in deleterious actions conducted
on the part of a B2B relational partner. The dark side may manifest where things go so
well that B2B partners fail to recognize that these “good behaviors” are actually a
manifestation of the dark side itself. That is, a “we like the way things are going so we
are going to leave them as is” attitude develops. This attitude of course fails to account
for things like changing regulations, technology developments or economic ebb and
flows. This scenario develops a dark side model that is solely based on B2B partners
believing that their relationship is the pillar of relationship strength and this belief,
consequently, leading to a shortsighted and complacent view of the B2B relationship.
Also, relationship strength was also taken out of the model as a theoretical argument
for the direct relationship between the dark side and performance can be made. That is,
relationship strength might not be a mediating influence between the dark side and
performance. This first rival model thus represents a theoretically derived, yet more
parsimonious dark side model.
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Figure 4. Rival Model 1
Chi Square – 72368.029
p > 0.001
RMR = 0.0709
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The above rival model does have a smaller though still very significant chi-square as
well as a slightly better RMR estimate than the proposed model. However, the proposed
model shows a better RMSEA, CFI and NNFI. Aside from the significant chi square the
fit indices between the two models are also very close regardless of which is better for
each model. At this point, it would appear that accepting the proposed model over the
first rival model is acceptable due to the inability of the rival model to clearly establish
itself as a clearly superior model when compared to the proposed model.
The second rival model is similar to the first with the exception of having
vulnerability and suspicion as the two dark side constructs as opposed to relational
myopia and complacency. These two constructs are conceptually similar in that they are
both believed to manifest more in B2B relationships where events that have negatively
influenced the relationship have occurred or in relationships where the relational
sentiment between the B2B partners has been deteriorating for one reason or another.
Also, the shared values construct is removed from this rival model as there are no
hypothesized relationships between shard values and vulnerability and suspicion. The fit
indices for this second rival model as well as a diagram illustrating this modified rival
model are illustrated below in figure five.
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Figure 5. Rival Model 2
Chi Square – 77436.592
p > 0.001
RMR = 0.1057
RMSEA = 0.0987
CFI = 0.8964
NNFI = 0.8438
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Rival model two looks to be a better model than rival model one. Like the proposed
model, the chi square is significant but the RMR is also higher than both the proposed
model and the first rival model. The RMSEA is comparable to the proposed model and
slightly lower than that of rival model one. The real strength of the second rival model is
the CFI and NNFI which are better than both the proposed and first rival model.
However, as with the first model, the second rival model fails to clearly distinguish itself
from the other models discussed and again, acceptance of the proposed model is perfectly
reasonable given its fit relative to the other two rival models.
The third and final rival model removes the moderating time variable that is in all of
the other models. Figure six illustrates this modified structural model as well as listing
the relevant fit indices.
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Figure 6: Rival Model
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This final rival model looks to be the worst fitting model of all. None of the fit indices
for this model are better than those of the proposed model which is very similar to this
third rival model with the exception of the moderating variable of time. The results of
the rival models compared to those of the proposed model suggest that the proposed
model is acceptable, as none of the other rival models were able to clearly support itself
as a superior model to the one that was proposed. The acceptance of the proposed model
should be done with caution however as many of the fit indices failed to exceed their
recommended thresholds. Future research should consider adding additional constructs,
refining construct measures or reevaluating and perhaps re-specifying casual
relationships within the structural model (Hair et al. 1998).

192

Chapter Five: Conclusion
Summary
Though sparse, there is some B2B literature that recognizes that there is a dark side to
relationship marketing (e.g. Grayson and Ambler 1999; Hibbard et al. 2001; Moorman,
Zaltman, and Desphande 1992;). Given the plethora of studies that have investigated the
various aspects of relationship marketing it is surprising that there has not been more
work dedicated to investigating this dark side. This negligence has been recognized
however. Palmatier (2008) in his recent monograph dedicated to the exposition of
relationship marketing states “More effort is needed to understand how RM can
negatively affect performance through inefficiencies, cognitive rigidity, and seller-side
relationship effects (price erosion)” (p. 95). This dissertation represents an effort to
contribute to this largely untouched and unknown area of relationship marketing. What
makes this work important isn‟t solely that it offers new knowledge relevant to the
marketing literatures (though that contribution shouldn‟t be underestimated), the impact
value of the work presented in this dissertation stems from the contrarian stance taken
against some of the most fundamental and entrenched conventions governing relationship
marketing. Since researchers investigating the effects of relationship marketing have
focused almost exclusively on relationship benefits and the positive effects relationship
marketing has on the firm, the idea that closely-bonded B2B relationships may actually
have negative effects seems to have received very little consideration and even less
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empirical investigation. Given the expanse of the relationship marketing literature and all
the areas that have been influenced by this stream (e.g. Allen 1988; Bejou 1994; Scheer
and Steenkamp 1995) identifying and examining this relational dark side is a task that we
consider to be of immediate and considerable importance.
The belief in the importance of gaining this dark side insight motivated this
dissertation. Through the support of several of the hypothesized relationships, this
dissertation is able to empirically support the more global notion that relationship
constructs such as shared values, trust, commitment, and satisfaction can have a direct
influence on the onset of such dark side symptoms as relational myopia, complacency,
vulnerability and suspicion. These results would be considered heretical within main
stream RM literature as these relational constructs have typically been linked to positive
outcomes for the firm (c.f. Palmatier, Dant, and Grewal 2008).
This dissertation should be seen as a first step toward developing a deeper
understanding of RM that will not only provide insight into how engaging in B2B
relationships can benefit the firm but also how engaging in these relationships can also be
harmful. More specifically, this dissertation is a move to shift the focus of RM research
away from the benefits of a RM strategy as these benefits are already well established
within the RM literature (e.g. Morgan and Hunt 1994; Palmatier et al. 2006; Rao and
Perry 2002) and toward the recognition of the dark side so that its causes and its effects
can be more deeply understood. From this knowledge, appropriate coping and defense
mechanisms can be developed so firms can both enjoy the benefits of a RM strategy as
well as guard against the onset of its dark side.
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Theoretical Contributions
This dissertation contributes a theoretical perspective that integrates a sunset clause
into the dominant theoretical perspectives currently guiding the majority of RM research.
More specifically, the results of this dissertation found that several key RM constructs,
generally accepted as having a positive influence on B2B relationships can, over time,
lead to negative effects or what is described in this dissertation as dark side symptoms.
This stands in direct contrast to the dominant theoretical perspectives currently guiding
much of the current RM research. Specifically, theoretical perspectives, such as the
commitment-trust perspective, dependence perspective, transaction cost perspective and
relational norms perspective have all been applied within the RM literature as tools that
offer theoretical explanations for how and why relational constructs positively influence
B2B relationships. Though these perspectives have proven useful when examining the
positive benefits and outcomes associated with RM, they have not yet accounted for the
eventual manifestation of the dark side as it is described in this dissertation. This sunset
clause provides the missing theoretical justification for the diminished returns and
eventual onset of dark side symptoms associated with continued investment in a RM
strategy.
To help clarify, consider the commitment-trust perspective, which suggests that it is
the trust and commitment relationship partners feel for each other that are the ultimate
drivers of relationship performance (Palmatier, Dant, and Grewal 2007). Since trust and
commitment drive relationship performance, it would then stand to reason that the more
resources firms invest in these relational constructs the greater the relational return. The
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relational norms perspective, (MacNeil 1980; Kaufmann and Dant 1992) explains that
relational norms like solidarity and mutuality positively influence relational performance.
Like the commitment trust perspective, the relational norms perspective implies that
firms should continue to invest in the development of these relational norms. What is not
provided in these perspectives is the recognition of decreased returns from greater and
greater investments over time. In other words, continued investment in the development
of relational sentiments does not produce greater returns in perpetuity. Simply put, there
is a limit to how much these relational investments will return. After this limit is
exceeded, continued investment may lead to these dark side symptoms.
This dissertation hypothesized and found partial support for the moderating influence
time has on the relationships between shared values, commitment, trust, satisfaction, and
the dark side constructs of relational myopia, complacency, vulnerability and suspicion.
As a practical interpretation these results empirically support the presence of this limit
and provide support for the notion that increased relational investment, over time, may
begin to yield negative or deleterious effects.
The TCE perspective (Williamson 1975), also a dominant theoretical perspective
guiding RM research, is similar to the perspectives discussed above in that it does not
predict the time moderated relationships between relational constructs and dark side
constructs. The TCE perspective recognizes the potential for opportunistic behavior.
The belief that a partner is acting opportunistically may provoke feelings of vulnerability
and or suspicion. These feelings are undesirable so firms will take action to somehow
alleviate these symptoms. In order to do this it is likely that firms are going to need to
dedicate time and resources toward this goal which ultimately will negatively influence
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relationship performance. Though this sounds consistent with the onset of the dark side,
the TCE perspective does not link the onset of opportunism to the relational constructs
studied in this dissertation. In other words, though the TCE perspective theoretically
predicts impediments of relational performance, and is useful for predicting such
occurrences, it does not link these impediments to continuous relational investments over
time which is what the results of this dissertation suggests is happening.
This dissertation provides and tests a rich repertoire of constructs as they relate to the
dark side symptoms and the moderating influence of time. Including as many relational
constructs as possible into the sunset perspective will provide a greater understanding of
how the positive linkages between B2B relationships and positive outcomes changes over
time and starts yielding negative results.
The three theoretical perspectives discussed above are generally regarded as three of
the more dominant perspectives that have guided much of the RM research for the better
part of thirty years (Palmatier 2008). However, discussed throughout this dissertation is
Cyert and March‟s (1963) behavioral theory of the firm which warrants further discussion
here as it relates to the dark side. This perspective does seem to have a limited ability to
offer an established theoretical framework capable of explaining the onset of some of the
dark side constructs. Specifically, this theory explains, from an organizational learning
perspective, that firms will learn from their past experience and work to provide an
environment that promotes and re-enforces positive results. Of course, firms will try to
control their environment but no firm, regardless of size, can exert that kind of control
over the environmental landscape. Thus, firms often adopt a narrowed view of their firm
as the environment changes but firm level managers, through their myopic view of the
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firm, fail to make the adjustments needed for the firm to function optimally. Applying
this theoretical perspective to the B2B relationship is logical as organizational learning
certainly is influenced by the past success and failure of organizational relationships.
Thus, firms that have myopic views of their firms most certainly have myopic views of
their B2B relationships and hence, the connection of the onset of the dark side to this
organizational behavioral theory.
Though the perspective offered by Cyert and March (1963) provides some explanatory
power and predictability regarding the onset of elements of the dark side, the sunset
perspective being offered in this dissertation is believed to offer more as it includes a
greater number of constructs and directly links the onset of the dark side to continued
relational investments over time.
As Palmatier (2008) recognizes, most RM research has been focused on the benefits
of the relationship. It makes sense that if researchers have been too narrowly focused on
the benefits of RM then the theoretical perspectives used to guide their research will also
be narrowly constructed and only account for the benefits and not the potential hazards of
adopting a RM strategy. This narrowly focused view of RM research means that RM
researchers have not given attention to the potential hazards of adopting an RM strategy
despite the growing amount of evidence, published in the practitioner literature, that these
hazards exist (e.g. Dowsett 2007; Merriden 1999; Shipley 1994).
This dissertation serves as the much needed first step toward the development of a
broader and more complete theoretical perspective capable of explaining both the
benefits and hazards associated with the adoption of a RM strategy. In other words, the
results of this dissertation provide evidence that relational variables can and do lead to a
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dark side. These dark side or deleterious effects can manifest in several ways. For
example, as discussed in chapter two of this dissertation, B2B partners may develop such
a level of familiarity that they are no longer able to evaluate one another objectively
(Moorman, Zaltman, and Desphande 1992), A “what have you done for me lately”
attitude may develop (Gruen, Summers, and Acito 2000) or B2B firms may begin to
think that their B2B partners are taking them for granted or otherwise abusing their
relationship (Grayson and Ambler 1999; Baker 2006). Of course these potential problems
represent only a small amount of the seemingly infinite number of potential issues that
may develop as the result of continued relational investment over time.
The sunset clause perspective developed throughout this dissertation is a theoretical
perspective that accounts for the relationships between the relational and dark side
constructs. By attaching a sunset clause to the notion that relational constructs are
positive influences on relationships allows for their benefits to wane and potentially
disappear over time. More specifically, by accounting for the diminished benefits
relational constructs have on relational performance over time, RM researchers are able
to theoretically justify the initial positive influence of these relational constructs while
also accounting for the development of the dark side symptoms. This sunset clause
perspective provides RM researchers a deeper and clearer understanding of B2B
relationships and the influence these relationships have on the firms who engage in them.
Managerial Implications
The results of this dissertation may be interpreted as a reminder that though B2B
relationships often yield positive results for the firm engaged in the relationship (e.g.
Cannon and Homburg 2001; Palmatier, Dant and Grewal 2007; Morgan and Hunt 1994),
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entering into them should be tempered with caution as these relationships do pose
hazards for those not actively engaged in the monitoring of their B2B relationships.
Palmatier (2008), draws from several previously offered definitions of relationship
marketing to derive an integrated and consistent definition of RM, “Relationship
marketing (RM) is the process of identifying, developing, maintaining, and terminating
relational exchanges for the purpose of enhancing performance”. Businesses enter into
B2B relationships in an effort to reach organizational goals not obtainable on their own.
However, though managers are encouraged to enter into B2B relationships when
appropriate they are also encouraged to do so with the understanding that over time, the
positive effects that the B2B relationship has provided may begin to wane or even
provoke more serious issues and consequences. For example, as discussed in this
dissertation, firms who become so entwined in their relationship may begin to, over time,
drift into a relational myopia where everything runs on auto pilot. Though this may
sound attractive to managers because it implies fewer resources toward relationship
maintenance, it may prove costly as processes and systems become dated and inefficient.
Managers are reminded to stay vigilante regarding their relational processes. Though
a certain amount of automation regarding systems and processes may be desirable, the
attainment of this sought after automation should not lull firm managers into believing
they are “where they need to be”. The environment is very dynamic and ever changing,
relational myopia may be disguised as increased efficiencies and process automation but
as the environment changes, managers must take stock of their B2B relationships to make
sure they are operating as efficiently and appropriately as possible relative to their
business environment.
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Managers are encouraged to stay active and critical in the evaluation of their B2B
relationships. It is easy to see how firms that reflect similar thoughts or otherwise share
in the same values are attractive relational partners. Though this may make establishing a
new relationship easier the results presented here suggest that this can also handicap the
vision of those involved in the relationship. Specifically, firms may adopt too similar a
view of the relationship which effectively prevents the emergence of diversified ideas and
creative problem solving. It may be wise to remain cognizant of this possibility in an
effort to prevent the onset of relational myopia.
In other words, the most obvious solutions to the relational problems may not be the
best ones. If firm manages demand solutions from several sources or at least demand the
evaluation of several potential solutions they can be sure they have, as thoroughly as
possible, evaluated as many potential options from as many different perspectives as
possible. This sort of exercise may be more time consuming but it does provide
insurance against the onset of relational myopia.
This dissertation is not suggesting that becoming committed to a B2B partner is a bad
thing. It is suggesting that firm managers remain aware of the potential hazards that may
accompany the emergence of commitment over time. Affective commitment was found
to be significantly related to relational myopia, complacency and suspicion while
normative commitment is significantly related to relational myopia and vulnerability over
time. It is tough to imagine relational myopia or complacency becoming a problem if
firms are constantly evaluating relationship processes as well as relationship partners.
This may not sound like a good strategy for developing strong, lasting B2B relationships
but it believed that if these evaluation programs are administered as a function of policy
201

from the beginning of the relationship, it will not hinder the evolution of a strong efficient
relationship. In other words, just because firms are committed to remaining vigilant it
does not mean they are not also committed to their B2B relationships. It means that firms
will routinely take stock of how their B2B relationship is functioning in an effort to make
sure that relationship potential is being realized. Firms will still be focused on the long
term but through their routine evaluations of their B2B relationships will have a
safeguard against the relationship becoming too comfortable which lull firms and
managers into complacency and relational myopia.
Also, if firms are aware of their options as they pertain to relational partners there is
really no reason to feel vulnerable or suspicious toward the B2B partner‟s behavior. The
ability to engage in another relationship or at least the knowledge of knowing there are
other B2B partners available may be enough to prevent the onset of these dark side
symptoms. Of course maintaining this knowledge will require firms keeping an active
scan of the horizon to see who and what is available.
Of course trust is important in any B2B relationship (e.g. Doney and Cannon 1999;
Moorman, Zaltman and Desphande 1992) but consistent with this more global
recommendation of this dissertation, trust needs to be tempered with vigilance. It is
believed that firms that remain active in the scanning of the horizon and the evaluation of
their B2B relationships will not only not allow the onset of these dark side symptoms;
their relationship may even become stronger. As time passes it makes sense that firms
that are constantly evaluating their environment and its B2B relationships, will learn that
they either need to switch relational partners or that their current partner‟s are the best
ones to help them achieve their relationship and organizational goals. This isn‟t to imply
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that firms should be ready to take an immediate turn toward a discrete transaction but that
remaining observant doesn‟t mean you don‟t trust your B2B partner, it simply means you
are guarding against the onset of these dark side symptoms. Put another way, it means
that though you trust your B2B partner to work as best they can with your best interest in
mind, you don‟t trust the combination of the dynamic environment and a positive trusting
relationship to be able to guard against the onset of these dark side symptoms. So,
instead of allowing the relationship to run itself, the firm and its managers must to an
active role in relationship management despite the feelings of trust that characterize the
relationship.
Satisfaction was found to be positively related to relational myopia, complacency and
suspicion over time. To guard against satisfaction leading to the onset of these dark side
symptoms it is recommended that firms follow the advice prescribed above to guard
against other relational constructs leading to the onset of the dark side which is to remain
vigilant regarding the environment and the B2B relationships they are in. Remaining
vigilant and engaged in the relationship simply means to keep monitoring the relationship
and its progress in an effort to ensure maximum efficiencies and proper fit among
relational partners. Some things that may aid in this effort include organizational buyers
routinely examining competitor bids to take stock of their relational partner‟s current
level of pricing. Firm management should take an active role in the development and
management of the relationships as well its monitoring. Do not leave B2B relationship
governance solely in the hands of subordinates. It is important to remember that B2B
relationships are at the firm, not the individual, level. Rotating people in at different
times may aid in the prevention of the dark side as it prevents interpersonal relationships
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from developing to the point where interpersonal interests supersede the interests of the
firm. Finally, compare progress and status reports to other B2B relationships. Metrics of
particular interests include price, service, and other intangibles not expressed in the
contract.
It is important not to confuse satisfaction with success or as signs they have the
relationship figured out or so finely tuned the relationship can now run itself. There is
nothing wrong with being satisfied with one‟s B2B relationship, the danger manifests
when this satisfaction acts as evidence that it can‟t get any better and a firm subsequently
“lets down their guard”.
Firms should also realize that when they are in a position of dependence it is still in
their best interest to cater to their relationships as well as working to alleviate their
dependent position. Dependent firms should not sit back and let the less dependent firm
run the relationship on their own simply because the more dependent firm feels they have
no input. Taking an active role in the governing of the B2B relationship will build
confidence and allow for the firms to both grow and contribute to the relationship. The
same can be said for less dependent firms. It is tempting to allow the more dependent
firm to do all the work since they need the relationship more than the less dependent firm.
This is really symptomatic of complacency, and even for firms that are less dependent,
can eventually lead to the onset of such things as vulnerability and feelings of suspicion.
Finally, firms need to be sure not to confuse dark side sentiments with relationship
strength. As discussed above, it is logical to believe firms may perceive the onset of
relational myopia and complacency as sign of relationship strength. This makes sense as
firms may reach a point where they no longer put as many resources toward the B2B
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relationship as they once did and figure that the relationship, if left alone, will always run
the way it currently is. This is fine provided the relationship is running in a manner
appropriate for the current business environment. However, as the environment changes
the need to modify relational processes will emerge. If a firm is complacent and myopic
toward how its relationship runs it may miss these signs believing that the relationship is
strong and not in need of adjustment. Provided firms stay active in monitoring how these
relational process are performing and make changes when needed then there is no reason
to believe these dark side constructs should ever become an issue, despite the evidence in
this dissertation, suggesting that they do.
Limitations
The empirical investigation for this dissertation was done without dyadic data. This
provides a limitation as it only provides the insight of one side of the relationship. In this
case it is the buying, not the supplying side that contributed information with which this
dissertation is based. Though this dissertation made every effort to combat the issues
associated with common method bias by ensuring participant anonymity and
psychologically separating the predictor and criterion variables (e.g. Podsakoff et al.
2003) these data should be interpreted with these limitations in mind.
The fit indices provide another limitation that should be recognized. Though the fit
indices for the proposed model were better than any of the rival models they still fell
short of reaching several of the commonly accepted thresholds (c.f. Hu and Bentler
1999). This is not unexpected given the exploratory and novel nature of this research but
it still is cause for caution. When interpreting these results, this limitation needs to be
kept in mind as these results suggest there is a better, yet still unproposed, structural
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model that can better capture the nature of the dark side and its relationship to the
constructs inherent in relationship marketing.
Though an initial attempt was made to expand the data collection efforts to include
foreign buyers this effort fell well short of where it needed to be to do an appropriate
comparison and subsequent analysis of international buyers and their dark side effects.
Therefore this dissertation relies on a domestic sample. This means the model should not
be extended to foreign cultures without additional testing. Finally, the cross-sectional
nature of this empirical study limits causal inferences. Though qualitative data were
included in this dissertation, in an effort to support the directionality of the hypothesized
relationships, longitudinal data, though difficult to obtain, would be better for evaluating
how the dark side of relationship marketing manifests and changes over time.
Future Research
This dissertation presents a new theoretical sunset clause that predicts the positive
benefits associated with adopting a RM strategy as well as the eventual manifestation of
dark side. Specifically, this sunset clause recognizes the important moderating influence
of time and its influence on the relationships between relational constructs and the
eventual manifestation of dark side symptoms. However, as discussed in chapter two,
time is really a surrogate for other moderating issues that are the real culprit as far as the
onset of the dark side is concerned. Future research should focus on replacing time as the
moderating variable with something more descriptive and exact regarding the relational
constructs and the true moderating catalyst of the dark side. One potential issue is the
levying of punitive, abusive or other destructive acts. Interpersonal friendships that
develop to the point where the interpersonal relationship trumps the firm level goals may
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also become a problem when individuals behave according to this mindset. Also, the
unwillingness to acknowledge better relational partners can become problematic in a
rapidly changing economic and business environment. This may become a problem
when firms become so comfortable that dedicating resources to monitoring exchange
partner alternatives may seem like a waste of money. An investigation in how this
sentiment develops and to what extent it is a problem should be of particular interest to
the firm. Finally, closely related to the previous, is the idea that firms will mistake
adequate for optimal. Again, how this develops and why should be of particular interest
to researchers and practitioners alike.
For example, the results of this dissertation found that the ability component of trust is
positively related to complacency over time. Of course it‟s not simply the passage of
time that is provoking this relationship. It is more likely that partnering firms, as time
passes are realizing their B2B partners are capable of meeting their contractual
obligations and completing their assigned tasks. As time passes, and partnering firms
continue to perform as expected, partnering firms are lulled into complacency knowing
that they do not need to monitor their relational partner as previous behavior has led them
to believe they will continue to perform as expected.
Of course, it is the partnering firms pleasing behavior, not simply the passage of time
that is provoking the onset of complacency. Future research should investigate this
relationship between complacency and ability but with expected repetitive behavior as
the moderator, not time. There is a potentially infinite number of moderators that may be
influencing these relationships between the relational variables and the onset of the dark
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side. Researchers may want to spend time investigating these moderators in an effort to
isolate those that are most influential and most common.
There are emerging theoretical perspectives within RM that may prove useful in
explaining the onset of the dark side. The resource based view of the firm is an
integrated perspective that suggests that relationship marketing‟s impact on relational
performance is influenced by relational constructs such as trust and commitment as well
as relational investments like training and communication (Palmatier 2008). Future
research may investigate how these investments may lead to the dark side and what dark
side sentiments are provoked as a result of these relationship specific investments.
Elements of evolutionary psychology have also been utilized in the RM context (e.g.
Eyuboglu and Buja 2007). Instinctual feelings like gratitude, guilt and norms of
reciprocity are believed to influence B2B relationship behavior (Palmatier 2008). How
these intrapersonal constructs influence B2B relationships may be of particular interest
from an evolutionary perspective. It begs the question about control over behavior and if
firms have any choice or have the ability to put safeguards in place that can guard against
the dark side or if natural instinct prevents the recognition of the dark side. Future
research should investigate these potentialities to see if these evolutionary psychology
sentiments really do have a place in an RM context, and if they do, to what extent do they
influence the onset of the dark side.
Future research should also investigate how to devise tools and strategies to help
guard against the dark side. The benefits of relationship marketing and the realization of
its dark side present an interesting paradox for marketing researchers to study. The idea
of looking for RM failures will provide marketers with a better understanding of their
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B2B relationships as well as provide the tools needed to better manage and govern these
relationships. This will also help marketers make a clear distinction between the
dynamics and nuances of interpersonal relationship and those of B2B relationships. A
distinction, through the emergence of relationship marketing, can be argued to have been
very much blurred.
From an operational perspective, future research can be expanded by gathering data
from the supplying or selling side of a B2B relationship to evaluate the effects of the dark
side on this side of the relationship. Gathering data from both sides of the relational dyad
will help eliminate any concern associated with common method bias (Podsakoff et al.
2003) as well as provide a broader understanding of the dark side and its influence on the
relationship as a whole, not just one side of it. Future research should expand this
research outside the United States. Given the increasingly integrated global economy
(Keegan and Greene 2004) it is likely that the dark side manifests itself in other countries
and cultures as well. Especially interesting are the dark side implications in some of the
emerging economies such as those in India, Brazil and China. All of these countries have
vastly different cultures from the U.S. so the dark side may manifest itself completely
differently or not at all in those foreign business cultures.
Future research should also consider adding other constructs such as fear, loyalty and
vigilance to these models. It will be interesting to see if firms that remain vigilant and
open to change regarding their B2B relationships will indicate relationships that are just
as strong as those relationships where firms become so committed to their partners that
they are willing to sacrifice organizational goals in order to preserve the B2B
relationship.
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Appendix 1: Pre-Test Survey
University of South Florida
Retail Outlet & Business Relationship Pre-Test Survey 2008

Dear Retail Outlet Agent:
As someone who keeps in contact with your establishment’s vendors or suppliers you are in a
unique position to gauge the quality of the relationship you and your establishment has with these
partnering firms.
The following survey is for two research projects on business to business relationships. These
studies are designed to gauge the quality of business to business relationships and how your
vendors or suppliers handle issues of conflict. It is believed that the results of these surveys will
provide a deeper understanding of how business to business relationships evolve and change over
time and consequently provide a deeper understanding of how best to manage and govern these
business relationships.
Your participation in this survey is completely voluntary and your individual responses will
remain strictly confidential. No names will ever be revealed to any supplier. All reports based on
this survey will only present combined data. Also, please keep in mind that the authors of this
survey are only affiliated with the University of South Florida and the University of Oklahoma
and have no affiliation with any of the suppliers. Therefore, we have no reason to consult with any
of the suppliers about the results of this study. So, please be completely honest and as frank as
possible.
Thank you in advance for your cooperation.
P.S. These surveys should take about 20 - 25 minutes to complete.

Survey I:
Section I: Relationship with Focal Supplier
This section seeks your opinion about the quality of the relationship you currently have with one of your focal suppliers. We
ask that you identify a supplier that your establishment has been able to conduct a significant amount of business with. Please
review the following statements, and provide your evaluations by checking the appropriate box. All questions refer to the focal
supplier you’ve identified and not the individual representatives of the supplier.

Please identify a focal
supplier that your
retail establishment
has conducted a
significant amount of
business with

Name of Supplier: _____________________________________

To the best of your knowledge
The amount of time your establishment has
Conducted business with this focal supplier
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Months: _______

Years: ______

Appendix 1 (Continued)
The below items
need to be answered
in 2 parts. Please
indicate the degree to
which you believe
that (1) your supplier
would agree with the
following statements,
and (2) you would
agree with the
following statements:

1a

1b

2a

2b

3a

3b

4a

Managers in this
business often engage
in behaviors that I
consider to be
unethical. (Supplier’s
Response)
Managers in this
business often engage
in behaviors that I
consider to be
unethical. (Your
Response)
In order to succeed in
this company, it is
often necessary to
compromise one‟s
ethics. (Supplier’s
Response)
In order to succeed in
this company, it is
often necessary to
compromise one‟s
ethics. (Your
Response)
Top Management in
my company has let it
be known in no
uncertain terms that
unethical behavior
will not be tolerated.
(Supplier’s Response)
Top Management in
my company has let it
be known in no
uncertain terms that
unethical behavior
will not be tolerated.
(Your Response)
If a manager in my
company is discovered
to have engaged in
unethical behavior that
results primarily in
personal gain (rather
than corporate gain),
he or she will be
promptly
reprimanded.
(Supplier’s Response)

Strongly
Disagree

Disagre
e

Moderatel
y
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Moderately
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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4b

5a

5b

If a manager in my
company is discovered
to have engaged in
unethical behavior that
results primarily in
personal gain (rather
than corporate gain),
he or she will be
promptly
reprimanded. (Your
Response)
If a manager in my
company is discovered
to have engaged in
unethical behavior that
results primarily in
corporate gain (rather
than personal gain), he
or she will be
promptly
reprimanded.
(Supplier’s Response)
If a manager in my
company is discovered
to have engaged in
unethical behavior that
results primarily in
corporate gain (rather
than personal gain), he
or she will be
promptly
reprimanded. (Your
Response)
Please indicate how
much you either
agree or disagree
with the items below.

1

2
3

4

5

6

7

8

I would be very happy
to not ever have to
change partners.
I enjoy referring my
supplier to others.
I really feel as if my
supplier‟s problems
are my own.
I think that I could
easily become as
attached to another
supplier as I am to this
one.
I do not feel like part
of the family with my
supplier.
I do not feel
“emotionally
attached” my supplier.
My supplier has a
great deal of personal
meaning for me.
I do not feel a strong
sense of belonging to
this supplier

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
Disagree

Disagre
e

Moderatel
y
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Moderately
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

I think that
establishments these
days change suppliers
too often.
I do not believe that
an establishment must
always be loyal to
their suppliers.
Jumping from supplier
to supplier does not
seem unethical to me.

One of the major
reasons we continue to
have a relationship
with this supplier is
that loyalty is very
important and
therefore we feel a
sense of moral
obligation to remain in
the relationship.
If we got a better offer
from another supplier
we would not feel it
was right to leave our
current supplier.
We believe in the
value of remaining
loyal to one supplier.
Things were better in
the days when
establishments stayed
with only one supplier
at a time.
We do not feel that
remaining loyal to one
supplier is sensible
anymore.

Even when our
supplier gives us a
rather unlikely
explanation, we are
confident that they are
telling the truth.
Our supplier has often
provided us
information that has
later proven to be
inaccurate.
Our supplier usually
keeps the promises
that it makes to our
establishment.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
Disagree

Disagre
e

Moderatel
y
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Moderately
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

30

31

32
33

34

Whenever our supplier
gives us advice on our
business operations,
we know that it is
sharing its best
judgment.
Our establishment can
count on our supplier
to be sincere.
Though circumstances
change, we believe
that our supplier will
be ready and willing
to offer us assistance
and support.
When making
important decisions,
our supplier is
concerned about our
welfare.

When we share our
problems with our
supplier, we know that
it will respond with
understanding.
In the future, we can
count on our supplier
to consider how its
decisions and actions
will affect us.
When it comes to
things that are
important to us, we
can depend on our
supplier support.
I believe my supplier
is capable of
delivering products
that meet our needs.
I believe our supplier
is an expert in the
position that they
hold.
Generally speaking,
our supplier‟s
representatives are
poorly trained.
People with relevant
work experience are
employed by our
supplier.
Our supplier does
things competently.
Unfortunately, our
supplier does things
poorly.
Our supplier
employees perform
their tasks with skill.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
Disagree

Disagre
e

Moderatel
y
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Moderately
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

Our supplier does
things in a capable
manner.
Our supplier is a good
partner to deal with.
We are satisfied with
the products we get
from our supplier .
In general, we are
satisfied with our
dealings with our
supplier.
We will continue
having a relationship
with our supplier if we
can.
We are satisfied with
the service we get
from our supplier.

Most of the
disagreements we
have had with our
supplier were settled
to our satisfaction.
Our supplier is very
interested in helping
us make our business
profitable.
We are satisfied with
the sales of our
supplier‟s products.
We are satisfied with
the performance of
our relationship with
our supplier.
We are satisfied with
the extent to which
our sales target has
been met.
Regarding the
economic aspect of
our relationship with
our supplier we are
pleased with its
performance.
Regarding the
economic aspect of
our relationship with
our supplier we are
pleased with its
reliability.
If for some reason
our supplier ended
its relationship with
us…

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
Disagree

Disagre
e

Moderatel
y
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Moderately
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
Disagree

Disagre
e

Moderatel
y
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Moderately
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree
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48

49

50

51

The loss would hurt
our sales of nonsupplier products as
well.
We could compensate
for it by switching our
efforts to other
supplier products we
carry.
It would be relatively
easy for us to develop
a relationship with a
different supplier.
We would suffer a
significant loss of
income despite our
best efforts to replace
the lost incomes.

If for some reason
we ended our
relationship with
our supplier
52

53

54

55

56

Such a loss would
seriously hurt the
sales of our supplier
in this area.
Our supplier could
easily compensate for
it by finding another
establishment in this
area.
There are other
establishments in this
area that would
quickly partner with
our supplier.
Such a loss would
seriously damage our
suppliers‟ reputation
in this area.
Such a loss would
negatively affect the
availability our
suppliers customers
have come to expect.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Moderately
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Moderately
Agree

Agree

Stro
ngly
Agr
ee

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Survey II:
Section I: Relationship Issues
The following questions, in this second survey, are concerned with how business relationships deal with such things as
conflict or other situations that drift outside of how the business relationship normally operates. Incidents or issues that run
contrary to what each partner in a business relationship finds acceptable occur in all business relationships. In this survey, we
ask you to recall and discuss an issue that has adversely affected the relationship you have had with your chosen supplier.
Please remember that these results will not be discussed or otherwise revealed in any way shape or form to any supplier
listed in this survey so please be as honest and frank as possible.

1. Briefly,
describe the
issue.
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2.
Approximatel
y, when did it
occur?
(Month and
Year)

Month ________________________

Year ______________________________

3. What was
the
approximate
total dollar
value and
volume at
stake?
Specifically pertaining to the issue or issues referred to above, please answer how much you either agree or disagree
with the items below.

Please indicate how
much you either
agree or disagree
with the items
below.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

We have little control
over the things that
happen in our
relationship with our
supplier.
There is really no
way we can solve the
problems in our
relationship with our
supplier.
There is little we can
do to change our
relationship with our
supplier.
We often feel
helpless when dealing
with our supplier.
What happens to us is
mostly dependent on
us, not our supplier.
We can accomplish
just about any goal
our establishment sets
out to do.
Our Supplier could
act in a way that
would hurt our
establishment.

Regarding how our
supplier behaves in
our relationship, they
can get away with not
doing what we expect
of them.

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Moderatel
y
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Moderately
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

We do not have the
ability to stop our
supplier‟s behavior,
even if it hurts our
establishment.

I do not believe our
supplier always
adheres to all
applicable laws and
regulations.
I do not believe our
supplier always
accurately represents
their credentials.
I do not believe our
supplier is always
honest in serving us
as a client.
I believe our supplier
would participate in a
conflict of interest
without prior notice
to all parties
involved.
I often feel as if our
supplier is not
completely truthful
with me.
Our supplier is
basically honest.

Our supplier seldom
lies to me.
Our supplier rarely
tells us what they are
thinking.
I do not believe our
supplier always
considers my
establishment‟s best
interest when acting.
I believe our supplier,
at times, acts in ways
that could be harmful
to our relationship.
I believe our supplier,
at times, acts in ways
that could be harmful
to my establishment.
I believe our supplier,
at times, takes our
relationship for
granted.
I believe our supplier,
at times, uses our
relationship against
us for their own gain.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Moderatel
y
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Moderately
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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Section II: Relationship Dynamics
All relationships, including business relationships, change in some way over time. In this section we ask you to evaluate the
relationship you have with your chosen supplier AS IT CURRENTLY IS. When making this evaluation we ask that you
consider all the events and issues that have transpired over time that have helped form your opinion of this relationship as it
is today.

As compared to
other similar retail
establishments, our
performance is very
high in terms of:

Strongly
Disagree

Disagre
e

Moderatel
y
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Moderately
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

1

Sales Growth

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2

Profit Growth

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3

Overall Profitability

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4

Labor Productivity

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5

Cash Flow

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Please indicate how
much you either
agree or disagree
with the items
below.

Strongly
Disagree

Disagre
e

Moderatel
y
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Moderately
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6

7

8

9

11

Our supplier uses
flexible systems of
delivery that have
been adapted for our
establishment.

Our supplier has
available novel
distribution systems
(for example online
ordering) for my
establishment to use.
Our supplier offers
my establishment a
diversified product
range.
Our supplier uses
modern stock and
control systems when
doing business with
my establishment.
Our supplier has
offered our
establishment new
products since the
beginning of our
relationship with
them.
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12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

Our supplier has
offered our
establishment new
services since the
beginning of our
relationship with
them.

Our supplier has
offered our
establishment new or
updated delivery
methods since the
beginning of our
relationship with
them.
Our supplier has
offered our
establishment new or
updated ordering
methods since the
beginning of our
relationship with
them.
When it comes to our
relationships, we
prefer variety to
routine.
When it comes to our
relationships, we
prefer to stick with
things that we know.
When it comes to our
relationships, we
dislike change.
When it comes to
how our relationships
operate, we are
attached to
conventional ways of
doing things.
When it comes to our
relationship we often
find new ways of
doing things.
The relationship we
have with our
supplier lacks a longrange perspective.
When it comes to the
relationship my
establishment has
with our supplier,
things normally
happen the same way
every time every
time.
Our supplier does not
waste time on change
initiatives.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
Disagree

Disagre
e

Moderatel
y
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Moderately
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

238

Appendix 1 (Continued)
23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

Our supplier does not
worry about the
future of our
relationship.
Our supplier does not
usually make any
changes.
Our supplier often
makes major
changes.
Regarding our
relationship with our
supplier we do not
worry about future
trouble in the
relationship.

Regarding the
relationship we have
with our supplier, we
are planning to make
changes to how the
relationship works.

Regarding the
relationship we have
with our supplier, I
do not believe we
would recognize the
need to change
anything if the need
developed.
I do not believe my
establishment
continues to look for
other suppliers.
I do not believe my
establishment would
recognize a better
supplier if one was
available.
Please indicate how strong
or weak the relationship
you have with your
supplier is, as it pertain to
the questions below.

31

32

What is your overall
assessment of the
strength of your
relationship with
your supplier‟s sales
rep?
How strong would
you like the strength
of your relationship
with your supplier‟s
sales rep to be?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
Disagree

Disagre
e

Moderatel
y
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Moderately
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very
Weak

Weak

Moderatel
y
Weak

Neither
Weak nor
Strong

Moderately
Strong

Stron
g

Very
Strong

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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33

34

35

What is your overall
assessment of the
strength of your
relationship with
your supplier as a
company?
How strong would
you like the strength
of your relationship
with your supplier as
a company to be?
Over time I feel that
the strength of my
relationship with my
supplier has
become…

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Section III: Classification Questions
This final set of questions is asked so that we can combine your answers with other survey participants. We absolutely
guarantee that any reports based on this survey will show only combined findings, and your individual identity will not be
revealed.
1

Your Name:

2

Your Title at your
establishment:

3

Male or Female:

4

Your Age:
How long have you
worked in this
industry?

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

Your establishments
name:
How long have you
worked in your
current
establishment?
How would you
classify your retail
establishment? (e.g.
shoe store , clothing,
pet store etc.)
How long, to the best
of your knowledge,
has your
establishment been
involved in a
relationship with
your supplier?
How often do (or
did) you interact with
your supplier‟s
representative at
your establishment?
How often did your
supplier‟s
representative
interact with you
over the phone?

Male: ________________

Female: ____________________

Estimated Times per Month ____________

Estimated Times per Month ____________
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13

14

15

16

17

18

What percent of your
interactions with
your supplier‟s sales
representative were
dedicated to
resolving issues?
Briefly describe your
primary
responsibilities
within your
establishment.
I had enough
information to
complete this survey.
Approximately, how
many full time
employees work in
your establishment?
Approximately, how
many part time
employees work in
your establishment?
If you would like a
summary report of
this research projects
finding, please
complete the
following or attach a
business card.

% ____________

Yes: ________________

Email:
Phone:
Address:
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Appendix 2: Main Study Survey
University of South Florida
Business to Business Relationship Main Study Survey 2008 – 2009
Dear Organizational Buyer:
As someone who keeps in contact with your establishment’s business to business relational
partners you are in a unique position to gauge the quality of the relationship you and your
establishment has with these partnering firms.
The following survey is for two research projects on business to business relationships. These
studies are designed to gauge the quality of business to business relationships and how you and
your relational partners handle issues of conflict. It is believed that the results of these surveys
will provide a deeper understanding of how business to business relationships evolve and
change over time and consequently provide a deeper understanding of how best to manage and
govern these business relationships.
Your participation in this survey is completely voluntary and your individual responses will
remain strictly confidential. No names will ever be revealed to any member of any partnering
firm. All reports based on this survey will only present combined data. Also, please keep in
mind that the authors of this survey are only affiliated with the University of South Florida and
the University of Oklahoma and have no affiliation with any organization within the business
community. Therefore, we have no reason to consult with any organization about the results of
this study. So, please be completely honest and as frank as possible.
Thank you in advance for your cooperation.
P.S. These surveys should take about 20 – 25 minutes to complete.

Survey I:
Section I: Relationship with Focal Relationship Partner

This section seeks your opinion about the quality of the relationship you currently have with one
of your main suppliers. For the purpose of this study, a main supplier is defined as a supplier with
which your organization has conducted a significant amount of business, not necessarily your best or
favorite business to business partner. Please review the following statement pertaining to the
relationship you have with one of your main suppliers and provide your evaluations by checking or
circling the appropriate box. All questions refer to the supplier you’ve identified and not the
individual representatives of the supplier.
Name of Relationship Partner (Optional) :
_____________________________________
Please identify a
main supplier that
your organization
has conducted a
significant amount of
business with.

(This question is asked for the purposes of calling to your attention a specific supplier
that your organization has conducted a significant amount of business with.
Answering this question is strictly voluntary and not critical for the completion of this
survey. However, please answer the following questions with the same supplier in
mind)
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The below items
need to be answered
in 2 parts. Please
indicate the degree to
which you believe
that (1) your supplier
would agree with the
following statements,
and (2) you would
agree with the
following statements:

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Moderately
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

3

4

5

6

7

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2b

In order to succeed in
this company, it is
often necessary to
compromise one‟s
ethics. (Your
Response)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3a

Top Management in
my company has let it
be known in no
uncertain terms that
unethical behavior
will not be tolerated.
(Suppliers Response)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3b

Top Management in
my company has let it
be known in no
uncertain terms that
unethical behavior
will not be tolerated.
(Your Response)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Moderatel
y
Disagree

1a

Managers in this
business often engage
in behaviors that I
consider to be
unethical. (Suppliers
Response)

1

2

1b

Managers in this
business often engage
in behaviors that I
consider to be
unethical. (Your
Response)

1

2a

In order to succeed in
this company, it is
often necessary to
compromise one‟s
ethics. (Suppliers
Response)
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4a

If a manager in my
company is discovered
to have engaged in
unethical behavior that
results primarily in
personal gain (rather
than corporate gain),
he or she will be
promptly
reprimanded.
(Suppliers Response)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4b

If a manager in my
company is discovered
to have engaged in
unethical behavior that
results primarily in
personal gain (rather
than corporate gain),
he or she will be
promptly
reprimanded. (Your
Response)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5a

If a manager in my
company is discovered
to have engaged in
unethical behavior that
results primarily in
corporate gain (rather
than personal gain), he
or she will be
promptly
reprimanded.
(Suppliers Response)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5b

If a manager in my
company is discovered
to have engaged in
unethical behavior that
results primarily in
corporate gain (rather
than personal gain), he
or she will be
promptly
reprimanded. (Your
Response)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Please indicate how
much you either
agree or disagree
with the items below.

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Moderatel
y
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Moderately
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

1

I would be very happy
to not ever have to
change our supplier

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2

I think that I could
easily become as
attached to another
supplier as I am to this
one.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3

I do not feel like part
of the family with our
supplier.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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4

My supplier has a
great deal of personal
meaning for me.

1

2

3

Please indicate how
much you either
agree or disagree
with the items below.

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Moderatel
y
Disagree

4

5

6

7

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Moderately
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

5

I do not feel a strong
sense of belonging
with our supplier

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6

I do not believe that
an establishment must
always be loyal to
their suppliers

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

7

Jumping from supplier
to supplier does not
seem unethical to me.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

One of the major
reasons we continue to
have a relationship
with our supplier is
that loyalty is very
important and
therefore we feel a
sense of moral
obligation to remain in
the relationship.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

9

If we got a better offer
from another supplier
we would not feel it
was right to leave our
current supplier

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

10

We believe in the
value of remaining
loyal to one supplier
when possible

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

11

Things were better in
the days when
establishments stayed
with only one supplier
at a time.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

12

We do not feel that
remaining loyal to one
supplier is sensible
anymore.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

13

14

Even when our
supplier gives us a
rather unlikely
explanation, we are
confident that they are
telling the truth.
Our supplier has often
provided us
information that has
later proven to be
inaccurate.
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15

Our supplier usually
keeps the promises
that it makes to our
establishment.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Please indicate how
much you either
agree or disagree
with the items below.

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Moderatel
y
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Moderately
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

16

Whenever our
supplier gives us
advice on our business
operations, we know
that it is sharing its
best judgment.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

17

Our establishment can
count on our supplier
to be sincere.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

18

Though circumstances
change, we believe
that our supplier will
be ready and willing
to offer us assistance
and support.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

19

When making
important decisions,
our supplier is
concerned about our
welfare.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

20

When we share our
problems with our
supplier, we know that
it will respond with
understanding.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

21

In the future, we can
count on our supplier
to consider how its
decisions and actions
will affect us.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

22

23

When it comes to
things that are
important to us, we
can depend on our
supplier‟s support.
I believe our supplier
is an expert in the
position that they
hold.

24

Generally speaking,
our supplier‟s
representatives are
poorly trained.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

25

Our supplier does
things competently.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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26

Unfortunately, our
supplier does things
poorly.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

27

Our supplier does
things in a capable
manner.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Moderately
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

Please indicate how
much you either
agree or disagree
with the items below.

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Moderatel
y
Disagree

28

Our supplier is a good
partner to deal with.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

29

We are satisfied with
the products/service
we get from our
supplier

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

30

In general, we are
satisfied with our
dealings with our
supplier

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

31

We will continue
having a relationship
with our supplier if we
can.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

32

We are satisfied with
the service we get
from our supplier

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

33

We are satisfied with
the performance of
our supplier‟s
products/service (e.g.
sales)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

34

We are satisfied with
the performance of
our relationship with
our supplier

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

35

36

37

We are satisfied with
the extent to which
our sales target has
been met.
Regarding the
economic aspect of
our relationship with
our supplier we are
pleased with its
performance.
Regarding the
economic aspect of
our relationship with
our supplier we are
pleased with its
reliability.
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If for some reason
our supplier ended
its relationship with
us

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Moderately
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

3

4

5

6

7

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Moderatel
y
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Moderately
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

It would be relatively
easy for us to develop
a relationship with a
different supplier.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

We would suffer a
significant loss of
income despite our
best efforts to replace
the lost incomes.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

If for some reason
we ended our
relationship with our
supplier

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Moderatel
y
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Moderately
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

42

Such a loss would
seriously hurt the sales
of our supplier in this
area.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

43

Our supplier could
easily compensate for
it by finding another
establishment in this
area.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

44

There are other
establishments in this
area that would
quickly partner with
our supplier.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

45

Such a loss would
seriously damage our
supplier‟s reputation
in this area.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

46

Such a loss would
negatively affect the
availability our
supplier‟s customers
have come to expect.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

38

39

40

41

The loss would hurt
our sales of other
supplier‟s products as
well.
We could compensate
for it by switching our
efforts to other
supplier‟s products we
carry.

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Moderatel
y
Disagree

1

2

1
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Survey II:
Section I: Relationship Issues

The following questions, in this second survey, are concerned with how business relationships
deal with such things as conflict or other situations that drift outside of how the business relationship
normally operates. Incidents or issues that run contrary to what each partner in a business
relationship finds acceptable occur in all business relationships. In this survey, we ask you to recall
and discuss an issue that has adversely affected the relationship you have had with your chosen main
supplier. Please remember that these results will not be discussed or otherwise revealed in any way
shape or form to any supplier listed in this survey so please be as honest and frank as possible.

1. Briefly,
describe the
issue.

2.
Approximately
, when did it
occur? (Month
and Year)

Month ________________________

Year ______________________________

3. What was
the
approximate
total dollar
value and
volume at
stake?

4. This issue
has frequently
occurred
before:

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Moderately
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Moderatel
y
Agree

1

2

3

4

5

Agree

Strongly
Agree

6

7

Specifically pertaining to the issue or issues referred to above, please answer how much you either
agree or disagree with the items below.

249

Appendix 2 (Continued)
Please indicate how
much you either
agree or disagree
with the items
below.

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Moderatel
y
Disagree

1

We have little control
over the things that
happen in our
relationship with our
supplier

1

2

2

There is really no
way we can solve the
problems in our
relationship with our
supplier.

1

3

There is little we can
do to change our
relationship with our
supplier.

4

We often feel
helpless when
dealing with our
supplier.

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Moderately
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

3

4

5

6

7

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Moderatel
y
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Moderately
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

5

Regarding how our
supplier behaves in
our relationship, they
can get away with not
doing what we expect
of them.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6

We do not have the
ability to stop our
supplier‟s behavior,
even if it hurts our
establishment.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

7

I do not believe our
supplier is always
honest in serving us
as a client.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

I believe our supplier
would participate in a
conflict of interest
without prior notice
to all parties
involved.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

9

I do not believe our
supplier always
considers my
establishment‟s best
interest when acting.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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10

I believe our supplier,
at times, acts in ways
that could be harmful
to our relationship.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

11

I believe our supplier,
at times, acts in ways
that could be harmful
to my establishment.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

12

I believe our supplier,
at times, takes our
relationship for
granted.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

13

I believe our supplier,
at times, uses our
relationship against
us for their own gain.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Section II: Relationship Dynamics

All relationships, including business relationships, change in some way over time. In this section we
ask you to evaluate the relationship you have with your chosen supplier AS IT CURRENTLY IS.
When making this evaluation we ask that you consider all the events and issues that have transpired
over time that have helped form your opinion of this relationship as it is today.

As compared to
other similar
organizations, our
performance is very
high in terms of:

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Moderatel
y
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Moderately
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

1

Sales Growth

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2

Profit Growth

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3

Overall Profitability

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4

Labor Productivity

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5

Cash Flow

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Moderatel
y
Disagree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Moderately
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

Please indicate how
much you either
agree or disagree
with the items
below.
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1

Our supplier has
offered our
establishment new
products since the
beginning of our
relationship with
them.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2

Our supplier has
operated the same
way since the
beginning of our
relationship with
them

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3

Our supplier seems
content with our
relationship as it has
been since the
beginning of our
relationship

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4

Our supplier has
offered our
establishment new
services since the
beginning of our
relationship with
them.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5

Our supplier has
offered our
establishment new or
updated delivery
methods since the
beginning of our
relationship with
them.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Moderately
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

3

4

5

6

7

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

9

When it comes to
how our
relationships operate,
we are attached to
conventional ways of
doing things.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

10

When it comes to our
relationship we often
find new ways of
doing things.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
Disagree

Disagre
e

Moderatel
y
Disagree

6

Our supplier has
offered our
establishment new or
updated ordering
methods since the
beginning of our
relationship with
them.

1

2

7

When it comes to our
relationships, we
prefer to stick with
things that we know.

1

8

When it comes to our
relationships, we
dislike change.
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11

When it comes to our
relationship, we do
not keep looking for
different suppliers
after we have
developed
relationships with the
ones we have

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

12

When it comes to our
relationship, we
prefer not to change
things that have
proven to work

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Please indicate how
strong or weak the
relationship you
have with your
supplier is, as it
pertains to the
questions below.

Very
Weak

Weak

Moderatel
y
Weak

Neither
Weak nor
Strong

Moderately
Strong

Stron
g

Very
Strong

13

What is your overall
assessment of the
strength of your
relationship with
your supplier‟s sales
rep?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

14

How strong would
you like the strength
of your relationship
with your supplier‟s
sales rep to be?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Please indicate how
strong or weak the
relationship you
have with your
supplier is, as it
pertains to the
questions below.

Very
Weak

Weak

Moderatel
y
Weak

Neither
Weak nor
Strong

Moderately
Strong

Stron
g

Very
Strong
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11

What is your overall
assessment of the
strength of your
relationship with
your supplier as a
company?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

12

How strong would
you like the strength
of your relationship
with your supplier as
a company to be?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

13

Over time I feel that
the strength of my
relationship with my
supplier has
become…

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Section III: Classification Questions

This final set of questions is asked so that we can combine your answers with other survey participants.
We absolutely guarantee that any reports based on this survey will show only combined findings, and
your individual identity will not be revealed.

1

Your Name:

2

Your Title at your
establishment:

3

Male or Female:

4

Your Age:

Male: ________________
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Female: ____________________

Appendix 2 (Continued)

5

How long have you
worked in this
industry?

6

Your establishments
name:

7

How long have you
worked in your
current
establishment?

8

How would you
classify your retail
establishment? (e.g.
shoe store , clothing,
pet store etc.)

9

How long, to the best
of your knowledge,
has your
establishment been
involved in a
relationship with
your main supplier?

10

How often do (or
did) you interact
with your main
supplier‟s
representative at
your establishment?

11

How often did your
main supplier‟s
representative
interact with you
over the phone?

Estimated Times per Month ____________

Estimated Times per Month ____________
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Appendix 2 (Continued)

13

What percent of your
interactions with
your main supplier‟s
sales representative
were dedicated to
resolving problems
or issues?

14

Briefly describe your
primary
responsibilities
within your
establishment.

15

I had enough
information to
complete this survey.

16

Approximately, how
many full time
employees work in
your establishment?

17

Approximately, how
many part time
employees work in
your establishment?

18

In which country has
most of the business
between your
organization and
your supplier taken
place?

% ____________

Yes: ________________
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No: __________________

Appendix 2 (Continued)

Email:

18

If you would like a
summary report of
this research projects
finding, please
complete the
following or attach a
business card.

Phone:

Address:
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Appendix 3: Survey Cover Letter
December 8, 2008
Dear Organizational Buyer,
My name is Brent Baker and I am a Ph.D. Candidate in the Marketing Department, at the
University of South Florida. I am currently collecting data for my dissertation. The
dissertation is the final yet most significant portion of the Marketing Ph.D. program. I
elected to study business to business relationships and how they change over time for my
dissertation topic. This dissertation is being conducted under the guidance of Dr. Rajiv P.
Dant of the University of Oklahoma and Dr. James R. Stock of the University of South
Florida. The working hypothesis of this dissertation is that as business relationships age
attitudes and behaviors within the relationship will also change.
Attached to this letter is a survey asking about your establishment and the relationship it
has with one of your key suppliers.
It is important to note that the attached survey is completely a University of South Florida
research project. IT IS NOT IN ANYWAY AFFILIATED OR OTHERWISE
ASSOCIATED WITH ANY COMMERCIAL SUPPLIER OR VENDOR. Your
participation in this survey is completely voluntary and your individual answers will
remain confidential. No names will ever be revealed to any vendor or supplier. The
authors of this survey have no reason to consult with any vendor or supplier about
the results of this study.
The attached survey should take approximately 20-25 minutes to complete. If there are
any questions or concerns regarding the survey and your participation please feel free to
contact me. My contact information is listed below. I thank you in advance for your
time and support in completing this significant research project.
Sincerely,

Brent L. Baker
Department of Marketing/College of Business
University of South Florida
4202 East Fowler Avenue, BSN 3403
Tampa, FL 33620-5500
813-974-6239
bbaker@coba.usf.edu
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